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ABSTRACT 
With the sedentarisation of North African migrants from the 1960s onwards, 
French society witnessed the emergence during the 1970s of a second 
generation of Maghrebian residents. Formerly, Maghrebians had engaged in 
relatively limited forms of political activity, notably in French trade union 
movements and associations linked to the country of origin. The election of 
over a hundred municipal councillors of Maghrebian descent in March 1989 
brought a new dimension to political activism among ethnic minorities in 
France. 
In seeking to chart the progress of these municipal councillors, fieldwork was 
conducted in the form of questionnaires and interviews, mainly in the Paris 
and Lyons conurbations. Drawing on this data and other sources, the activities 
of Maghrebian councillors are examined in the thesis at two levels: within the 
confines of municipal politics, and within the wider framework of national 
politics in France. 
In analysing the process by which Maghrebian councillors gained office, the 
following factors are considered: the main objectives to which those 
concerned subscribed at the time of their election; the manner in which their 
positions were negotiated on party lists; their prior associational and political 
experience. 
In assessing the councillors' period in office the following aspects are 
investigated: the objectives which councillors sought to pursue on taking up 
office; the responsibilities with which they have been entrusted; the obstacles 
they have faced while in office; their role as intermediaries between civil 
society and the local machinery of the state. 
At a national level, consideration is given to the role played both by pressure 
groups external to political parties and those internal to them. These include 
France-Plus, SOS-Racisme, the Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 
and the Confederation Nationale des Elus Originaires du Maghreb. The 
attitudes of Maghrebian councillors towards issues of national importance 
such as the place of Islam in French society and the Gulf War are also 
analysed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Objectives 
The election of more than a hundred municipal councillors of Maghrebian origin 
in March 1989 marked a new phase in the political participation of ethnic 
minorities in France. Maghrebians are the largest single group of immigrant 
origin in contemporary French society. As most first generation immigrants 
have remained foreign nationals, they have been unable to participate in electoral 
politics. Most of their children, however, enjoy French citizenship. With 
growing numbers of younger Maghrebians reaching adulthood during the 
1980s, they have become increasingly involved in the electoral process. A few 
gained seats on municipal and regional councils in 1983 and 1986, but it was not 
until 1989 that a significant number ran for office. 
In October 1989, I decided to undertake doctoral research on those who had 
been elected in March of that year. A number of researchers in France were 
embarking on similar work at about the same time, but none was in a position to 
undertake a comprehensive study of the field. Varying methodologies have been 
employed and diverse parts of the country have been studied. Abdelomoula 
(1991), Dazi-Heni and Polac (1990), Diop and Kastoryano (1991) and Poinsot 
(1991) have, for example, examined the associational dimension of Maghrebian 
political participation. Other researchers such as Geisser (1992) have attempted 
national studies on Maghrebian councillors based on quantitative data. However, 
knowledge of Maghrebian political activism remains fragmentary and no one 
has yet produced a comprehensive survey of the field. 
For reasons explained below, I decided to base my own research mainly on 
qualitative data. I set out to study not only the participation of Maghrebian 
councillors at a local level, but also their involvement in ethnic minority pressure 
groups at national level. In so doing I hoped to gain a more general 
understanding of Maghrehian political activism. 
In examining the political participation of municipal councillors of Maghrebian 
origin between March 1989 and December 1992, I set myself four primary 
objectives: to chart the socio-economic backgrounds of the councillors; to 
explore their motivations for becoming candidates; to analyse their achievements 
once in office; and to throw light on their attitudes towards national issues and 
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organisations affecting the Maghrebian population. 
With respect to the first objective, I sought to determine the nature of their 
involvement in political and organisational life prior to being elected. This 
involved analysis of their membership of and contact with political parties at 
local section level and with associations of both a local and national nature. 
Inherent in this was an attempt to establish how councillors had forged links 
with political parties and had come to be candidates on party lists. Had they put 
themselves forward as candidates? Or were they invited to do so either by local 
party heads, or by an intermediary? Were they members of a political party prior 
to becoming elected? If they had never been members of a political party and 
were thus affiliated councillors, why was this the case? Had they envisaged 
being a candidate on a different party list, or even a separate party list 
specifically aimed at Maghrebians? 
Secondly I wanted to explore the factors which had led the councillors to seek 
office. Had they been attracted to electoral office by tangible or more abstract 
goals? To what extent were such motivations primarily individual, or collective 
concerns? 
Concerning the achievements of councillors once in office, I was interested to 
know whether one could, for example, explain differences in the experiences of 
individuals according to their sex, socio-professional status, or age. In order to 
achieve this aim, I first of all had to acquire an understanding of the powers that 
councillors have at their disposal and the limits of these. This entailed an 
examination of municipal politics and of the decision making process. Equally, 
however, I required an insight into the responsibilities that councillors have been 
entrusted with. These differ in at least two respects: according to the committee 
to which they belong and; whether they are simply a municipal councillor, or 
occupy in addition the role of maire-adjoint. 
The nature of the relationship between councillors and the Maghrebian 
population at large was to be an integral feature of my research. In particular I 
was anxious to discover whether and also in what ways councillors acted as 
intermediaries between, on the one hand, the ethnic minority group from which 
they originate and, on the other hand, the institutions of French society of which 
they are members. Do Maghrebian councillors perceive themselves to be 
representing solely their ethnic group, or do they consider themselves to be in 
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office to serve the interests of all members of the municipality? Linked to this 
would be an examination of the period of office of councillors belonging to 
different Maghrebian sub-groups (differentiating for example between 
Maghrebians of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian origin, as well as between 
Arabs and Berbers and between harki families on the one hand and economic 
migrants on the other). What might this reveal about the relationships that exist 
between the various Maghrebian populations resident in France? 
Fourthly, determining the nature of the relationship between political parties and 
ethnic minorities was to be a further objective. Are Maghrebian councillors 
concentrated within particular parties and if so why? Have political parties 
enabled councillors of Maghrebian origin to carry out their functions like any 
other councillor, irrespective of race, religion, or nationality? Or have the former 
channelled Maghrebians into specific types of responsibility which are linked to 
the Maghrebian population in the municipality? Do Maghrebians have access to 
the same positions of responsibility as non-Maghrebians? Has there been a 
conscious attempt by political parties in France to place Maghrebians in limited 
positions of power and by so doing to 'neutralise' potential violence on the part 
of Maghrebian youths after the events of the early 1980s? 
1.2 Phasing of the research programme 
I began by undertaking a literature research of the field, looking not only at 
France, but also at longer established models of ethnic minority political 
participation in the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries. At 
the same time I sought to establish contact with institutions specialising in the 
area of race and politics in France (the Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique and the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris) and the United 
Kingdom (the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at the University of 
Warwick). In addition, national political party structures incorporating the 
concerns of Maghrebians in France were identified and initial contacts were 
made via attendance of a conference of the Federation Nationale des Elus 
Socialistes et Republicains (FNESR) in Paris in January 1990. Links with 
ethnic minority pressure groups in Britain and British postgraduate researchers 
interested in the field were established in June 1990 when presenting a paper at 
the annual conference of the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations. 
During the first year of research I was able to define the objectives and 
methodology of my study. This included the drafting of a questionnaire and the 
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question format for semi-directive interviews with councillors. The questionnaire 
and interview data were to form the core of my primary sources. 
From October 1990 to June 1991, I engaged in fieldwork in France. Having 
secured the post of English Language Assistant at the University of Nancy II, I 
used Nancy as my base for field trips to the greater Paris and Rhone-Alpes 
regions. In the course of these field trips, I interviewed 18 councillors of 
Maghrebian origin as well as the president of a Maghrebian national pressure 
group. In June 1992 I conducted interviews with five additional councillors and 
with three PS officials interested in Maghrebian affairs. This brought the total 
number of interviewees to 27, of whom 23 were Maghrebian councillors. 
Between autumn 1991 and autumn 1993, I processed my data and wrote up the 
results. 
1.3 Methodology 
In order to carry out research of this nature, a number of fundamental questions 
had to be asked beforehand. The first of these concerned the number of 
Maghrebian councillors elected in March 1989. Determining the precise figure 
was inherently problematic given that the Ministry of the Interior does not keep 
official figures on the ethnic origins of candidates. Furthermore even if a 
breakdown on ethnic grounds was available, there would still be the major task 
of ploughing through the lists of candidates in over 36,000 communes. 
Similarly, if one attempted to make up for the absence of official ethnically- 
based data by taking Maghrehian names as a possible starting point, this would 
at best provide only an approximate estimation. In certain cases it might, for 
example, be difficult to distinguish between the names of Maghrebians and 
French nationals of pied-noir origin. Other sources would therefore have to be 
consulted such as political party officials interested in the fate of Maghrebian 
candidates. Initial surveys carried out immediately after the municipal elections 
suggested that the PS had the largest percentage of councillors, followed by the 
PC, and that parties of the Right also contained a significant share. The figures 
were nevertheless at best patchy concerning the actual number of councillors. 
Georges Morin, then conseiller-delegue to Louis Mermaz at the Ministry of 
Agriculture and himself a pied-noir, had compiled a coded list of all councillors 
on PS lists originating from the Maghreb which included pied-noirs as well as 
Muslims both from harki and economic migrant backgrounds, but was not 
prepared to reveal either an exact figure, or the names of individuals listed. A 
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second potential source was the Maghrebian association which claimed to have 
'sponsored' many of the councillors, France-Plus. It initially quoted a figure of 
506 elected councillors (this figure has in fact changed several times over the 
following years), but was willing to identify only a handful of these. In these 
circumstances, the only practical way to proceed was by using a chain approach. 
Drawing on published sources, I identified known councillors of Maghrebian 
origin whom I subsequently interviewed, then asked them for details of other 
Maghrebian councillors in their municipality or departement. An additional 
source of information was provided by ethnic minority pressure groups, 
particularly France-Plus and the Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 
(CSCM). To this day the overall national figure has yet to be determined with 
exactitude by any of the researchers active in this field, but it seems probable that 
there are no more than a hundred or so Maghrebian councillors, of whom over 
eighty were elected on PS lists. 
Granted the difficulties inherent in undertaking an all-encompassing national 
survey of Maghrebian councillors and given the time restrictions within which I 
was working, I decided to select a number of departements within which I would 
attempt to obtain comprehensive data. In this way the study would be thorough 
at local level even if this was not possible nationally. A decision was therefore 
taken to focus initially upon a limited number of councillors using the cluster 
sample technique. This is a device by which sub-units are grouped together as a 
total unit. This was seen as a preferable method to quota sampling, where 
councillors would have been analysed according to criteria such as sex, age 
group, or socio- professional status. This is a somewhat artificial way of 
examining candidates and could result in one having to distort research methods 
in order to fulfil quota requirements. It would in any case have been impractical 
since I did not know the socio-professional characteristics of potential 
interviewees. 
A second question with which I had to deal concerned the total number of 
councillors whom I might realistically hope to interview, and the localities on 
which it might be appropriate to concentrate my efforts. As there appeared to be 
very few municipalities with more than one councillor of Maghrebian origin, 
their scattered distribution suggested that it would be unrealistic to conduct more 
than around 30 interviews within the time available for my fieldwork, particularly 
as I also wished to seek additional information by interviewing other party 
officials who had a personal interest in Maghrebian affairs. My hope was that 
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the latter would able to offer a more general overview both of the period in office 
of the councillors and of the development of Maghrebian political activism 
nationally. In targeting particular areas, I took into account factors such as 
regional concentrations of Maghrebian councillors, geographical promiximity to 
my base, political orientation and the responsiveness of potential interviewees to 
my initial approaches. 
The concentration of Maghrebian councillors within the greater Paris region, and 
especially in the departement of Seine-Saint-Denis, made this a natural target 
area. The large concentration of councillors in Marseilles made this a potential 
area of study also. However, given the large distance between Nancy and 
Marseilles, such an undertaking would have been very difficult to carry out. For 
this reason study of Maghrebian councillors in the south of France was not 
undertaken. Travel to the Paris region was easy from the east of France. 
Similarly there were direct train services to Rhone-Alpes, where Lyons and 
Grenoble were the furthest I could reasonably expect to travel with any real 
frequency. The political orientation of municipalities was a far from negligible 
factor and given the tendency of Maghrebian youths to vote for parties of the 
Left, the choice of municipalities would have to take account of this. In this 
respect it became apparent that the study of councillors in the departement of 
Seine-Saint-Denis would be particularly relevant. Finally, the degree to which 
councillors in a given municipality were willing to co-operate was important. 
Initial contacts in my target departements suggested that councillors there would 
be willing to discuss their experiences in detail. However, in Hauts-de-Seine a 
number of councillors were unreceptive to my initial approaches and it proved 
impossible to achieve comprehensive coverage within this departement. 
A third set of questions concerned the precise kinds of data which I would seek 
to collect and the manner in which I would do this. My sample would clearly be 
too small for it to be possible to focus primarily on quantitative data. In order to 
undertake a survey based on qualitative data, a three-pronged approach was 
adopted: closed questionnaires, semi-directive interviews, and such published 
sources as were available. 
Questionnaires would be distributed to councillors prior to the interview taking 
place. If properly planned and administered, the questionnaires presented the 
advantage of asking impersonal questions where there was little possibility of 
interviewer bias. The uniformity of the questions would facilitate comparisons 
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between councillors. It was my intention to have them fill in the questionnaire as 
a preliminary to the interview. In a few cases for operational reasons, this had to 
be varied slightly and the interviewees brought the questionnaires with them, 
already filled in. This was justified on the grounds that some councillors could 
not be contacted by telephone and therefore sending a questionnaire 
accompanied by an introductory letter would gain their confidence and 
encourage them to participate in interviews. While this worked satisfactorily in 
most cases, in a few cases there were difficulties. In PC-controlled 
municipalities, where correspondence is pre-selected before reaching the 
councillor, several letters did not reach the person concerned. A second 
drawback was that councillors invariably combine their period in office with a 
full-time occupation and are thus unable to visit the town hall on a regular basis. 
This meant that some letters had been unopened before further contact was 
attempted by telephone. 
Given these factors, I thought it would be preferable to establish initial contact 
by telephone. A detailed explanation of the reasons for undertaking the research 
was provided and the benefits of acquiring a wider knowledge of the field were 
impressed upon the councillors from the outset. Questionnaires were presented 
to the councillors in tabular form so that responses could he filled in without 
difficulty. This would also enable my analysis of the responses to be speeded up 
considerably. Care was taken to ensure that terminology was clearly defined, 
likely response categories incorporated into the questionnaire and questions 
succintly posed so that this reduced the likelihood of questions being interpreted 
in an ambiguous manner. In addition to questions on the background, 
motivations and achievements of councillors, a separate section was devoted to 
personal details on the councillor concerned. Since this involved sensitive 
information such as the date when French nationality had been obtained, I felt 
that it was important to point out, both in the questionnaire and to the councillor 
in person, that all information would be treated confidentially and would only be 
published with the prior consent of the interviewee. This ensured that councillors 
would be willing to provide personal data on themselves. 
Prior to engaging in discussion with councillors, a number of specialists with an 
interest in the field of race and politics were consulted in France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. These included individuals from the following 
institutions: the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, the Institut 
d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at the 
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University of Warwick, the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Ohio and Canisius College, New York. These contacts were undertaken partly to 
seek guidance when research was still in the early stages of hypothesis 
formulation and partly to establish goodwill with a view to future exchanges of 
information. 
During the year spent in France, I initially hoped to hold informal discussions 
with each councillor before conducting the formal interview. In the event, 
informal interviews were dispensed with, on the grounds that to undertake 
interviews of this nature would have required questioning all councillors on at 
least two occasions. This was not possible given time and geographical 
constraints, though for a minority of councillors contact had already been 
established via attendance at the January 1990 FNESR conference. Where the 
views expressed by councillors during my formal interviews with them needed 
follow up on and clarification, this was done either by telephone, or by letter. I 
also refrained from conducting focus group interviews where several councillors 
would be questioned at the same time. This method was unsuitable for my 
purposes in that first of all it could have resulted in a 'majority' view prevailing 
when in reality councillors might well hold divergent views. Secondly certain 
individuals would be likely to dominate discussions and this might have meant 
that some individuals were left out of matters altogether. 
Formal one-to-one interviews were preferred and the responses were recorded 
on tape with the prior consent of councillors. Interviews took place in one of 
three places: a cafe; a town hall office of the councillor concerned; at the 
councillor's home. Councillors were asked to choose their own preferred 
meeting place and this helped to create a relaxed atmosphere between interviewer 
and interviewee, greatly reducing any pre-existing apprehensions that the latter 
might have of being interviewed. No written notes were taken during the 
interview. Interviews were semi-directive and this method offered a number of 
advantages. First of all it enabled any ambiguities in the completion of the 
questionnaire to be resolved immediately. Secondly, where councillors found it 
necessary, formal interviews provided them with the opportunity to expand upon 
answers in the questionnaire where, due to closed questions, their own opinions 
might contain nuances that could not otherwise be detected. Thirdly the 
flexibility of the interview format enabled me to incorporate new, or emerging 
issues related to Maghrebians, but which went beyond the confines of the 
councillor's municipality. In particular, the beginning of hostilities and the 
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ending of the Gulf War were subjects that I was able to add to pre-existing 
stimuli. 
Once the majority of interviews had been completed towards the end of the year 
spent in France, a new strategy was adopted with respect to one of the 
Maghrebian pressure groups, the CSCM. During one weekend I attended in the 
role of an observer the annual national conference of the association. Witnessing 
the activities of the association, notably during discussions on the general plight 
of Maghrebians in France after the affaire du foulard and the Gulf War, enabled 
me to gain first-hand experience of the pressure group, and to obtain documents 
unavailable to non-members of the association. In effect I adopted a double role, 
that of a group member of the association, providing my own contributions to 
the subject, while at the same time posing questions in the capacity of researcher. 
Published material was used from a variety of sources, notably covering the 
following three countries: France; United Kingdom; United States of America. 
Material on Belgium and the Netherlands was also consulted. Given the plethora 
of data on and the longer history of ethnic minority political activism in the 
country, literature from the the United States especially concerning African- 
Americans and Hispanics proved invaluable in terms of providing possible 
theoretical models. These enabled me to identify more clearly the peculiarities of 
the French model and the unique characteristics of the Maghrebian population in 
France. The ongoing nature of Maghrebian political participation necessitated 
consulting French daily newspapers and weekly magazines. These provided up- 
to-date information on specific events and issues. However, they often contained 
inaccurate details and as such were treated with circumspection. Published 
autobiographical sources were occasionally used where available. The inside 
information which they contained made them esssential reading, but it was of 
course necessary to be aware of possible author bias. Finally conference reports, 
research reports and theses were consulted. 
1.4 Choice of sample 
Attendance at the FNESR conference in January 1990 revealed that a coded list 
of councillors on PS lists had been drawn up. However, it was not possible to 
acquire the list at the time due to PS reluctance to disclose information. Thus 
prior to beginning fieldwork in October 1991, in the absence of readily available 
official details, the acquisition of candidates names' was obtained via an informal 
network of contacts at grass roots level. It had become apparent at the 
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conference, through discussions with participants and available literature on their 
whereabouts, that a large number of the councillors had been elected in the Ile- 
de- France region, centred on Paris. Once initial contact had been established 
with councillors, early strategic surveys indicated that there was a particularly 
strong concentration of Maghrebian councillors in the departement of Seine- 
Saint-Denis. This reflected the demographic profile of Seine-Saint-Denis, which 
contains the heaviest concentrations of Algerians - the largest Maghrebian group 
in France - to be found in the petite or grande couronne. Census data showed 
that apart from the Ile-de-France, two other regions contained particularly heavy 
concentrations of Maghrebians: Rhone-Alpes and Provence-Alpes-Cote-d'Azur. 
Granted the time and financial constraints under which I was operating, 
Provence-Alpes-Cote-d'Azur was too far away from my base to be included in 
my sample. Instead, Rhone-Alpes was targeted as a more realistic alternative and 
within this region the two major conurbations were singled out: Lyons and its 
suburbs and Grenoble. Grenoble presented an additional advantage in that as 
opposed to the greater Paris region and Lyons, its concentrations of 
Maghrebians were far more modest. A similar point applies to Dijon, the only 
location in my sample situated outside Ile-de-France and Rhone-Alpes. In this 
respect a more accurate reflection of variations in the distribution of the 
Maghrebian population in France could be made, though it should be 
emphasised that any such comparisons are necessarily tentative in the absence of 
a comprehensive study of councillors elected in localities with large, medium and 
small concentrations of Maghrehians in the whole of France. 
After an initial number of interviews had been conducted in the Paris region by 
the end of January 1991, an additional list of councillors was procured from the 
study undertaken by Vincent Geisser at the Institut de Recherche et d'Etudes sur 
le Monde Arahe et du Maghreb (IREMAM). His study involved analysis of 
Maghrehian councillors in Lyons, Grenoble and Marseilles. Geisser had 
secured a complete list of councillors in all of these areas and information on the 
former two helped to supplement my own more fragmentary list. 
During June 1991, I was allowed sight of the unpublished coded PS list of 
councillors. The list contained few surprises, but I discovered that there was an 
additional number of councillors in the Paris region of whom I had previously 
been unaware. These councillors would therefore have to be interviewed when 
funding could be secured to engage in additional field work. This was achieved 
during June 1992 and in the same month the PS finally provided me with a 
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complete list of Maghrebian councillors elected on its lists throughout France. 
The 23 councillors finally included in my sample included all Maghrebians 
holding municipal council seats in six out of the seven departements in which 
my interviews were conducted. The largest concentration was in Seine-Saint- 
Denis, where I interviewed all 11 of the Maghrebian councillors elected in 1989. 
Even here, their seats were very scattered. Only one municipality, Ile-Saint- 
Denis, had two Maghrehian councillors. When all my interviews had been 
completed, Ile-Saint-Denis remained the only municipality in my sample having 
more than one Maghrebian councillor. Also within Ile-de-France, I interviewed 
two councillors in Essonne, one in Val-de-Marne and two in Hauts-de-Seine. 
This brought the total number of interviewees in Ile-de-France to 16. For 
reasons explained in section 1.5, Hauts-de-Seine was the only target 
departement in which I failed to secure interviews with certain Maghrebian 
councillors. There are in in this departement five Maghrebian councillors, three 
of whom refused to he interviewed. 
Outside the greater Paris region, my sample included all four Maghrebian 
councillors in the Rhone departement, centred on Lyons, both of the 
Maghrebian councillors in Isere, where the principal city is Grenoble, and the 
sole Maghrebian councillor in Cote-d'Or, who holds her seat in Dijon. It was 
possible to interview her without making a separate trip to Dijon because she 
spends a large amount of time in Paris. This brought to seven the total number 
of councillors holding seats outside Ile-de-France. 
1.5 Problems encountered 
The nature of the the subject studied and its almost constant evolution presented 
numerous obstacles to be overcome. It was often necessary to distance oneself 
from current events relating to Maghrebians in France in order to gain a wider 
perspective. This was particularly important when interviewing councillors after 
some incident had taken place and had made the headlines in the media. Equally, 
however, new events could not he ignored if they questioned the existence of 
Maghrebians in France in general. This was the case for the Gulf War and an 
additional chapter was incorporated into the thesis reflecting this development. 
Account had to be taken of external factors which might adversely affect the 
interviewees. This was most noticeable during and immediately after the Gulf 
War, particularly after the affuire de Rheims when a French youth of 
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Maghrebian origin was shot by a white French shopkeeper. During the fighting 
in the Gulf, councillors displayed a marked reluctance to talk, attributable no 
doubt in part to the widespread public anxiety about potential tensions which 
might surface between ethnic minorities and possible retributions from the white 
French population, but also perhaps reflecting internal divisions on the matter 
within the Maghrebian population. It was extremely difficult to contact 
councillors during the period of hostilities and for this reason relatively few 
interviews were conducted from January to the end of March 1991. In the 
immediate post-war period councillors were more willing to discuss issues, yet 
this was also a tense and emotional period for Maghrebians with a series of 
individual incidents between youths of Maghrebian origin and the police 
featuring heavily in the media. The sometimes virulent reactions of councillors 
cannot be divorced from this context. 
Throughout the interview stage divisions between Maghrebian sub-groups 
became apparent. If one was seen to favour a particular sub-group, then another 
might perceive one to he a potential adversary. In the case of Maghrebian 
pressure groups, dealing with members of France-Plus and the two groups 
internal to the PS, the Confederation Nationale des Elus Socialistes Originaires 
du Maghreb (CNESOM) and the CSCM, was a difficult balancing act since 
individuals would often criticise Maghrebians in the other group(s). It was 
important for me to adopt a neutral stance and not to express opinions on other 
councillors in my sample. 
An initial wariness on the part of councillors concerning my research had to be 
overcome, and this was sometimes difficult. This was particularly the case in the 
departement of Hauts-de-Seine, where, prior to my own interviews, researchers 
and media representatives had already questioned Maghrebian councillors at 
length. Despite my best endeavours, it proved impossible to secure the 
cooperation of three of the five councillors in this departement. Elsewhere, 
councillors were on the whole receptive to my requests. The fact that I was non- 
French was an advantage in that, apart from arousing their curiosity, this enabled 
interviewees to feel that they could criticise French society and institutions in 
front of me without embarrassment. Care had to be taken to ensure that contact 
with women councillors, particularly those who remained in the parental home, 
was made with sufficient reassurances about personal safety. This invariably 
meant acting via a male intermediary, usually another Maghrebian councillor, 
with whom they were familiar. Whenever possible interviewing at the home in 
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the presence of other family members was avoided. For one male councillor it 
was not possible to interview anywhere else and the nature of the questions 
posed proved to be acutely embarrassing for the councillor concerned. 
A far greater hindrance was the initial hostility of PS leaders concerned with the 
Maghrebian community. When research began in earnest at the beginning of 
1990 it was made quite clear to me that the names on a coded list of Maghrebian 
councillors elected on PS lists would not be provided and that the official 
association concerned with Maghrebian PS councillors, the CNESOM, would 
not be willing to assist me with my research despite repeated requests for help. 
This considerably slowed down the process of establishing contacts and it was 
only in the summer of 1992 that the complete list was finally released to me. 
1.6 Previous studies 
The political participation of Maghrebians in France is a relatively new 
phenomenon and it is only during the 1980s that youths of Maghrebian origin 
have successfully entered politics at municipal level in significant numbers. 
Consequently published material in this area has been sparse. Previously 
political participation among the parents of these youths, the so-called 'first 
generation' who migrated from the Maghreb, was of a limited nature, restricted to 
activism within fields such as the trade union movement during the 1970s. There 
were several reasons for this. As first-generation immigrants remained 
foreigners, they had no formal political rights. Secondly the first generation did 
not perceive its installation in French society as permanent and when it settled in 
various waves during the 1950s and 1960s, it was reluctant to become involved 
in French politics. Thirdly the first generation was still closely linked to the 
country of origin and if it was politically active, then it was primarily in 
organisations of the country of emigration. Finally there was the fear among the 
first generation that political activism in France would be frowned upon by the 
authorities in the country of origin, who might indeed call into question their 
right of residence. 
To the above factors must be added the tendency among French researchers to 
view the condition of Maghrebians in France as falling primarily within the 
discipline of sociology. This is justified by researchers in that Maghrebians are 
the main targets of discrimination within French society and have been faced by 
two divergent and often opposing cultures: the Western French one, external to 
the home, and the Muslim one within the place of residence. Maghrebians have 
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de facto been perceived as a 'problem' and this has resulted in numerous studies 
and counter-studies highlighting the difficulties that they face in such spheres as 
education, employment and housing. While these studies may have some merit, 
an over-emphasis on questions of this nature has neglected more salient issues 
concerned with youths attempting to overcome difficulties by playing an active 
part in French institutions. 
Given, then, the recent nature of Maghrebian political particpation and the stress 
on sociological perspectives, there has been a dearth of published studies on the 
political field. New theoretical approaches are required as long-standing 
researchers such as Leveau and Wihtol de Wenden (1988c, 109) have pointed 
out: 
Les commentaires sur les limtes des instruments d'analyse dont nous 
disposons aujourd'hui, pour etudier les comportements politiques d'un 
groupe culturel minoritaire clans 1'espace national, conduisent ä une 
interrogation sur la mise au point d'instruments nouveaux de r6flexion. 
A decision was thus made early on in my research to consider other longer 
standing models of ethnic minority political participation outside France. In so 
doing, it was not my objective to make a systematic comparison of other models 
with the French experience since such an undertaking would have required a 
separate study in its own right. Rather, other models would serve the purpose of 
providing theoretical frameworks upon which the French experience could be 
tested and a clearer view of the latter gauged. I decided to examine a variety of 
models, each of which enabled me to gain a clearer understanding of 
Maghrebian political participation in France. The following minorities were 
considered: Hispanics and African-Americans in the United States; Afro- 
Caribbeans and Asians in Great Britain. 
For the former two minorities there is an abundant literature on the political 
domain and this indicated a number of useful lines of inquiry with respect to 
Maghrebian political participation in France. Like Hispanics, Maghrebians are 
also composed of extremely heterogeneous and often opposing populations. 
Both groups were involved in successive post-war migrations to the 'host' 
nations, although Maghrebian immigration in its earliest forms pre-dates this. 
Among both groups there is the lack of a common agenda, or a single leader and 
this has negatively influenced political participation. However, a number of 
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significant differences exist also. Hispanics have met with a far greater degree of 
electoral success at both local and national level in terms of numbers and 
positions of seniority and responsibility, and have become involved in American 
politics at an earlier date (from the mid-1970s onwards) than has been the case 
for Maghrebians in France. There has been a greater degree of support between 
candidates and electorate among Hispanics in terms of increasing the number of 
politicians from the ethnic group and unlike Maghrebians in France, a national 
caucus has been in existence since 1977, creating the conditions for a national 
Hispanic leadership framework. Where appropriate in the thesis, I make 
reference to these issues, though solely with the aim of shedding more light on 
Maghrebian political participation. 
With regard to African-Americans, Maghrebians share the dubious privilege of 
being the principal targets of racism in their respective countries of residence. 
However, they differ in the reasons which led to their large-scale migration and 
subsequent discrimination. There is a legacy of enforced slavery for African- 
Americans contrasting with the legacy of the Algerian war and a combination of 
economic and political factors for Maghrebians. Some Maghrebian associations 
such as France-Plus have made a point of studying the African-American 
model in order to learn from its successes and failures, and have adopted some 
of tts tactics. At a national level Maghrebians have also followed the example of 
African-Americans by creating ethnic minority pressure groups, both inside and 
outside political parties. The Civic Rights campaigns of France-Plus have quite 
unashamedly taken a leaf out of the ones undertaken by African-Americans in 
the 1960s. However, one needs to be acutely aware that the manner in which 
ethnic minorities have integrated into American and French societies varies 
considerably. Whereas minorities in the United States have, in general, 
integrated on a collective basis and have asserted pre-migratory identities (hence 
the terms African-American, Irish-American, or Italian-American), the tradition 
of immigration into France has primarily been one of insertion on an individual 
basis (hence the tendency to Frenchify surnames and even first names in order 
to gain acceptance and the playing down of former national identities). In the 
case of Maghrebians, though, citizens resident in France have retained clearly 
identifiable names of non-European origin and, perhaps, following the example 
of African-Americans, some youths declare themselves to he Franco-Algerian, 
Franco-Maghrebian or Beur (though the latter term refers particularly to youths 
of Maghrebian origin in the Paris Region and is largely rejected by similar 
youths elsewhere). 
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Ethnic minority political participation in Britain, while a fairly recent 
phenomenon, has preceded that in France, and research in this area offers tools 
which may assist in understanding the French experience. Similar to African- 
Americans, Afro-Caribbeans are also victims of discrimination in a myriad of 
forms and, like Maghrebians, are generally perceived in negative terms by the 
dominant society. Political participation for Afro-Caribbeans pre-dates that of 
Maghrebians in France and may, perhaps, indicate likely future political 
developments for the latter in France. Local councillors and a number of mayors 
of Afro-Caribbean origin have been elected since the 1970s, and since 1987 
there have been three MPs of Afro-Caribbean origin. Afro-Caribbeans, like 
Maghrebians, vote overwhelmingly for parties of the Left and thus far the 
overwhelming majority of local councillors and all parliamentary representatives 
have been members of the Labour Party. Both minorities have also migrated for 
essentially economic reasons, though in the case of Maghrebians a significant 
minority left their home country to escape political repression. 
Asians, while also migrating to Britain as a result of 'pull' factors and including 
persons of diverse nationalities and religions which are often at odds with one 
another, present an additional point of comparison with Maghrebians. Many 
Asians of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin share the Muslim faith with 
Maghrebians. On both sides of the Channel the place of Islam in Western 
society has been called into question with the Salman Rushdie affair in Britain 
and the affaire du foulard in France. A small number of youths from both ethnic 
minorities have sought comfort from low socio-economic status and esteem in 
the dominant society by turning to Islam. Equally abortive attempts have been 
made to set up independent Islamic parties. At present three MPs in Parliament 
are of Asian origin. As with Maghrebians, Asians vote overwhelmingly for, or 
represent as candidates, one political party, the Labour Party. However, Asians 
are not concentrated to the same degree within the Labour Party as is the case 
for Afro-Caribbeans. This is, perhaps, indicative of a greater degree of success 
by Asians in adapting to the social conditions, although this differs considerably 
according to nationality (Bangladeshis faring worse than any other ethnic 
minority in Britain in terms of educational achievement for example). 
Furthermore the presence of a thriving Asian economic base is clearly visible 
whereas this is not the case for Afro-Caribbeans or Maghrebians to anywhere 
near the same extent. 
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The following literature review is divided up on a thematic rather than 
chronological basis and includes the works of American and British political 
scientists in addition to those in France, for reasons outlined above. Rather than 
attempting an exhaustive review of the literature, I shall concentrate on some of 
the most important works to have been published which are directly relevant to 
my own research. 
1.6.1 Theoretical Approaches 
I have examined a variety of hypotheses put forward by political scientists in the 
United States in relation to non-white (African-American plus Hispanic) political 
participation. The opposing 'isolation' and 'ethnic community/compensation' 
theories of Orum (1966) and Olsen (1970) have proven inconclusive in that they 
do not fully explain variations in the success of political participation. According 
to the first approach, the social isolation of African-Americans hinders the 
development of competence required for political participation, while the second 
argues that African-Americans are on average more politically active than whites 
of equivalent social status since activism is a major norm within the African- 
American population. The efforts of Danigelis (1977) have led to major 
developments in the field. By constructing a new hypothesis, which he labels the 
'political climate' theory, Danigelis has managed to incorporate elements of both 
the 'isolation' and 'ethnic community' models. Danigelis focuses on the ways in 
which non-white political activity may be affected positively or negatively by the 
following three factors: formal and informal white rules; white attitudes towards 
these rules; black attitudes towards these same rules. For my own research 
purposes this is particularly helpful. If the political climate theory is adapted to 
Maghrebian political participation in France, then it would imply that the success 
or failure of action would be dependent to a large extent upon the support of 
white allies. While my own findings confirm that white support is required if 
Maghrebian political activity is to develop successfully, we shall see that success 
may be limited. 
A major advance in the area of ethnic minority elite study has been provided by 
the work of Martiniello (1992). There are two distinctive features about his 
research. First of all Martiniello has sought to analyse elite theory from an 
ethnic minority leadership perspective. Taking on hoard the contributions made 
by Myrdal (1944) and Higham (1978), he has provided new insights into the 
emergence of ethnic minority elites and the leadership styles in terms of the 
strategies deployed and roles assumed. I found this approach invaluable in my 
25 
own analysis of Maghrebian pressure groups. The second concerns 
Martiniello's comprehensive review and analyses of previous research in the 
area, pinpointing the major shortcomings at present. What is particularly 
impressive here is the breadth of Martiniello's reflection. He argues that the 
American model is best suited to providing researchers with a more complete 
understanding of ethnic minority leadership in Europe. Besides traversing 
national boundaries, Martiniello also cuts across academic disciplines. He 
criticises the compartmentalisation of research on ethnic minorities into narrow 
and constricting disciplines, which has resulted in a lack of awareness of each 
other's studies. Instead he advocates a pluri-disciplinary approach where 
common ground concerning terminology and hypotheses can be found. I share 
a great many of these beliefs and have sought to explore further the American 
model in order to clarify Maghrebian political participation with respect to 
differences that may be apparent. 
1.6.2 Electoral Studies 
The electoral behaviour and attitudes of Maghrebians in France have been the 
focus of a number of studies during the late 1980s. Muxel (1988) has compared 
and contrasted the political attitudes of the Beurs (i. e. Maghrebian youths) with 
white French youths. Her findings reveal that the former identify closely with 
parties of the Left and in particular with the PS. No less than 83% of the 
Maghrebian youths interviewed situated themselves to the Left of the political 
spectrum, of which 51% identified with the PS and 20% with the PC. This 
compared with only 42% of French white youths who considered themselves to 
be allied to the Left. Clearly my own study would have to take into consideration 
such conclusions when examining the extent to which councillors in my sample 
belonged to, or stood on the lists of parties of the Left. Was there, for example, a 
particularly large number of Maghrebian councillors on PS lists? Muxel also 
clearly points to the pro-integrationist stance of many Maghrebian youths which 
is reflected in the desire among these youths to become involved in associational 
activity and the anti-racist struggle. The associational experience prior to gaining 
political office that candidates in my sample received was one of the features that 
I aimed to illuminate in my own study. 
Dahi and Leveau (1988), while reiterating the experience gained by Maghrebian 
youths in associational activity, added a new dimension to the field in France by 
examining the factor of ethnic minority concentration in certain areas and the 
effect that this can have upon electoral results, particularly at local level. They 
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identified three locations with particularly large concentrations of Maghrebians: 
Marseilles, Nord and Seine-Saint-Denis. The last of 3 was included in my field 
of study. 
In the United Kingdom, Anwar (1980,1986,1990) and Fitzgerald (1984,1987, 
1989) have made important contributions in their respective studies on the 
political attitudes of Afro-Caribbeans and Asians as well as on the attitudes of 
political parties towards these minorities. The analyses of Fitzgerald in particular 
concerning the treatment of ethnic groups by political parties, especially the 
Labour Party, were extremely useful in helping me to construct a framework for 
examining the attitude of the PS towards Maghrebians. 
1.6.3 Political mobilisation and participation 
Wihtol de Wenden (1988), in her study of the relationship between immigrants 
and politics in France, places the issue of political activism within a far wider 
historical perspective. The author enters into the thorny questions of political 
rights, nationality and citizenship. Discussion includes the following areas: a 
questioning of whether citizenship and nationality are in fact synonymous in 
France; distinctions made between political rights at local and national levels; a 
need to revise the traditional assimilationist concept of the Nation-State. Her 
reflections on these issues were particularly helpful in my study of the 
background to the electoral participation of Maghrebians and successive 
governments' policies towards immigration. Wihtol de Wenden concludes by 
arguing that the collective integration of youths of Maghrebian origin into 
French society (by, for example, the civic rights campaigns) implies a change to 
existing political power relations. 
The factors precipitating the entry of Franco-Maghrebians onto the political 
scene provide one aspect of a study by Jazouli (1986). The book was the first of 
its kind to examine in detail the transformation from defensive to counter- 
offensive action by youths of Maghrebian origin. As such it constitutes an 
important development in the literature on the political participation of 
Maghrebians in France even if it is from a sociological perspective. 
Geisser (1992), taking the election of Maghrebian municipal councillors in 1989 
as the starting point for his research, has focused attention upon those elected in 
Rhone-Alpes and Provence-Alpes-Cote-d'Azur. He has concluded that in terms 
of socio-professional status Maghrebian councillors are an elite and clearly 
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distinguishable from French youths of Maghrebian origin as a whole. This was 
an issue which I had already decided to examine, and Geisser's results provided 
interesting comparisons. Geisser argues also that councillors are unable to play 
the role of intermediaries between the local Maghrebian population and the 
municipal powers since they are not considered as 'legitimate' representatives by 
Maghrebians locally and in some cases are perceived to be tokenist symbols. I 
sought to gauge the views of municipal councillors in my own sample on 
whether they perceived themselves to be token candidates and whether they felt 
they had a role to play as intermediaries. Councillors were questioned also on 
the role of Maghrebian pressure groups as intermediaries. 
Vigil (1987) has made a valuable contribution to the study of Hispanic political 
participation in the United States. The developments that he assesses from the 
1970s onwards pre-date and mirror those in Maghrebian political activity 
beginning in the 1980s. Vigil starts by describing the change from protest to 
accommodation electoral politics among Hispanics. He stresses the positive 
development of the large-scale increase in voter registration which has resulted 
in a significant increase in the number of elected Hispanic officials at local and 
national levels and the importance of population concentration in influencing 
political activity. This was extremely helpful in interpreting the civic rights 
campaigns of France-Plus. Vigil points to a willingness among Hispanic 
candidates to support one another even when the other candidate in question 
may belong to a different national sub-group. For my own study of Maghrebian 
councillors, Vigil was useful both in highlighting national sub-group differences 
that emerged and in suggesting the extent to which such differences might 
impair the effectiveness of Maghrebian political activism. Furthermore he argues 
that the Hispanic politician is no longer dependent solely on the Hispanic 
population since s/he appeals to a wide cross-section of the American 
population. Nevertheless Vigil urges caution, for Hispanics have been unable to 
find a common agenda and this has adversely affected the influence they might 
exert nationally. He concludes by pointing out the limits of political action 
achieved and argues that what is required is a combination of electoral and non- 
electoral strategies. 
Fitzgerald (1984,1990) has charted the emergence of Afro-Caribbean and Asian 
councillors and MPs in the United Kingdom. She highlights the obstacles faced 
by black candidates and the limits to what they can achieve once in office. This 
greatly aided me in preparing the chapter on the period in office of Maghrebian 
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councillors. 
1.6.4 Pressure group and protest politics 
Walton (1972) in a pioneering study of the multi-faceted nature of Black politics 
has made a significant theoretical contribution to the understanding of ethnic 
minority pressure groups. With reference to the African-American model, 
Walton argues that the success of ethnic pressure groups is dependent on the 
positive or negative attitudes of the dominant society. This is the case no matter 
how charismatic ethnic leaders may be, witness the ineffectiveness of even Dr. 
Martin Luther King once white support had been withdrawn from the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). In this respect Walton's hypothesis 
is a precursor of Danigelis' political climate theory. The author examines the 
various tactics of ethnic pressure groups which include the following: lobbying; 
mass propaganda; electioneering and working inside political parties. The use of 
such techniques was not lost upon my analysis of the four nationally-based 
pressure groups considered in my study. In addition Walton identifies a number 
of inadequacies in ethnic pressure group activity, notably that of the National 
Association for the Advancement. of Colored People (NAACP) of which the 
following two predominate: the abstract nature of their goals contrasting with the 
economic interests of the ethnic minority masses; the failure of pressure groups 
to agree on collective objectives and strategies, which may he attributable to 
factionalism, or leadership personality differences. Walton's criticisms of 
pressure group divisions were particularly useful in helping to understand 
differences that exist between Maghrehian pressure groups internal to the PS. 
Shukra (1990) has examined ethnic minority pressure group activity in Britain. 
Her study of Black Sections in the Labour Party illustrates why it has taken so 
long for ethnic pressure groups to emerge and how they are extremely limited in 
what they can hope to achieve in terms of electoral and policy goals. The article 
served to identify a number of areas of investigation for Maghrebian pressure 
groups inside the PS for my own study. 
1.6.5 Political leadership 
Thus far there has been little academic analysis of Maghrebian political leaders. 
Negrouche (1992) has looked at the shortcomings of France-Plus but in so 
doing did not undertake any detailed examination of the association's 
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organisational framework, or internal divisions. While a somewhat larger body 
of literature exists on SOS-Racisme, this has consisted almost entirely of 
personal accounts by former members (Ddsir 1985, Dray 1987, Malik 1990) 
and as such should be treated with caution. A recent exception to this is the work 
of Slama (1993) who places the anti- racist campaign of the association at the 
heart of PS ideology in the 1980s. 
1.6.6 Coalition politics 
In the United States Marable (1985 and 1993) has explored African-American 
political activism from an essentially Marxist perspective. Of particular note is 
the section devoted to the 1984 presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson and the 
'Rainbow' coalition which cut across ethnic divisions. This work was helpful in 
illuminating potential future strategies for Maghrebian political participation and, 
given the change of government as a result of the 1993 legislative elections, 
assumes even greater significance with the divisions in Socialist ranks, notably 
among members of the Socialisme et Republique tendency. 
A most novel study of electoral coalitions, not from a black-white pressure 
group perspective but dealing with a coalition of Hispanics and African- 
Americans, is to be found in the book by Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1984). 
The study examines the development and transformation of political activism 
from the protest mode to one of electoral participation in ten Californian cities. 
The recent nature of the Hispanic entry into the political arena makes this 
especially relevant to Maghrebians in France. However, the analysis is flawed in 
its failure to put African-American-Hispanic coalitions into any sort of 
perspective and it completely ignores black-white coalitions, based on similar 
socio-economic status, thus leaving its theory of incorporation open to criticism. 
Nevertheless comparative studies of this kind are to be encouraged provided that 
a more convincing theoretical framework can be constructed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FACTORS PRECIPITATING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
2.1 Introduction 
The election of over one hundred representatives of the 'second' generation 
among the North African immigrant community during the 1989 municipal 
elections was indicative of a new direction in Franco-Maghrebian political 
participation in France. It represented a major landmark for at least two 
reasons. Firstly it broke with the relatively passive role of the parents of these 
youths, the 'first' generation who emigrated to France from their native North 
Africa, principally from Algeria and to a lesser extent Morocco and Tunisia. 
Traditionally the parents were discouraged by their respective national 
governments (and particularly by the Algerian government after the Franco- 
Algerian war) from becoming involved in politics abroad and in any case as 
foreigners they were not entitled to enjoy the same political rights as French 
nationals. Secondly the collective action of Maghrebian youths in some 
respects went against the former tradition of ethnic minorities integrating into 
French society on an individual basis. This therefore undermined the 
Republican and Jacobinist concept of priority being accorded to the 
individual. 
In attempting to chart the progress of the Maghrebian councillors from the 
1989 municipal elections onwards, I have first of all sought to trace the birth 
and development of political action among Franco-Maghrebians. In so doing, 
the future direction that such activities were to take should become clearer. It 
was in fact from the early to mid- 1970s onwards that French social scientists 
in particular and French society in general began to become aware of the 
visible existence of this 'new' generation. These youths were born 
overwhelmingly in France during the 1960s and their parents had decided for 
the most part to stay in France, however long they might continue to entertain 
the myth of return. 
2.2 The myth of return 
Essential to the development of collective political action was the simple 
realisation by youths of Maghrebian origin that they would remain 
permanently in France rather than settle in their parents' native country. This 
was reinforced by holidays spent in their parents' country of origin. The 
overriding image retained was a negative one. In comparison with life in 
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France, life in the North African countries was often perceived by the youths 
as inferior to that in France. It should be remembered that the majority of 
candidates who emigrated to France from the Maghreb originated from the 
least advanced rural areas. More significantly, though, the youths themselves 
were considered as semi-foreigners by the native population. This was 
especially the case for girls who were clearly distinguishable by virtue of their 
western clothes and behaviour. 
Given, then, that youths of immigrant origin were rejected by the indigenous 
populations of the Maghreb and that in addition governments there were 
reluctant to facilitate their insertion (for example through the setting up of 
special language classes in Arabic since the majority of youths spoke little, or 
no Arabic apart from their parents' dialect), they have increasingly come to the 
conclusion that their mother country is France and that the idea of return is a 
myth. 
2.3 Counter-offensive action 
This realisation created the framework upon which collective action was to 
develop. Its earliest expression was to be found in the networks created by 
Franco-Maghrebian youths following the decision during the presidency of 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing to attempt to expel certain categories of North 
African immigrants at the end of the 1970s. Action of a more visible and long- 
lasting form was to be continued by the Rock against Police movement. 
Inspired by a succession of racist crimes perpetrated against French youths of 
North African origin, it grouped together members of the 'second' generation 
and various left-wing movements in France. Through the medium of live rock 
concerts, Rock against Police sought to question racist murders and police 
repression of youths. 
Thus far collective action by youths was mainly of a defensive nature. A 
major change in policy adopted by Maghrebian youths became apparent prior 
to the 1981 Presidential elections. It was in April of that year that a group of 
Franco-Maghrebians decided to go on hunger strike to protest against 
continuing expulsions. Simultaneously a letter of appeal was sent out to the 
various presidential candidates. The tactic proved to be successful since one of 
these, the PS candidate and eventual winner, Francois Mitterrand, replied that 
upon coming to power he would put an end to the expulsions. This promise 
was indeed honoured. The importance of this decisive institutional victory 
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should not be underestimated for, apart from achieving their avowed aim, the 
youths were asserting that the 'second' generation did not only want to remain 
in France, but was in fact ready to participate in French society when given 
the chance and this was the final blow to the myth of return. 
2.4 The accession to power of the Socialists 
If this initial victory was an obvious spur to further collective action of a 
counter-offensive nature, then the Socialist government was to provide an 
additional impetus that would have an even greater impact. Upon being 
elected to office, the new government set about repealing the 1939 law 
concerning foreign associations. Henceforth associations could be created by 
Maghrebians and other foreign nationals in France without prior government 
authorisation. Aside from enabling a massive increase in the number of 
associations, it would also significantly permit those who participated within 
them to gain useful experience. That Maghrebian youths would be likely to 
participate was, perhaps, indicated by the violence that took place in 
conurbations with large Maghrebian concentrations in 1983, particularly in 
Lyons. Events such as these convinced youth leaders of the need to go beyond 
immediate defensive measures. 
2.5 The extreme Right 
A further factor was to be, ironically, the major political breakthrough made 
by the extreme Right in the 1983 municipal elections with the Front National. 
Immigration became the main issue during the 1983 elections and the 
discourse and practices of even the PS (considered by the Maghrebian 
population as their natural allies) became more hesitant and indeed 
ambiguous. With the above negative factor coming into play, the attention of 
the 'second' generation was now focused upon a clearly defined enemy. 
Lapeyronnie (1987) in his comparative study of African-Americans in the 
United States and French youths of North African origin in France alludes to 
the importance of the increase in intolerance displayed by segments of the 
white French population in stimulating collective action. 
If Lapeyronnie's analysis is accurate, then it would appear that the social 
integration of the 'second' generation was already well underway and that 
rather than the youths themselves, it was hostility towards them by part of the 
indigenous white working class which was at the root of the problem. Whites 
of relatively low socio-economic status live in closest proximity to the 
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Maghrebian population and also show the greatest tendency among the white 
French population to vote for the Front National. It should be stressed, 
however, that this is not the sole factor behind the dramatic increase in support 
for the extreme Right. 
2.6 The anti-racist marches of 1983-4 
It is partly as a response to the increasing wave of xenophobia (and in 
particular anti-Arab sentiment, aimed principally at Maghrebians, but de facto 
affecting the whole Maghrebian population) that the 1983 'March for Equality 
and against Racism' should he viewed. The march was initially conceived of 
by a Catholic priest, Christian Delorme, head of the CIMADE in Lyons, and 
inspired by European non-violence and African-American civil rights 
movements. The march from Marseilles to Paris was a form of action, new, 
not only to the 'second' generation, but also to social movements in France as 
a whole. The importance of the march can be gauged from the fact that it 
aimed at highlighting institutional and political blocking points marginalising 
the Maghrebian population, which was thus maintained in a position of 
inequality and injustice (immediately prior to the march there had been a spate 
of racist attacks against 'second' generation youths in Lyons). Those involved, 
then, were presenting a general demand for equality in such fields as 
education, employment, justice and various political and administrative 
powers. 
The immediate success of the march was obvious enough: the mobilisation of 
100,000 people in Paris in addition to those on the route there; the positive 
portrayal of Maghrehian youths in the media; the granting of some of their 
requests, such as a meeting with President Mitterrand. However, perhaps more 
important than these achievements was the recognition in the long-term of the 
need for collective action and the very desire to act. After the march had taken 
place, Franco-Maghrebian youth associations held meetings throughout the 
country. Although some meetings found difficulty in going beyond the initial 
phase of simple denunciations, there was at least now the implicit recognition 
that integration, whilst underway, would be problematic. Secondly if 
Maghrebian youths wished to overcome such obstacles, then they could not 
afford to abstain from political life as their parents had, on the whole, tended 
to do. 
Equally, though, Maghrebian youths now became aware to a much greater 
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degree that there remained hurdles for putting into practice their demands at 
local level. This was all the more frustrating for these youths given that the 
success of the march had considerably increased their hopes and expectations. 
That frustration arose was partly a consequence of bureaucratic constraints. 
Furthermore formulating concrete demands proved to be an additional 
stumbling block since the march had appealed to 'values' as opposed to a 
clearly designated plan of action. Thus there was a gap between what the 
march had facilitated at national level in terms of general ideas espoused by 
the government and the reality of restrictions encountered at local level. 
Paradoxically it was possible to persuade the most important person 
representing the state, the President himself, of the legitimacy of their 
demands, while failing at a local level to convince the most humble officials. 
2.7 Dispensing with traditional intermediaries 
By November 1984, following the far less successsful 'Convergence 84 for 
Equality' march, the Maghrebian youths did not appear to have made much 
progress. What options were open to them at this juncture? It was impossible 
to integrate fully into French society via the traditional channel of workers' 
movements and trade unions since these no longer served the same function as 
previously, nor did they enjoy the same degree of influence. Formerly Italian, 
Spanish, Polish and Belgian workers had assimilated into French society by 
means of such bodies. As Thibaud (Jazouli 1986,194-5) has stated: 
Des etrangers s'integraient d'abord non pas ä la France en g6neral, 
mais ä une France contre 1' autre. 
By this Jazouli meant that immigrants were previously able to assimilate by 
finding a central social conflict to which they could adhere via membership in 
a French social movement. This was illustrated by Spanish Republicans and 
Italian and German communists who took part in the Resistance during the 
Second World War. However, when the 'second' generation entered into the 
political arena, they were faced with a complete vacuum; there were no 
political, or social movements to which they could adhere. The traditional 
political ally of immigrants was the PC. During the 1960s Communist- 
controlled municipalities had welcomed successive waves of Maghrebian 
labour and family migration. However, an open-door policy had been pursued 
by the PC on the understanding that any such migratory flows were a 
temporary phenomenon and that workers would eventually return to their 
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country of origin. When tensions surfaced in municipalities between the 
established white working class and the newly arrived Maghrebians, as a 
result of the presence of the latter, the attitude of the PC leadership changed. 
Instead of its former conciliatory tone, the approach of the party leadership 
hardened. What was at stake for the PC was the defence of its traditional 
working-class support which, by virtue of the prolonged settlement of 
Maghrebians, was in competition with the latter for limited municipal 
resources. As far as Maghrebians themselves were concerned, there was an 
awarenes of the exclusion strategy deployed by the PC and a resulting 
reluctance to participate in, or offer support for the party structure. This posed 
a potentially serious threat to the local position of the PC and it in this light 
that one should view the opposition of the party to the right to vote for 
foreigners at municipal level. By the late 1970s a new generation of youths of 
Maghrebian origin had emerged. Unlike the. 'first' generation, the 'second' 
generation identified far less closely with the PC and youths tended to operate 
outside the party's orbit. Associational networks set up were of far greater 
significance in structuring Maghrebian youths and this was particularly the 
case after 1981 when an unprecedented development in associational activity 
was witnessed. Secondly, as Leveau (1989) has argued, the youths in question 
had, via an extensive stay in the French education system, developed social 
aspirations far removed from those of the PC and identified more with 
Palestinian youths than with the traditional forms of working class solidarity. 
In this respect, then, as Leveau has again pointed out, associations have 
replaced political parties and in particular the PC as social intermediaries 
between the immigrant and white French populations. 
What, then, of the potential alternative of allying with the various associations 
on the Left who were sympathetic to their cause? Judging by the relative 
failure of the 1984 march, youth leaders realised that they could not rely 
indefinitely upon the support of these organisations. Moreover, many youths 
considered that the organisations were not so much interested in the plight of 
Franco-Maghrebians as in promoting their own interests. Even the avowedly 
anti-racist association, SOS-Racisme (whose principal success was spreading 
the message of racial harmony and tolerance via the 'Touche pas a mon pote' 
slogan worn on badges), was not beyond criticism. Many youths refused to be 
identified with the cause of SOS-Racisme in that it was perceived to be largely 
an instrument of the PS. The fact that many of its hierarchy were not Franco- 
Maghrebians and that even its leader, Harlem Desir, was not of North African 
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origin, but rather of West Indian descent, furthered the alienation of the 
youths. It should not be forgotten either that SOS-Racisme encouraged links 
with Jewish organisations in France, whereas many youths from the 'second' 
generation identified themselves with the plight of Palestinians in Israel. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, SOS-Racisme's role in Franco-Maghrebian 
political participation has been somewhat marginal to date. 
2.8 Creating new intermediaries 
Arezki Dahmani, an Algerian-born university lecturer at Paris XII, had taken 
part in both the 1983 and 1984 marches, felt that no existing political party or 
association could respond to his desire for integration. He therefore 
participated in the setting up of another organisation, France-Plus (eventually 
becoming its leader) in the autumn of 1985 which would be targeted 
specifically at Maghrebians and at their participation in the political process. 
Dahmani was largely inspired by two factors: his disappointment and 
disillusionment with communism when visiting the eastern-bloc nations and 
his consequent endorsement of the advantages of western-style democracy; a 
close examination of the U. S. model for the integration of African-Americans 
where the overwhelming adherence of this ethnic group to the Democratic 
Party resulted in the latter largely ignoring the needs and demands of the 
African-American population since the Democrats were virtually guaranteed 
their vote. France-Plus would, according to Dahmani's experiences and 
research, be an organisation which aimed at creating a new channel of 
integration into French society. In explaining the reasoning behind the 
creation of France-Plus, which, contrary to SOS-Racisme, did not have the 
support of celebrities, or famous intellectuals, Dahmani quite categorically 
stated that: 
Nous [France-Plus] refusons de choisir une France contre une 
autre... La mise en place d'une vraie politique d'intdgration necessite un 
consensus. Elle doit eire ä 1'abri des changements de majorite, ä 
l'echelon national. Et ä l'abri des conflits inter-nationaux. 
(La Lettre de France-Plus: March 1989,1). 
According to this logic, Franco- Maghrehians could adhere to political parties 
on either side of the spectrum (the Front National excepted) and the Left could 
no longer count on their support. 
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By placing emphasis upon integration via political means, Dahmani was 
already at the forefront of a major departure from the stance of organisations 
such as SOS-Racisme (see section 4.6. for further details). 
While the objectives of France-Plus might at first sight find favour among the 
youths concerned, there were at least three obstacles to the willing 
participation of the 'second' generation that would have to be broken down. 
Perhaps most difficult of all would be persuading youths that participation 
within the French political apparatus was not a denial, or more to the point a 
betrayal of the parents' cultural heritage (again the fact that most Maghrebian 
youths are the children of Algerian parents is crucial here). In order to 
participate in elections in France, it is necessary to be a French national and to 
enrol on the electoral list. Until its amendment by the Balladur government in 
the summer of 1993, Article 44 of the Code de la Nationalite Francaise 
(CNF) provided that, with certain exceptions, any child horn on French soil 
automatically acquired French nationality on reaching the age of majority. 
These provisions applied, for example, to the children of Moroccan and 
Tunisians immigrants. The picture is more complicated where Algerians are 
concerned. Most of the children born to Algerian immigrants before 1963 lost 
French nationality when Algeria became independent in 1962, but under 
Article 23 of the CNF, they retained the right to reassume French nationality if 
they so wished. In addition, any child born to Algerian immigrants in France 
since 1963 was deemed to be French from birth. Algeria has always refused to 
recognise these claims, insisting that the children of Algerian immigrants are 
Algerian rather than French nationals. In practice, most youths of Algerian 
origin have been able to choose between French and Algerian identity papers. 
But as their parents generally sided with the cause of Algerian nationalism 
during the war of independence, there have often been strong emotional 
pressures against their taking up French citizenship. As electoral participation 
required precisely such a commitment, France-Plus faced an important 
emotional barrier in this respect. Secondly a marked degree of apathy among 
these youths, due in part to a lack of knowledge about the political process and 
the benefits that might accrue, had to be reversed. Finally as France-Plus 
proposed to cooperate with parties of all complexions apart from the extreme 
Right, it would have to convince youths that parties of the mainstream Right 
would be willing to take their needs and concerns into consideration. The 
previous actions during Giscard's presidency were not a very encouraging 
factor. 
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At the outset France-Plus claims that approximately 792,000 Franco- 
Maghrebians were on the electoral list in 1985. By 1989 this figure, according 
to the association, had almost doubled to 1.5 million. These figures should be 
treated with extreme caution since the Ministry of the Interior does not keep 
figures according to ethnic origin and France-Plus has not to our knowledge 
identified the precise source of them. However, even taking on board these 
figures, while the major campaign orchestrated by France-Plus of travelling 
throughout France to educate youths on the advantages of enrolling was 
instrumental in the substantial increase in numbers, it does not alone explain 
the large-scale turnaround from previous apathy. Further impetus was to be 
found in the actions of the Chirac government during the 1986-88 period. 
Uppermost in the minds of Maghrebian youths and in fact the entire 
Maghrebian and non-French populations was the government's proposed 
reform of the French Nationality Code. Whereas previously any person born 
on French territory, but of foreign parents, automatically acquired French 
nationality at the age of eighteen, the Chirac government was now proposing 
to modify this provision so that the children of immigrants would have in 
effect to 'earn' the right to acquire citizenship. This potential change was 
especially alarming to youths of North African origin since if it were to he 
adopted, then they might he refused French nationality, and thereby rendered 
liable to expulsion. From the viewpoint of political rights, however, the 
proposed actions of the Chirac government crystallised in the minds of the 
'second' generation the belief that if they did not participate fully in the 
political process, then there would be others quite willing and able to take 
decisions which could change their very status in terms of nationality and this 
could be to their detriment. 
The first opportunity that Maghrebian youths would have to express their 
political opinions on a large scale was to be during the 1988 Presidential 
election campaign. Research has indicated that youths of Maghrebian origin 
voted overwhelmingly for the PS candidate, Francois Mitterrand, and has even 
suggested they were a non-negligeable factor in his triumph (Dazi, Leveau 
1988). 
As far as being able to vote for candidates of Maghrebian origin was 
concerned, however, it was the municipal elections of 1989 which were more 
relevant. Although it was not the first time that Franco-Maghrebian youths 
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had put themselves forward as candidates (there were in fact several 
candidates in 1983, though a precise figure has yet to be arrived at), never 
before had such a large number expressed the desire to operate within the 
electoral process. Of an estimated 600 Franco-Maghrebian candidates put 
forward on various party lists, over one hundred were elected (see section 
4.5.2. for precise details on numbers). Given the actions of the Chirac 
government with regard to ethnic minorities and more specifically the 
proposed modification of the Nationality Code, the overwhelming majority of 
candidates elected belonged to parties of the Left, particularly the PS. 
Aside from the numerical importance of the 'second' generation's presence, the 
election of candidates was significant in that it saw the coming together of 
children whose parents had fought on opposing sides during the Algerian war 
of independence. The presence as candidates for electoral office of the sons 
and daughters of harkis indicated that they too had been the victims of 
discrimination and felt that they had to make their views felt. Figures vary 
wildly as to the exact number of elected councillors, but it would seem likely 
that the figure advanced by Catherine Wihtol de Wenden (1989,21) of 20, if a 
somewhat conservative estimate, is, perhaps, closer to the truth than the 60% 
of all elected Maghrebian councillors put forward by the weekly Le Point 
magazine (7 August 1989). 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE PROCESS OF BECOMING A CANDIDATE 
3.1 Introduction 
There has been much discussion of the nature of political elites and the extent 
to which such elites are self-perpetuating in the sense they are drawn mainly 
or exclusively from one or more particular segments of society. Municipal 
councillors of Maghrebian origin in France seem to represent a new segment 
of society that has gained access to the channels of power, however limited 
the power associated with these channels may in reality be. Do these 
councillors nevertheless constitute an elite and if so what kind of an elite are 
they? To answer this question, one must first of all say what we understand by 
the term 'elite'. Dahl (Parry 1969,31) defines the term in the following 
manner: 
The category of 'top persons' in any interest group or activity which 
affects politics. 
However, for an elite to have the ability to exert political influence, it is 
almost certainly necessary for it to constitute a coherent, united and self- 
conscious group. Meisel (Parry 1969,32) gives a more comprehensive 
definition when he refers to the three 'C's', namely cohesion, conspiration and 
consciousness. By cohesion we refer to those factors which unite municipal 
councillors. When using the term 'conspiration' we allude to agreement among 
councillors to carry out certain acts in unison (though unlike the dictionary 
definition, this does not necessarily refer to acts of an illegal nature). By 
consciousness we mean an awareness among councillors of the convictions 
and indeed actions of their counterparts elsewhere. For our present purposes, 
we shall take these to he our definitions. We shall first of all examine whether 
there is cohesion among our sample of municipal councillors and will seek to 
determine whether these councillors are distinguishable from all Maghrebians 
resident in France and from the French population as a whole in terms of 
gender, age and educational success. 
3.2 Motivations 
3.2.1 Objective factors 
In order for an elite to exercise its domination, the organisational and political 
skills of a homogeneous group are required. We need, then, to examine factors 
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which may lead to unity of purpose. We shall differentiate between, on the 
one hand factors of an objective nature and, on the other, those of a subjective 
nature. Let us take a closer look at the former. If the municipal councillors 
concerned do form a homogeneous group, then this is likely to be seen in their 
social characteristics. A recent study of municipal councillors in the 
communes of Cenon and Blanquefort in the Bordeaux region by Richard 
Balme (Mabileau 1989) provides an interesting comparison. Here it should be 
noted that all municipal councillors were questioned, irrespective of their 
ethnic origins. The study revealed that in terms of gender, councillors are 
predominantly men (43 men to 12 women). A similar feature characterised my 
sample of municipal councillors of Maghrebian origin, although the ratio was 
much smaller (15 men to 8 women). The Bordeaux study also indicates that in 
terms of age, the majority of municipal councillors are of 'mature years' (the 
average age being 49). For the sample of councillors of Maghrebian origin, 
however, the figure was considerably lower (the average age being 35). Some 
40% of the councillors of Maghrebian origin studied were found to be in the 
31-40 year age bracket, while another 35% were situated in the even younger 
21-30 classification. Thus three quarters of all councillors were aged forty or 
less. 
Analysis of the socio-professional origins of the municipal councillors in 
question and their levels of educational achievement should give us a greater 
insight into whether they actually constitute a homogeneous group. Taking the 
I. N. S. E. E. definition of socio-professional categories (Mabileau 1989,137), 
table 1.1 indicates the categories to which councillors in our sample belong. 
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Table 1.1 Socio-professional analysis of Maghrebian councillors and the 
population as a whole (%) 
Socio-professional Councillors National Working 
category * Population 
1. Managers and 39 9.7 
higher intellectual 
professions 
2. Intermediate 43 19 
professions 
3. Others 18 70.3 
4. Total 100 100 
* As defined by the revised (1982) scheme of the Institut National de la 
Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, Paris. 
The distinct characteristics of the councillors become apparent from analysis 
of table I. I. The data reveal that 39% (9) of Maghrebian councillors 
interviewed belong in the managerial and higher intellectual professions. By 
these we refer to such professions as engineers, teachers, journalists and 
business managers. This compared with only 9.7% of the total working 
population in this category. Another 43% (10) belong in the category of 
intermediate professions. These cover occupations as diverse as junior school 
teachers, nurses and technicians. This was the case for 19% of the total 
working population. The remaining 18% (4) are to be found in a category that 
I have termed 'others'. This encompasses a disparate group of councillors who 
are either retired, unemployed or are currently students in higher education. 
Further evidence of the particular characteristics of the councillors of 
Maghrebian origin can be gauged from my examination of the educational 
qualifications of councillors in my sample. Some 74% (17) of those 
councillors interviewed obtained the baccalaureat. This compares with 40% 
of all youths in France in 1989 irrespective of their origins. For French youths 
specifically of Maghrebian origin there are no detailed statistics on 
educational attainment. This is mainly attributable to the fact that statistics 
according to ethnic origin are not drawn up, but partly also to the logistical 
problems of counting youths who may in fact enjoy dual nationality (this is 
the case for many youths of Maghrebian origin, particularly those of Algerian 
descent) and who in theory could therefore be counted twice. However, using 
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the results of a study conducted into the educational success of these youths 
(Aissou 1987), it is possible to examine figures on the percentage of French 
youths of Maghrebian origin who complete the whole of the 'second cycle' of 
high school studies which terminates at baccalaureat level. The data from 
Aissou's study reveal that youths of Maghrebian origin tend to perform less 
well than French youths as a whole and markedly less than the councillors of 
Maghrebian origin in my sample. Whereas 60% of French youths as a whole 
completed studies up to and including the baccalaureat, this was the case for 
only 29.5% of youths of Maghrebian origin. Bearing in mind that only 40% of 
French youths actually passed the baccalaureat, it is not, then, unrealistic to 
assume that a similar proportion of youths of Maghrebian origin who took the 
baccalaureat in fact obtained the qualification. This would leave us with a 
figure of approximately 20% of French youths of Maghrebian origin passing 
the baccalaureat. Even taking into account margins of error, there is a striking 
contrast with the fact that among my sample of councillors, 92% had obtained 
the baccalaureat. Moreover, 44% (10) of Maghrebian councillors interviewed 
possess qualifications above those of baccalaureat standard (this being the 
equivalent of an 'A' level), which in terms of the British higher education 
system would approximate obtaining a degree level certificate and 13% (3) of 
Maghrebian councillors studied hold higher degrees (ma? trise or doctorat ). 
The councillors in question, then, clearly differ in terms of educational 
achievement from both the population as a whole and from other inhabitants 
of Maghrebian origin resident in France. 
Where unity of purpose among councillors is concerned, one indicator worth 
examining is whether they occupy posts in either the public or private sector. 
Balme found in his study of the Bordeaux region that there was a close 
correlation between the political allegiances of the councillors and their 
occupations. For example those councillors who were members of parties of 
the mainstream Right (UDF, RPR) tended to be employed in the private 
sector, whereas those on lists of parties of the Left worked predominantly in 
the public sector. 
Councillors share similar characteristics also in their national origins. Graph 
1.1 highlights the national origin of the councillors' parents. 
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Graph I. I. National origins of Maghrebian councillors (nationality of 
parents) 
9% 
9 
13% 
9°A 
KEY 
1= Algerian 
2= Algerian + French 
3= RONA (Rapatries d'Origine Nord-Africaine) 
4= Moroccan 
5= Tunisian 
2 
3 
84 
60% Cl 5 
The graph reveals that by far the most important nationality is Algerian, which 
accounts for no less than 60% (14) of the councillors' parents. Eight of these 
are concentrated within the single departement of Seine-Saint-Denis. A 
further 9% (2) of the councillors have parents of Algerian and French origin 
while 13% (3) are the descendents of harki parents. Thus 80% (18) of the 
councillors in our sample have at least one parent, and in most cases both, 
who are of Algerian origin. Identical proportions, 9% respectively (2 + 2) 
account for the remaining councillors, who are of Moroccan and Tunisian 
origin. 
These factors, while important, nonetheless do not indicate whether we can 
expect the political convictions of the councillors to be similar. In this 
connection, it is necessary to examine the process of political socialisation 
which all politicians have undergone. By this we mean the prior political 
and/or associational experience that councillors have gained before taking up 
office. Membership of an organisation is a vital factor in forming the political 
character of a municipal councillor. As a result of previous group membership 
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a councillor may both acquire and develop a willingness to become involved 
in council matters. For the Maghrebian councillors interviewed, membership 
of an organisation was an important staging post on the road to political 
investiture. Table 1.2 enables us to develop this analysis. 
Table 1.2. Circumstances of councillors' prior involvement in the council by 
type of organisational membership (%) 
Prior activities Councillors 
Associational 52 
Political parties 45 
Trade unions 9 
None 9 
The figures show that 52% (12) of the councillors acknowledged they had 
been members of associations prior to being elected. Often they had belonged 
to more than one association. Another 45% (10) belonged to political parties 
and 9% (2) had been members of trade unions, while 4.5% (1) had adhered to 
anti-racist organisations. Of the remainder, 9% (2) did not have any prior 
political experience. 
The first observation that one can make from the figures is that several 
municipal councillors are members of more than one organisation. This 
explains why the total percentages exceed 100. Secondly it should be noted 
that not only can training for political office be obtained via the traditional 
channel of political parties, but political parties themselves look favourably 
upon potential candidates who have gained an apprenticeship via associations, 
irrespective of whether they were previously involved in the party machinery. 
Membership of an organisation is important for at least four reasons. Firstly it 
is indicative of a keenness on the part of the individual to become involved in 
organisational life. Secondly it is evidence of the attachment of that individual 
to the local community (though in certain individual cases, experience has 
been acquired via national associations such as France-Plus or SOS-Racisme). 
Thirdly, as has been mentioned, time spent in an organisation serves as an 
apprenticeship within the community power structure. Finally and in 
individual cases crucially, it is the stage upon which prospective municipal 
councillors make contact for the first time with the already elected 
representatives of the local council. 
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From the examples highlighted thus far it should he clear that there is indeed 
cohesion, as defined earlier, among the municipal councillors of Maghrebian 
origin. Cohesion alone, though, is not in itself proof of unity of purpose. As 
Parry (Mabileau, Moyser, Parry, Quantin 1989,109) has concluded: 
... The link between social 
background and political behaviour is often 
feeble and. many other factors can intervene to strengthen or weaken 
cohesion. Social homogeneity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for elite integration. 
It is necessary therefore to examine the degree of consciousness and 
conspiration among the councillors. Consciousness and conspiration are 
important factors in that there is a close relationship between frequent contact 
among elites and shared values. Rosenau (Parry 1992,112) explains it thus: 
It seems reasonable to presume that the greater the interaction among 
diverse types of leaders, the more they will comprehend each other's 
attitudes and thus the readier they will be to join together in support of 
a particular policy. 
For those councillors of Maghrebian origin within the PS (the overwhelming 
majority of those intervewed, it should be remembered), the first experience of 
meeting other councillors from the same ethnic background was likely to be as 
members of the CNESOM. While the organisation itself is examined in detail 
in chapter 6, for the purposes of this chapter it is essential to understand that 
the councillors were divided up into committees. These were devoted to 
specific areas of interest pertaining to Maghrebians in France. These included 
the following: Islam, the armed forces, relationships with the police, culture 
and political participation. Meeting three times a year, councillors, by 
attending the meetings, became more aware not only of other Maghrebian 
councillors elsewhere and forged links with them, but also with the political 
convictions of the latter. In a minority of cases this actually became a source 
of conflict. Links between councillors were furthered during the Gulf War 
when participants at a CNESOM meeting voted to send a special delegation of 
councillors to the Maghreb immediately after the war had ended (see section 
6.5.1. ). Such actions have served not merely to cement existing links between 
councillors within the same departement, but have created a greater awareness 
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of the problems facing Maghrebian councillors throughout the country. 
CNESOM meetings have provided the forum in which councillors have been 
able to compare and contrast these problems. One maire-adjoint from the 
departement of Essonne, who regularly attends the CNESOM meetings, 
explained the gradual development of structured relationships between the 
councillors in the following terms: 
On a commence ä se connaitre. On a passe la premiere annCe ä cela, ä 
savoir qui fait quoi. La deuxieme annCe, je crois qu'on a commencd ä 
pdndtrer les dossiers [des differentes commissions] On a discutd ä 
froid. Parce que la premiere annee, c'etait vraiment une annee oü il 
fallait se positionner par rapport ä l'histoire de la France et du 
Maghreb. La deuxieme annde on a dit [qu']on veut une nouvelle 
politique, on veut de nouveaux rapports. Et le voyage [de la 
delegation] au Maghreb est en quelque sorte le couronnement. 
(Hanana: Chilly-Mazarin) 
3.2.2 Subjective factors 
Let us now turn our attention briefly to subjective factors. We shall first of all 
consider what factors motivate councillors into seeking office. Leaving aside 
ideological motivations, and focusing instead on personal objectives, it is 
possible to distinguish broadly between two types of politicians (Parry 1969, 
78). There are firstly those who, in seeking office, hope to satisfy a desire for 
prestige, power or adulation. These tend to come from relatively prosperous 
upper-class backgrounds and are commonly referred to as 'game' politicians. 
Secondly, however, there are those politicians who have been raised in a 
working-class background (typical in this respect of many immigrant families) 
and who in early life were deprived of many of the material comforts of life. 
In entering the political arena such politicians seek both wealth and venal 
rewards. These are commonly referred to as 'gain' politicians. The majority of 
municipal councillors with whom this study is concerned would tend to fit the 
latter model. Many of the parents originate from the poor rural areas of the 
Maghreb and are generally unskilled with low levels of education. 
This, though, is a somewhat general overview and we need to focus on the 
specific motives that Maghrebian councillors may have for seeking office. The 
picture here becomes far more complex with a variety of motives emerging 
from the interviews conducted. Some individuals are driven to enter politics 
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by what they perceive to be a mission. It is the identification with a clearly 
defined cause which often persuades these individuals to gain experience in 
politics early in life. This is the case for several municipal councillors in this 
study and appears to be the single most important factor at play. The 'mission' 
factor was expressed in a variety of ways by councillors. Some argued that 
their initial decision to enter politics was motivated by the need to provide a 
positive image of Maghrebians to French society as a whole: 
[Mon objectif] c'etait de montrer aux Francais et en particulier aux 
Dijonnais que nous en cant que Beurs pouvions etre comme les autres 
et s'integrer comme les autres. Et que 1'integration n'dtait pas forcement 
un probleme. 
(Hammadi-Denis: Dijon) 
Others placed particular emphasis upon becoming involved in politics in order 
to encourage French youths of Maghrebian origin to vote: 
Mes objectifs, c'etaient d'inciter les Beurs a voter, surtout ca parce que 
c'est vrai qu'ils ne votent pas. 
(Rahmouni: Vdnissieux) 
One maire-adjoint had been inspiredby the actions of civil rights activists in 
other parts of the world. This influenced his decision to seek office because, as 
a child, had identified with like-minded causes: 
J'ai ete eleve dans l'ere de Martin Luther King. Il m'a beaucoup 
marqu6. Notamment pour faire que les noirs am6ricains soient des 
citoyens amdricains... [... ] Peut-titre avec d'autres, surtout avec d'autres, 
j'ai essayd de traiter ce probleme. 
(Sahiri: Grenoble) 
For some councillors it was rather a specific event which crystallised in their 
minds the need for action on their part. The dramatic increase in support for 
the extreme Right during the 1980s is one case in point: 
La decision, je l'ai prise le lendemain de 1' election presidentielle [de 
1988]. Le Front national a fait 15 pourcent. Je me suis dit : Il faut que 
je rentre dans un parti politique et puisse avoir des responsabilites 
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politiques pour essayer de changer les choses. C'etait le Front national 
qui a dte pour moi le dttonateur. 
(Kedadouche: Aubervilliers) 
Others again cite the actions of the Chirac government between 1986-8, most 
notably the proposed reform of the Nationality Code, as the main contributing 
factor: 
C'est la periode de cohabitation qui m'a oblige ä sortir de 1'anonymat. 
J'ai commence ä militer en fac. 
(Hanana: Chilly-Mazarin) 
For a minority of the councillors interviewed, other incentives were suggested 
as motivating factors. One councillor from Isere was specifically interested in 
improving her awareness of how local politics operates: 
Moi, [... ] ca peut paraitre egoIste, ce qui me paraissait intdressant dans 
1'experience, c'6tait de voir comment au niveau communal 4a 
fonctionnait. 
(Chaib: Grenoble) 
3.3 Functions 
In this section we shall move away from factors motivating councillors into 
seeking office and instead will focus on the nature of our sample of 
councillors as an elite. Assuming that in any kind of society (or at the very 
least in most societies) there will be some form of hierarchy, an elite will tend 
to emerge which is distinct from the population as a whole. A distinction 
needs to be made, however, between the various types of elite. For the 
purposes of this chapter, it is necessary to distinguish between political elites, 
who are the focus of attention here, and socio-economic or military elites. 
Within the political elite there are differences between those who operate at 
national and local levels. Parry, when referring to national political elites, 
talks of two clearly distinct levels, one being the lower stratum (also referred 
to as the 'outer core' by other political scientists), the other being the upper 
stratum. By this he explains that there exists a bridge between an inner core of 
decision makers and the rest of society. The upper stratum are those elites who 
actively participate in major decisions. The lower stratum, on the other hand, 
act in effect as mediators between the inner core and the masses by 
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transmitting information in either direction and by explaining and/or justifying 
the reasoning behind the policies formulated by the inner core. While 
fundamental differences undoubtedly exist between the two levels, it is 
nevertheless possible for members of the lower stratum to gain access to the 
higher level by virtue of the experience they have acquired from below. 
How does this national model apply to municipal councillors in France? As 
the mayor makes most major policy decisions, s/he is clearly part of the upper 
stratum. However, as Mabileau (1989,29) indicates, the mayor is not the only 
player involved: 
In France [at municipal level], most such decisions are taken by 
individuals and not only just by the mayor (who generally keeps 
control of local finances), but also his deputies (adjoints). The latter 
are given delegated authority in specialised areas of local management 
such as town planning, welfare and culture. 
The status of the mayor is, in this respect, peculiar to France, particularly 
when one compares and contrasts it with the British model. Whereas in Britain 
the mayor is perceived more in terms of an honorary representative of the 
council, in France the mayor is a figure who wields considerable power, 
attributable to his/her prominent position within the local community. 
Furthermore s/he is expected to bring together a variety of divergent groups 
and interests which exist among the local population and are officially 
represented by the local councillors. The power in real terms of the mayor has 
been noted in the following manner by Dupuy (Meny, Wright 1992,82-3): 
Legally the Municipal Council makes decisions, but, in reality, it is the 
mayor who, in the name of the general interest, imposes his decisions. 
The mayor is perceived as independent of all the parties concerned; he 
is presented as the 'father' of the commune and is accorded great 
prestige and attributed exceptional qualities of wisdom and experience. 
The Municipal Council apathetically lends itself to ratifying the 
mayor's decisions, often by a generally unanimous show of hands. 
It should he apparent, then, that municipal councillors have relatively little 
influence over the decision making process and it is questionable whether they 
can be termed a political elite. At best they may belong to that category of 
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political elites known as the lower stratum or outer core. However, my own 
research has clearly demonstrated that the municipal councillors in the sample 
do belong to a socio-economic elite in terms of educational achievement and 
socio-professional levels, which clearly differentiates them from both the total 
French population and from the Maghrebian population in France. Despite 
obvious limitations in the political sphere, councillors are able to act as 
intermediaries between the mayor and the electorate in putting forward the 
views and grievances of the electorate which the mayor and his deputies may 
be unaware of. In so doing they are able to exert some degree of influence, 
albeit indirect, over future decisions that the mayor might take. 
3.4 Maghrebian councillors and elite theory 
Having noted that municipal councillors generally belong to the lower stratum 
of elites, we need to examine the extent to which their status fits in with elite 
theory. What for example is the relevance of the lower stratum to elites in 
general? Can elite theory adequately account for the evolution of the 
municipal councillors in question? If not, what alternative explanations exist? 
What possible conceptual deficiencies are inherent in elite theory? 
First of all what is the importance of the lower stratum? After all, have we not 
already demonstrated that it is the upper stratum that makes all the major 
decisions? Mosca (Parry 1969,33) argues that the lower stratum is essential in 
maintaining elite status: 
Below the highest stratum in the ruling class there is always another 
that is more numerous and comprises all the capacties for leadership in 
the country. Without such a class any sort of social organization would 
be impossible. 
Let us look more closely at the implications of Mosca's argument. Mosca puts 
forward the view that alone the upper stratum is numerically and politically 
incapable of performing the complete range of functions that are required of 
any leadership in a society. In order that such functions may he successfully 
carried out, the help of the lower stratum must be enlisted. The lower stratum 
will act as an intermediary in explaining and justifying the decisions of the 
upper stratum to the mass of the population. Secondly the lower stratum 
includes the prime candidates for recruitment to future positions of 
prominence within the upper stratum. Underpinning the whole argument is 
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Mosca's belief that the key to the stability of any political system lies more in 
the quality and continuing existence of the lower stratum than in that of the 
upper stratum. This is because the latter can always he replaced by suitable 
replacements from the lower stratum. If the lower stratum disappears, 
however, then not only is the potential for future leadership material lost, but 
society as a whole will lose its cohesion since there will no longer be any 
linkage between the elites and the masses. 
The implications for the municipal councillors with whom this study is 
concerned are profound. If the councillors are systematically prevented from 
reaching the upper stratum, then it is likely that they will become disenchanted 
with their status and, seeing no possibility of promotion, may decide to retire 
from the political arena altogether. 
A related aspect of elite theory is Michels' 'iron law of oligarchy', which is 
akin to the hypotheses put forward by Mosca and Parry. Michels interest in 
the pre-war Socialist parties in Europe provides the basis for pertinent 
comparisons with the majority of councillors under study, given their 
concentration on PS lists. 
Essential to an understanding of Michels research is his theory of the 'iron law 
of oligarchy'. Michels argues that in any organisation of any size, leadership is 
necessary to ensure its success and survival. However, one of the 
consequences is that, given the nature of the organisation, it becomes 
impossible to hold the leaders accountable to the party followers. This is true 
in spite of the fact that the leaders are supposed to be the agents of those who 
have elected them to office. Michels attributes the absence of checks to at 
least two sets of factors: those of an organisational and those of a 
psychological nature. The former are of greater importance since it is via 
organisation that more power can be acquired and this can be used to wield 
yet further power in terms of controlling the way the party operates. This may 
include the way in which the party is financed, the information that the party 
disseminates and crucially the selection of party candidates for electoral 
office. The last point is particularly relevant to the case of municipal 
councillors. For a party to acquire and maintain power, electoral success is 
clearly required. However, Michels recognises that party members alone are 
not sufficient to ensure this. Therefore the support of non-party members must 
be won. In order to achieve their support party policy will have to become 
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more moderate. A logical consequence of this is that in order to attract 
widespread support, 
the party must moderate its dogma, must provide continuity of 
leadership to give an assurance of stability, must devote itself to 
organizing its vote rather than maintaining the purity of its doctrine. 
(Parry 1969,43) 
If the party devotes its energies to ensuring that its support is sustained and 
indeed increased, then it should follow logically that retaining office will 
become the primary consideration . This specific goal 
is likely to he achieved 
by a 'watering down' of party doctrine according to Michels. If Michels's 
hypothesis is correct, then it may be difficult to maintain a proletarian 
leadership. Parry (1969,44) describes what happens as a result: 
Instead a 'proletarian elite' emerges which ceases to be proletarian in 
anything but origin as it exchanges manual for desk work and wages 
for salary. The leaders are 'bourgeoisified', strangers to their class, and 
the party hierarchy becomes an established career offering a rise in 
social status as well as income. 
Before we analyse the implications of Michels theory upon the plight of the 
Maghrebian municipal councillors, it is important to highlight one potential 
flaw in the model which may have direct implications for Maghrebian 
political participation. Mosca argues that it is by no means certain that 
minority interests are more likely to be attended to by an elite. The reverse 
may in fact be true with two potential outcomes. In the first, failure to take on 
board minority interests results in a combination of apathy and alienation from 
the political process. In the second scenario, the minority population may 
perceive the lack of attention it receives to be profoundly unjust and react by 
intervention inside or outside established channels. This could entail potential 
outbursts of violence as were witnessed in France during the mid-1980s. 
Against this criticism Michels argues that the ruling class maintains itself by 
adjusting its policies to meet the demands of the new social forces and 
incorporates the leadership of those forces into at least the lower stratum of 
the elite. For the purposes of our study this would mean the PS taking into 
consideration the needs and wishes of the Maghrebian population along with 
those of other ethnic groups present in France. This brings us to a question to 
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a question of great importance. Has the PS taken on board the municipal 
councillors of Maghrebian origin for purely electoral reasons, seeking to 
increase its support, or has it acted out of a genuine desire to improve the lot 
of Maghrebians in France? If it is the latter, then it should be possible for 
councillors to make the transition from the lower to upper strata and therefore 
be potential future candidates for mayoral and parliamentary office. The next 
section of this chapter will seek to answer this very fundamental question. 
3.5 Recruitment of Maghrebian councillors 
We need to examine why the PS has sought to attract candidates of 
Maghrebian origin for municipal office and the manner in which it has gone 
about the process. The previous municipal elections of 1983 had been 
something of a disappointment for the party in electoral terms and party 
leaders were keen to increase their support, both in terms of attracting new 
members to party ranks and improving the party's standing with the public at 
large. One potential area of attracting support was among the Maghrebian 
population. In the early years of Socialist rule, the party had witnessed 
outbreaks of unrest, notably in 1981 and 1983, when youths of Maghrebian 
origin were prominent along with other youths in expressing their anger and 
frustration with conditions in the suburbs of major French cities, notably 
Lyons. The PS had also been present to witness the more positive channelling 
of energy into events such as the 'Marche pour 1'egalite et contre le racisme' 
and had in fact been instrumental in setting up the anti-racist movement SOS- 
Racisme. The PS was, then, acutely aware of the desire among youths of 
Maghrebian origin for action and of the obstacles that remained when it came 
to taking effective action at municipal level. If carefully harnessed, then this 
energy could be used to the party's electoral advantage. The desire for action 
was reinforced by the creation in 1986 of France-Plus and the subsequent 
campaigns to enrol 'Beurs' on the electoral lists (see sections 4.2 and 4.5 for 
the creation and electoral participation of France-Plus). 
It was as a response to all these factors that the PS sent out a national directive 
at the beginning of 1989 calling upon local party sections, particularly where 
the Maghrebian population was significant numerically, to encourage suitable 
candidates of North African origin to put themselves forward as potential 
candidates. When interviewed, various councillors made specific reference to 
this directive. In response to the question of how the PS had reacted to his 
being proposed as a candidate, one municipal councillor from the departement 
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of Seine-St-Denis made the following comments: 
Cela r6pondait ä la demande de Mauroy. Au dtbut des elections 
municipales, Mauroy avail dit que sur chaque liste, il fallait qu'il y ait 
un Beur. 
(Kedadouche: Aubervilliers) 
This view was confirmed by another municipal councillor and reflected the 
opinions of all councillors interviewed: 
.... Un des objectifs pendant le mandat de Francois 
Mitterrand, c'6tait de 
retrouver des Beurs sur des listes. Et notre section s'est dit: ce serait 
bien de respecter 4a. Et c'est a ce moment-lä qu'on m'a dit: ce serait 
bien que tu participes.. 
(Hammadi-Denis: Dijon) 
Certainly the large number of municipal councillors of Maghrebian origin on 
PS lists suggests that their candidacies were not a mere coincidence. This view 
is confirmed by Georges Morin, President of the CNESOM, which brings 
together various municipal councillors originating from the Maghreb, and who 
was instrumental in the setting up of France-Plus: 
On va dire les choses franchement. Evidemment l'evenement 
[1'e1ection de nombreux conseillers municipaux issus de l'immigration 
maghrebine lors des elections de mars 1989] n'aurait pas pu se 
produire tout seul. Les elus francais autochtones, si je peux dire dire, 
avaient des reticcnces. 
(Morin: Paris) 
Morin adds: 
Il a fallu quand meme pousser le mouvement. Et de la meme fagon les 
jeunes Maghrdbins, meme ceux d'entre eux qui dtaient membres ou 
proches du PS, n'osaient pas encore. Parce qu'ils etaient encore un peu 
frais, un peu fragiles dans les structures du PS. 
(Morin: Paris) 
Morin explains further that with the agreement of Pierre Mauroy, the decision 
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was taken to encourage Maghrebians to stand as candidates: 
J'ai dit: "Ecoutez. 11 est tres important que le P. S. donne enfin un signe 
qu'il prend en consideration les Maghrdbins de France. Plus il y en a 
sur les listes, plus j'en serai satisfait. Mais il ne faut pas que ce soil 
artificiel. " 
(Morin: Paris) 
Further evidence of a directive from the national leadership was provided by a 
long-standing PS activist, Sultana Cheurfa. While not a municipal councillor, 
is of Algerian descent and as President of the Cercle des Socialistes de 
Culture Musulmane she has been closely involved with municipal councillors 
of Maghrebian origin: 
Oui le PS a passe un circulaire ä 1'epoque en 89 disant qu'il devrait y 
avoir un e1u [candidat] d'origine maghrebine sur les listes. 
(Cheurfa: Paris) 
In answer to the question of who actually sent out the circular, Cheurfa 
replied: 
C'etait un circulaire national. Doric c'est Mauroy au bureau ex6cutif. 
(Cheurfa: Paris) 
3.5.1 Selection process 
This being the case, the question needs to he asked of how candidates were 
selected. What kind of selection process was in operation and upon what 
criteria were candidates chosen? As we have already seen from observing the 
social characteristics of the councillors, they are on the whole relatively young 
and their organisational experience is somewhat limited, often restricted to 
that of membership of cultural or sporting associations rather than political 
parties. 
Georges Morin, President of the CNESOM, upon gaining the support of Pierre 
Mauroy, was personally entrusted with the responsibility of contacting 
prospective candidates. He explains the type of criteria employed when he 
telephoned and wrote to the various town halls prior to March 1989 in order to 
identify future candidates as follows: 
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... Si vous avez sur votre commune des Maghrdbins qui sont 
enseignants, medecins, animateurs sociaux, sportifs, qui ont vraiment 
de Fallure et qui ont du caractere, vous les prenez. (Morin: Paris) 
Furthermore after the 1989 municipal elections had taken place, Morin sought 
councillors of various denominations, but who all were of Maghrebian origin. 
Of the total of almost 3(X), over a hundred were of Muslim origin : 
J'ai dcrit, j'ai telephone ä toutes les mairies du P. S. en leur disant : 
Signalez-nous tous les gens qui sont du Maghreb, qu'ils soient 
chrCtiens, juifs ou musulmans. Nous avons rCussi ä trouver prts de 300 
dlus socialistes originaires du Maghreb et ä peu pros 200 d'origine 
europcenno juive, une centaine d'origine maghr6bine-musulmane. 
(Morin: Paris) 
It was on the basis of this data that Morin compiled a list of municipal 
councillors throughout the whole of France originating from the Maghreb, 
divided up into the various departements. Analysis of the selection process 
enables the comments of Morin to be tested, as is shown in table 1.3. 
Table 1.3. Selection process of councillors to municipal office (%) 
Manner in which approached Councillors 
Put themselves forward 35 
Contacted via intermediary 13 
Invited by local party 48 
Made up party list 4 
Asked how they had become candidates on party lists, 35% (8) of my sample 
said they had put themselves forward, 13% (3) had been proposed by 
intermediaries (either local associations, or national organisations such as 
France-Plus) and 4% (1) claimed to have made up the party list themselves. 
The latter category refers to one maire-adjoint in the depurtement of Seine- 
Saint-Denis who, as First Secretary of the PS, was personally responsible for 
drawing up the joint PC-PS list. However, the largest proportion, 48% (11), 
said they had been invited by the local party section. Of these six were below 
the age of 30 and another three below the age of 50. The figures appear to 
58 
support the above comments of councillors and PS officials that a national 
directive was indeed sent out to recruit 'Beurs' onto their lists and that young 
candidates were sought in particular. Among those councillors who were 
invited to stand as candidates, one was directly approached by the mayor: 
[Le maire] est venu me voir ä la sortie d'un match de basket (... ) Il m'a 
dit : Malika, il faut qu'on se voie. Done il m'a expliqud qu'il voulait me 
faire figurer sur la liste pour quelque chose puisque j'etais femme, 
parce que j'etais gic roise, parce que j'etais impliquLle dans la vie 
associative - et parce que je suis Beur. 
(Chaib: Grenoble) 
The above testimony is mirrored by that of other councillors, though not 
necessarily all were approached by the mayor in person. Significantly it tends 
to be the youngest and therefore least experienced of councillors who were 
selected in this manner. The question nonetheless remains as to how the local 
party section obtained the names of potential candidates for not all the 
councillors in my sample were necessarily party members. Over a third (8) of 
the councillors who filled in my questionnaire indicated that they did not 
belong to a political party. Of the remainder who did (15), all but two were 
members of the PS (one was a member each of the PC and one belonged to 
the RPR). One of the PS party members was also a member of Genration 
Ecologie and unsuccessfully sought election on one of the latter's party lists 
during the 1993 regional elections. One councillor in a suburb of Lyons 
explains her particular situation: 
C'est vrai qu'on connaissait mon nom au PS parce qu'au moment des 
dIections [prdsidentielles] de 88 j'avais soutenu Mitterrand (... ) Au 
moment des Elections, ils avaient sorti des tracts avec des noms de 
gens qui avaient apporte leur soutien. J'avais donne mon nom (... ) et 
puis ils 1'avaient sorti publiquement. Et c'est comme ca qu'ils avaient 
retcnu aussi un peu mon nom. 
(Rahmouni: Venissieux) 
Of the sample of councillors who put themselves forward as candidates not 
one was to be found in the 21-30 age bracket. Instead these councillors tend to 
be almost exclusively party members who have enjoyed several years of 
experience within the local party section and who saw their candidacy as a 
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natural and logical progression. In answer to the question of how she was 
elected, one rnaire-adjointe made the following remarks: 
Ben en militante. Parce que je suis au PS, j'ai adhdr6 il ya sept ans. 
Avant les elections [municipales] je me suis prdsentde sur la 
circonscription de Drancy pour etre ddputde supplCante. C'dtait dans 
fordre des choses comme ra. Bien sür il a fallu qu'on consulte 
1'ensemble des camarades. 
(Cocozza: Drancy) 
3.5.2 Typology of Maghrebian councillors 
In brief, then, it may be possible to distinguish between two types of 
councillor in respect of the selection process. On the one hand are younger 
candidates, below the age of 30, who are not necessarily party members and 
who have relatively recent experience, either in a political party, or more 
likely in an association. This type of candidate has been persuaded to enter 
local politics. On the other hand, there are candidates above the age of 30, the 
majority being in the 31-40 age bracket, who have gained considerable 
experience within the party as fully committed activists and who perceive 
their candidacy as being the logical next step. Only a tiny minority have been 
encouraged by intermediary sources to seek office. 
3.6 The promotion of councillors from the outer core to the inner core 
Now that we have ascertained how the selection process takes place, we have 
to determine what possibilities exist of promotion from the lower to upper 
strata. One circumstance in which Maghrehians may he promoted to the upper 
stratum may arise if they put themselves forward as candidates for mayoral 
office. If successful, Maghrebians would be able directly to influence the 
decision-making process. In addition the post could he used as a possible 
springboard for election to parliamentary office. However, since the next 
municipal elections after those in 1989 are not scheduled until 1995, this 
avenue has not so far been open to them. Other indicators nonetheless exist 
and prominent among these is the extent to which Maghrebians have been put 
forward by the main political parties as parliamentary candidates. The most 
recent opportunity of this kind was during the 1993 legislative elections, when 
in fact none of the mainstream parties fielded any Maghrehian candidates. 
Only the two principal ecologist parties, Generation Ecologie and Les Verts, 
put forward candidates of Maghrebian origin (including one councillor in my 
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sample who is presently a municipal councillor on a PS list). None of these 
was elected. 
The fate of Larbi Georges Sali, who attempted to run as a PS parliamentary 
candidate in 1988, is perhaps significant. Sall is a now maire-adjoint in St. 
Denis in the departement of Seine-Saint-Denis, which has the largest number 
of Maghrebians and particularly Algerians in Ile-de-France. Sall, who had 
undergone a theoretical grounding in politics at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques 
in Paris, was a long time activist in the PS local section, and appeared to be 
well positioned and qualified for seeking higher office, particularly in Saint- 
Denis, where he had born and brought up. He certainly believed he was well 
placed to stand for the office of depute and put himself forward. In order to 
conceal his origins from the electorate, he decided to invert his forenames. He 
was duly selected at the Assemblee Generale of the local PS section, but was 
opposed by Henri Weber, who was invited to stand by Laurent Fabius. Weber 
successfully demanded a second vote and the previous result was reversed. 
Sall alleges that the normal selection procedure was not respected and that it 
was as a direct result of this that Weber finally became the official PS 
candidate for parliamentary office. Weber was overwhelmingly defeated by 
the PC candidate. While it is by no means certain that Sali himself would have 
fared much better against the Communist adversary, the crucial point here is 
that if the above testimony is accurate, then he was forcibly denied the 
opportunity to do so. 
3.7 Conclusion 
While it cannot be assumed that the circumstances of the Sali case referred to 
above reflect the plight of Maghrebian councillors in general, some underlying 
principles which are general to the political participation of Maghrebians in 
France do nevertheless apply and merit further analysis. In the final section of 
this chapter we shall highlight potential obstacles and the implications of these 
for future political activism on the part of Maghrebians. 
The problems experienced by Sali in the selection process illustrate the 
difficulties that ethnic minority councillors may face in organising support for 
their nominations to positions of responsibility. As Fitzgerald (1984) has 
observed with respect to Afro-Caribbean and Asian councillors in the United 
Kingdom, the nomination of an ethnic minority councillor is dependent to a 
large extent upon white support since whites are in the majority in local party 
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sections. With respect to the French situation, there are few instances where, 
for example, Maghrebian members of a political party will constitute the 
majority. However, as Fitzgerald is at pains to stress, even if such a majority 
existed, there is no guarantee that members from the same ethnic minority 
group would vote for an ethnic minority councillor. 
It should not be assumed that the unsuccessful nomination of ethnic minority 
councillors can be explained solely in terms of racial factors. There may in 
fact be a number of non-racial factors equally at play. In the case of 
Maghrebian councillors, this might include the political convictions of an 
individual which are at variance with those of the local party section. This is 
particularly the case for any individual on a PS list who either does not belong 
to the same 'tendency' as the one which prevails in the local party section, or 
who is sufficiently independently-minded that s/he refuses to adhere strictly to 
official party policy. Indeed if an ethnic minority councillor was selected 
purely as a tokenist measure, then this may pose additional problems where 
that councillor holds divergent ideological opinions from other local party 
members. 
Nevertheless racial factors cannot be totally excluded from the analysis. In the 
case of the PS, which was the party in office nationally for over a decade, the 
choice of individual candidates have been influenced by external factors. The 
behaviour of any party in office is governed to a certain extent by public 
opinion and its reaction to events. From the mid-1980s onwards the PS, for 
reasons already explained, was forced into defensive mode. Therefore in a 
political climate which was clearly unreceptive to ethnic minority groups and 
especially to Maghrebians, account would certainly have to be taken of racial 
factors by the PS national leadership. This in turn would have a hearing upon 
the weight accorded to the placing of ethnic minority party members in high- 
profile positions of responsibility. Fitzgerald argues that this is one of the 
major obstacles to ethnic minority political participation. In what she terms 
'vicarious racism', the ethnic minority candidate is not selected by the political 
party on the grounds that the electorate at large would not tolerate his or her 
candidacy. This serves as an excuse for inaction on the part of the party 
concerning matters of racial equality. However, as Fitzgerald (1984,113) 
rightly points out: 
Those who take this attitude claim and may very well believe that they 
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do not share this general prejudice. They fail to recognise that it would 
make no practical difference if they did. 
Why, then, should it be important for people of ethnic minority origin to hold 
positions of responsibility in the upper stratum? Fitzgerald identifies at least 
four factors. First of all it would, according to her analysis, make the white 
policy makers of the upper stratum more sensitive to the needs of the ethnic 
minority population. Secondly it would enable ethnic minority councillors to 
play an active role in formulating policy. This is seen as preferable to the 
traditional situation which prevails where ethnic minorities remain passive 
agents who have decisions taken for them by white policy makers. Thirdly the 
tenure of positions of responsibility by, in my sample, Maghrebian 
councillors would provide a positive role-model for youths of Maghrebian 
origin. This may be particularly important in urban areas with high rates of 
unemployment where youths see no hope of future employment and may be 
attracted to the rapid acquisition of material wealth as flaunted by drug dealers 
for example. The latter, along with sportsmen, perhaps, often provide the only 
role-models to which many Maghrebian youths can hope to aspire. Finally by 
creating the conditions in which members of an ethnic minority can gain 
access to positions of responsibility, it would demonstrate the extent to which 
political parties are genuine in their commitment to equality of opportunity. 
The above guidelines require further discussion. The first dilemma faced by 
political parties who are willing to take on board the above considerations is 
whether they should implement a quota system. In the case of the PS the 
principle of quotas is already accepted for the political participation of 
women, though one must remember that women constitute the majority rather 
than the minority in French society. To accept such a system for Maghrebians, 
even if the percentages were much reduced, would leave any party open to the 
criticism of that it was disproportionately favouring one minority on the sole 
basis of race and this to the detriment of the population as a whole. This might 
create resentment and hostility on the part of the white French population 
since there would undoubtedly be the perception by some that Maghrebians, 
who were not necessarily deserving of electoral office, would be given 
political opportunities. at the expense of suitably qualified white candidates. 
There would need, then, to be careful consideration of the candidates chosen 
under any such system. The other side of the coin, however, is that under the 
present situation perfectly apt candidates from ethnic minorities may 
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themselves be prevented from being elected to office through no fault of their 
own. 
Secondly, and leaving aside for one moment the reasons for which ethnic 
minority councillors may be elected, even if they do rise to positions of 
prominence due to their own merits, there still remains the thorny issue of the 
extent to which they can be expected to represent their own ethnic group. 
While a more detailed discussion of this issue is to be found in section 5.5, 
for the purposes of this chapter it is important to stress that the selection of a 
candidate from an ethnic minority may have serious repercussions on the 
policies formulated by political parties with regard to that minority. If, for 
example, a Maghrebian councillor is perceived by the political party to be a 
representative of the Maghrebian population as a whole, he that at municipal 
or national level, then such a perception might adversely affect the treatment 
of Maghrebians. Fitzgerald (1984,110) explains why with reference to Afro- 
Caribbeans and Asians in the United Kingdom: 
... It 
is all too likely that the parties will take the easy option of treating 
the opinion of 'leading' black people in their own ranks as 
representative of the views of black people at large. Aside from the 
objections of 'tokenism', the real danger is that the idiosyncratic 
opinions of a small group of necessarily atypical black people may 
shape party policies on racial equality in ways which will fail to meet 
the real needs or wishes of the majority. 
In practical terms what can be done by political parties to ensure that 
Maghrebian councillors have the same opportunity as any other local 
politician to enter the upper stratum? An obvious measure to implement is 
systematically charting the number of Maghrebians within political parties and 
crucially those in positions of responsibility. Thus far only Georges Morin in 
the PS has sought to list municipal councillors originating from the Maghreb 
(which includes non-Muslims) and even he has yet to provide a list of 
Maghrebians in positions of responsibility within the party. It is only by a 
close internal examination of the methods employed for recruitment that 
political parties will be able to make an informed decision on whether a policy 
of positive discrimination should he advocated. There should therefore he an 
internal review which takes account of the recruitment and selection 
procedures for candidates. The progress that ethnic minority councillors make 
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will similarly need to be monitored. Any comprehensive review will equally 
require the party structure to be re-examined (Fitzgerald 1984). These remain 
the idealistic goals that political parties must pursue if their sincerity regarding 
the provision of equality of opportunity for ethnic minorities in the political 
sphere is to be fully credible. However, these considerations along with others 
will have to be measured against electoral considerations and in particular 
adverse public reaction, bearing in mind that the views of party members and 
those of party supporters are not necessarily one and the same. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NATIONALLY-BASED ORGANISATIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
In their dealings with the formal institutions of French political life, most 
councillors of Maghrebian origin have been involved more or less directly with a 
variety of pressure groups, some of which have sought to act as intermediaries 
on their behalf. While there are numerous local associations, whose influence is 
inevitably limited to particular localities, at the national level there are two well 
known organisations which claim to speak for young people of immigrant 
origin. These are France-Plus and SOS-Racisme. The present chapter will focus 
primarily on France-Plus. There are two main reasons for this. Unlike SOS- 
Racisme, which is concerned with all ethnic minorities, France-Plus devotes its 
efforts almost exclusively to Maghrebians. In addition, France-Plus has 
prioritised the electoral process, whereas SOS-Racisme has seldom been 
concerned with the promotion of local or national candidates. As my own 
research is centred on Maghrebians involved in electoral politics, I will not 
attempt an exhaustive analysis of the two organisations, but will instead use 
comparisons where appropriate to identify more clearly the strategies deployed 
by France-Plus. 
We shall begin by briefly outlining the origins of the two organisations and will 
seek to identify what links exist between them and mainstream political parties. 
During its early days France-Plus was closely identified with the PS, but we 
shall see that it has increasingly distanced itself from traditional political 
cleavages. This accomplished, I shall go on to highlight both the organisational 
structures of the associations and their objectives. The actions of France-Plus 
will be studied in the following two domains: civic rights campaigning and the 
'sponsoring' of Maghrebian youths for the 1989 municipal elections. 
The ideological differences that exist between France-Plus and SOS-Racisme 
will be considered with respect to the following issues: political strategies; the 
right to vote of immigrants; links with Jewish youth organisations and the 
Palestinian question. We shall then consider the views of the councillors in our 
sample towards the two associations and their role in the relationship between 
elites and the grass roots. Internal divisions within the associations, which have 
resulted in a rapid turnover of personnel, will be considered in a final section. 
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Before entering into an in-depth examination of associational activity at national 
level, it is important to recognise that associations claiming to promote the 
interests of Maghrebian youths exist also at local level. These include the 
Association Nouvelle Gendration Immigrde (ANGI), the Mouvement des Beurs 
Civiques (MBC) and Generation Beur, which operates in the departement of 
Seine-Saint-Denis. This latter organisation is presided over by Nordine Che rif, a 
graduate of the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Paris and a former PS activist 
whose bid for a place as councillor in the St. Denis municipality proved 
unsuccessful. In 1989, the association put forward no less than thirty proposals 
to the government of Michel Rocard, of which twenty-five were concerned with 
national issues and five with matters of international importance. By far the most 
controversial of these was the first, demanding that a French national of 
Maghrebian origin be appointed to a special ministry concerned with the 
integration of citizens of immigrant origin. 
4.2 Origins and development 
4.2.1 France-Plus 
Although the best known figure in France-Plus is now its President, Arezki 
Dahmani, the organisation owes its origins primarily to Georges Morin. Of 
pied-noir origin, Morin is a member of the comite directeur of the PS and a 
long-time activist in affairs concerning the Maghrebian population in France. 
When I interviewed Morin in June 1992, he emphasised the support which he 
had received from the upper echelons of the PS during the preparatory stages. 
Morin recalled sending a letter to Jean-Louis Bianco in 1985, not yet a minister 
but in regular contact with ministers in positions of power under the premiership 
of Laurent Fabius, in which he stated his desire for the PS to become more 
engaged with youths of Maghrebian origin. Subsequently, he met with party 
leaders, including Lionel Jospin, to discuss the matter and as a result of the 
latter's interest, a working party was set up to examine the issue in greater depth. 
Expanding on the objectives which he had in mind, Morin stated: 
L'une des choses qui fait le drame des Maghrebins A 1'heure actuelle 
dans les annees 80-90, c'est qu'ils sont la seule communaute francaise 
d'origine etrangZre qui n'a pas investi le champ politique. Toutes les 
autres minoritds, qu'elles soient protestantes, juives, armeniennes, pied- 
noir, ont investi le champ politique [... ] Moi, j'ai dit A mes amis beurs : 
"Si vous voulez que les hommes politiques cessent de vous insulter et de 
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jouer la corde du racisme pour avoir des votes ä droite ou a 1'extreme 
droite, le seul moyen, c'est que vous pesiez sur le plan electoral. C'est-A- 
dire qu'il vous faut vous inscrire sur les listes Clectorales et vous devrez 
aller voter. " 
(Morin, Paris) 
Asked how it was that Arezki Dahmani, then an assistant lecturer at Villetaneuse, 
had become president, Morin said: 
[Dahmani] e tait lä parce que la premiere reunion que nous avons tenue 
pour constituer cette association s'est tenue chez une amie algerienne 
[Dalila Chevalier] qui est 1'epouse d'un professeur de Villetaneuse. Il 
s'appelle Jean-Marie Chevalier et il m'a dit : "Tiens, j'ai un assistant qui 
s'appelle Arezki Dahmani". Donc il est venu et quelques mois aprCs il 
etait president. 
(Morin, Paris) 
This account is largely confirmed by that of Mohamed Meb Toul, another 
member of the comite directeur of the PS (the only member of Maghrebian 
origin, in fact) as well as a former producer of the "Mosaique" television 
programme. According to Meb Toul, the initiative for France-Plus had indeed 
originally come from Morin, with the backing of senior PS officials. It was at a 
meeting with other members of the working party, notably Dalila Chevalier, the 
Algerian wife of an economics lecturer at the University of Villetaneuse and 
Nacer Kettane, a Maghrehian writer and journalist, that Dahmani entered the 
picture: 
Its [le couple Chevalier] font propose comme president. Dalila parce que 
c'etait 1'&tudiant de son marl. 11 [Dahmani] est un peu jeune, mCdiatique 
[... ] et derriere lui c'est Dalila et Morin. Mais, Bisons, on le tient. C'est lui 
le prrsidcnt, mais nous, nous tenons les renes. 
(Meb Toul, Paris) 
The influence of the PS was plain to see at the official launch of France-Plus in 
the autumn of 1985, as Le Monde reported: 
D'autres personnalites proches du pouvoir dont M. Georges Morin, chef 
de cabinet de M. Louis Mermaz, president de 1'Assemblele nationale, 
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encouragent, avec des moyens plus modestes [que ceux de SOS- 
Racisme], la constitution de "France-Plus", une association regroupant 
enfants d'immigres et de harkis, sous la bannic're des droits civiques. 
(Le Monde, 1 November 1985) 
The magazine IM'media, which specialised in matters relating to young 
Maghrebians in France, took a jaundiced view of these links with PS officials, 
particularly those with pied-noir origins: 
[France-Plus] est decri6 de partout pour ses attaches avec Georges 
Morin, directeur du cabinet Mermaz ä 1'Assemblde nationale et president 
de 1'Office nationale des rapatries, et Dalila Chevalier, qui travaille au 
secretariat d'Etat aux rapatries. (IM'media magazine 1986,14) 
Despite France-Plus having been in large part the creation of Georges Morin, 
Dahmani, from the movement's early beginnings, had his own ideas as to how it 
should develop and took full advantage of the opportunity with which he was 
presented, directing the association in a way that was not anticipated by its 
initiators. Dahmani, born in Kabylia in 1952, became involved in Algerian 
politics while a student, setting up an autonomous student movement. After 
being imprisoned for this, however, he believed that he had reached an impasse 
in Algeria and would be better served by leaving the country. He settled in Paris 
in 1974 to undertake a Ph. D. in economics. A short stay in Eastern Europe 
convinced him of the benefits of western-style democracy and that his future lay 
in France. He participated in the 1983 and 1984 Beur marches, but believed that 
no effective association existed to take up the demands of youths of Maghrebian 
origin. Meb Toul claims that during the first France-Plus press conference, 
Dahmani, when questioned by a journalist as to his political orientations, clearly 
distanced himself from bi-partisan politics: "Un journaliste lui a dit : `Est-ce que 
vous ne roulez pas pour le PS? "' To this, Dahmani was reported to have replied: 
"Je ne roule pour personne". (Meb Toul, Paris) 
The reluctance of Dahmani to deal solely with one political party can be 
attributed in part to his analysis of the American model which has been the 
inspiration for many of his deeply-held convictions concerning France-Plus. 
Dahmani explains his logic as follows: 
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Aux Etats-Unis, noun aeons constatd que les Noirs ont fait une grosse 
erreur. Its ont choisi un camp et assimile la defense de leurs droits ä la 
victoire des democrates. Du coup, ils ont permis ä toute cette partie de 
1'Amdrique qui s'est toujours sentie republicaine de les rejeter en toute 
bonne conscience. 
(Jeune Afrique 15 March 1989) 
Meb Toul believes that Dahmani has displayed a considerable degree of 
shrewdness in his dealings with the originators of the movement by avoiding 
their manipulation. Once there was a change of government in 1986, the most 
prominent founder members withdrew their support from the association: 
Mais il s'avere qu'Arezki Dahmani est beaucoup plus malin que Georges 
Morin. Il s'est sauve avec cette association [... ] Arezki s'est sauve avec 
France-Plus, ce qui fait que tour les fondateurs de cette association sont 
partis. Dalila, Georges Morin, Nacer Kettane. Cest eux les fondateurs de 
1'association. 
(Meb Toul, Paris) 
Having taken over the presidency, though, Dahmani had to face the reality of 
financing the association. This was complicated by virtue of the opposition to 
the movement from certain members of and sympathisers with the PS. However, 
the main opposition originated from the parallel movement which had been set 
up, SOS-Racisme. Georges Morin explains why: 
La premiere raison, c'est qu'il y avait un autre mouvement qui dtait lance 
parallelement qui etait SOS-Racisme. Manifestement ils avaient etd plus 
soutenus que nous, pour des raisons de fond d'ailleurs. SOS-Racisme 
disait qu'il ne fallait surtout pas crMr des groupes sur une base ethnique 
ou culturelle. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Morin claims to have been told directly by Julien Dray and Harlem D6sir, the 
co-founders of SOS-Racisme, that the existence of a new movement would 
detract from their own support. With hindsight this appears to have been an 
exaggerated fear (and one which Morin denied at the time) given that so few 
youths of Maghrebian origin were involved in SOS-Racisme. Indeed Morin 
cites this as one of the main reasons for creating France-Plus. 
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Dahmani seems to demonstrate an awareness of difficulties encountrered when 
making the following comments: 
Nous sommes confrontds ä des gens de gauche, de droite et du centre 
qui continuent ä nous ignorer, nous manipuler, ä ne pas tenir leurs 
promesses. 
(France-Plus n. d. a, 27) 
Perhaps it was in part a realisation of the hard realities of political life that 
persuaded Dahmani of the need to pursue a pragmatic approach to fund-raising, 
remaining receptive to parties across the political spectrum who showed an 
interest in his movement. The following comments are revealing in this respect: 
Aux partis politiques de seduire, de convaincre et d'agir. A nous de 
choisir celui qui comprend le mieux nos preoccupations et defend 
l'intdret general de la societe dans laquelle nous vivons. 
(France-Plus n. d. a, 27) 
With the change in government in 1986, Dahmani had the opportunity to put the 
receptiveness of the mainstream Right to the test. Even Georges Morin is now 
willing to acknowledge that the new government in office at the time was more 
disposed to provide financial aid to the movement than the previous Socialist 
one: 
Done en 86 la majorit6 change en France et Arezki Dahmani qui est un 
garcon intelligent et habile a pris contact aver le nouveau gouvernement 
francais. Et lä par contre il a rencontrel des oreilles attentives. Notamment 
de Philippe Seguin et de Claude Maluret. Its ont eu une aide du 
gouvernement de droite qu'ils n'avaient pas eu d'un gouvernement de 
gauche. 
(Morin, Paris) 
This is something which Morin, although defending Dahmani's position, found 
particularly difficult to accept as a Socialist: 
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Cela me donnait mal au venire de voir que c'est un gouvernement 
conservateur qui donnait de 1'argent ä un mouvement que nous avons 
crM avec des jeunes issus du Parti socialiste. 
(Morin, Paris) 
In 1988 the government again changed hands and a Socialist Prime Minister 
returned to Matignon. Morin claims that subsequently the new Prime Minister, 
Michel Rocard, and members of his 'current' attempted to wield influence over 
France-Plus and this was to be the start of various tendencies within the PS 
developing similar tactics (see section 6.4 for details of the activities of various 
PS 'currents' with regard to Maghrebian pressure groups). According to Morin's 
testimony, he warned members of the Rocard tendency against such action in the 
following terms: 
Moi, j'avais dit ä l'dpoquc aux amis rocardiens, mdfiez-vous parce que si 
vous mettez la main dessus, cela va paraitre comme un mouvement beur 
rocardien et dejä les problemes de l'integration sont compliques [... ] 
Surtout chaque clan du Parti socialiste va titre tente de creer son propre 
mouvement et cela n'a pas rate. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Morin goes on to explain what he meant by the last sentence. In his opinion the 
result of not heeding the above advice was that he then witnessed the break-up of 
the 'Beur' movement into the following separate sub-groups: 
Alors il ya eu les amis de Jospin qui ont case Club Emergence, les amis 
de Jean-Pierre Chevenement qui ont crtse le Cercle des Socialistes de 
Culture Musulmane. Et tout cela apres que Laurent Fabius a Bien mis les 
mains sur SOS-Racisme. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Morin believed that such factionalism merely complicated matters further and 
deflected attention away from what he perceived to be the more important 
concerns of Maghrebians (see section 6.2.2 for further details). 
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4.2.2 SOS-Racisme 
During and after the 1983 Marche des Beurs and the 1984 Convergence march, 
it had become apparent that the 'Beur' movement was fragmented and unable to 
provide a single mouthpiece to air its views. Moreover this was the case not only 
for Beur youth associations, but equally for groups claiming to represent the 
plight of ethnic minorities in general. It was against this background that SOS- 
Racisme had its origins. 
The association was initially the brainchild of Julien Dray. Of pied-noir origin, 
Dray was born in Oran in 1955, but was brought up in the Seine-Saint-Denis 
municipality of Noisy-Le-Sec. He studied economics at the University of 
Villetaneuse, and subsequently secured a post as junior lecturer there. 
Villetaneuse was an important arena in which student activism was allowed to 
flourish during the 1980s. The student demonstrations in 1986 against the 
Devacquet bill began there and several of the original members of both SOS- 
Racisme and France-Plus were recruited from this university. Successive 
presidents of the university had been members of the PC and the party wanted to 
use the institution to demonstrate its ability to lead. Dray had become interested 
in politics via membership of the Ligue Communiste Rdvolutionnaire (LCR) 
while simultaneously setting up a new organisation, the Mouvement d'Action 
Syndicale (MAS). Among the founder members of the latter was Harlem Ddsir, 
a French national horn of mixed parents, a West Indian father and an Alsatian 
mother. D&ir would be instrumental in the creation and organisation of SOS. In 
1981 Dray joined the PS and became increasingly sympathetic to the plight of 
ethnic minorities resident in France. 
SOS-Racisme was set up in November 1984 and emerged into the public arena 
in the autumn of that year when it participated in the Convergence march, which 
was only a limited success. The reduced support for this demonstration 
compared with the 1983 march convinced Dray of the need to bring together the 
disparate groups which had participated in these events and to transform them 
into one united organisation. 
In order to achieve a structured and coherent movement which appealed to 
French youths, Dray would be required to enlist the support of ethnic minority 
groups including Maghrebian youth groups. He therefore devoted his efforts in 
the first three months of 1985 towards negociating with Beur association 
leaders, as well as Maghrebian intellectuals and religious leaders. A conference 
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was organised by Dray and Desir at the Sorbonne in March 1985. During this 
meeting, reservations were expressed by Beur leaders concerning the links 
between SOS-Racisme and the PS. Some argued that SOS was the official 
mouthpiece of the party. Equally there were doubts about the leadership of SOS 
since several figureheads including Eric Ghdbali, Marc Britton and Dray himself 
were of the Jewish faith and this could lead to potential conflict with the Beur 
movement given that the latter identified closely with the plight of the 
Palestinians. Dray was perfectly aware of such reservations, but nevertheless 
argued that French nationals of the Jewish faith were an essential feature of any 
movement which purported to be anti-racist: 
Au moment de la fondation de SOS, la communautd juive, ses 
intellectuels, ses jeunes sont d'emblee partants. Et nous nous sommes 
bien decides ä ce qu'ils jouent un role. D'abord parce que dins la bande 
certains sontjuifs, ensuite parce que le mode de fonctionnement desjuifs 
vis-ä-vis du racisme, de l'antisemitisme, concernes, militants, nous parait 
un exemple int6ressant. Meme si on nous 1'a parfois reproche. 
(Dray 1987,204-5) 
Dray was able to convince some, if not necessarily all, Beur leaders of the need 
to highlight their condition in the media and that SOS had the financial clout to 
do this. Dray was to realise the potential of PS support in helping the movement 
attract media attention early on according to Malik: 
Les fondateurs, et surtout le plus politique d'entre eux [Julien Dray], ont 
compris qu'ils pouvaient pallier la carence mediatique et institutionnelle 
des mouvements beurs. Its vont captor ä la source le fonds de commerce 
et, avec le soutien de l'appareil du PS, recup&rer la lutte des jeunes des 
cites. 
(Malik 1990,40) 
For the movement to function effectively, a representative figurehead was 
required. Dray was reluctant to put himself forward as leader since, because of 
his origins, he might risk marginalising the movement. However, Harlem D6sir, 
a history student from Villetaneuse, presented the ideal profile as Dray explains: 
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Cötts symbole, on est servi: il ya Harlem D6sir, black et surtout un nom 
ä faire rever; ensuite une extraordinaire facilit6 d't1ocution, une ttonnante 
maitrise de soi. 
(Dray 1987,204) 
In other words ethnic minorities could identify immediately with Desir because 
of his origins, but at the same time he possessed the necessary leadership 
qualities for the post. Despite this, Serge Malik maintains that Dray remained 
the driving force behind the association: 
Pour Harlem, qui vacille parfois face ä 1'enjeu, la confiance et la force 
viennent de Juju [Julien Dray], du Patron. 
(Malik 1990,41) 
Initially the supporters of the movement were drawn from the same background 
as Dray; students at the University of Villetaneuse, often from the classes he 
taught, who had joined the LCR and MAS, before adhering to the PS and finally 
SOS itself. Later, however, youth leaders from other parts of the country became 
involved. Prominent among these were Kaissa Titous, the first president of 
Radio Beur and later a vice-president of SOS, and Nora Zaidi, head of SOS in 
Franche-Comte, and who would eventually become one of two Euro-MPs of 
Maghrebian origin. This enabled an organised network to be set up on a small 
scale. If, however, the association was to attract more widespread support, it 
would require the recruitment of individuals on a far larger scale. According to 
Malik, potential members were to be recruited according to the following criteria: 
Dray demande ä Rocky [Didier Francois, recruteur pour la LCR] et ä 
Harlem [Desir] de recruter en faisant attention au look. 11 faut rameuter 
des Beurs qui fassent "hanlieue", ne soient pas politists, ou, si cc n'est 
pas possible, il convient de les selectionner au sein des federations d'Ile- 
de-France du PS. 
(Malik 1990,45) 
To pursue its aims SOS-Racisme required financial support. In due course, it 
was to receive funding from the Fonds d'Action Sociale (see section 4.3 on 
organisational resources). From the outset, however, the association had attracted 
the attention of the nation with its attempts to spread the anti-racist message via 
the Touche pus ü mon pofe campaign in the early part of 1985. As a result of 
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nationwide publicity, a number of sponsors came forward to help finance SOS. 
These included the Free Masonry (Grand Orient de France), Yves Saint-Laurent, 
and various industrialists and other institutional associations such as the Ligue 
Contre le Racisme et l'Antisdmitisme. It seems likely, however, that even more 
generous financial aid was provided by organisations sympathetic to the PS. 
These included the Mutuelle Nationale des Etudiants de France (MNEF), the 
Fdddration de l'Education nationale (FEN) and the Confederation Francaise 
Ddmocratique du Travail (CFDT). 
While the support of these organisations was appreciated, it posed a dilemma for 
SOS since they were all closely affiliated to the PS and therefore a direct link 
could be made between the association and this political party. Furthermore the 
link could potentially provide the basis for future conflict if SOS and the PS 
differed on policies regarding ethnic minorities in France. 
With the departure of Julien Dray from the daily running of the association in 
1988 to pursue his political career as a depute in Essonne, Dtsir was henceforth 
the uncontested leader behind the scenes in addition to remaining in control in 
public. 
4.3 Organisational resources of France-Plus and SOS-Racisme 
The two associations differ in terms of the composition of their members. 
Whereas France-Plus is composed almost exclusively of French nationals of 
Maghrebian origin, of whom Kabyles predominate among the leadership, SOS- 
Racisme encompasses a far wider range of nationalities and ethnic and religious 
groups. These include French nationals of Central and West African origin, 
South East Asians and to a lesser extent Maghrebians. SOS-Racisme estimates 
its national membership at 17,000. (Le Journal de SOS-Racisme Paris Ile-de- 
France 1992,3). France-Plus has not released any precise figures to date, 
although a figure of 10,000 has been quoted by one press source. (Le Monde 9 
July 1992) It seems likely, however, that the membership of France-Plus is 
considerably less than that of its counterpart. Both associations have a national 
network, although they are heavily concentrated in the Paris region. 
The organisation of France-Plus is divided up into three basic levels: an 
executive; a collective of national delegates; an honorary committee. The first of 
these is made up of a president, a vice-president, two general-secretaries (one is 
concerned with co-ordinating the network of its members, while the other deals 
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with external affairs), a treasurer and a deputy-treasurer. At a second level 
national delegates are chosen to sit on committees which examine specific 
issues. The number of these varies dependent on their particular relevance at the 
time. They have included the following: Europe; religion; elections; society; the 
economy; youth and sport; information and communication; education; finance; 
family; employment and training; social action; justice; old people; health; the 
environment; urban issues; housing; culture; women's and minority issues; 
business advice. The delegates on these committees tend to be either municipal 
councillors who were sponsored by the association, or members of the 
executive. Among our sample, five councillors have at some stage or other 
presided over one or more of these committees. It should be stressed, though, 
that not all claim to have been sponsored by France-Plus for the 1989 municipal 
election campaign (see section 4.7.1 for further details). Finally there is an 
honorary committee on which prominent Maghrehian personalities are invited to 
sit. These have included the writer and doctor, Nacer Kettane, instrumental in 
setting up Radio Beur, the cardiologist and moire-udjoint in Lille, Salem Kacet, 
the journalist Farid Afchoune and prominent businessmen such as Slimane 
Azzoug and Yazid Sabbeg. 
SOS-Racisme has an executive with a president, a vice-president and an 
administrative council. It has 15 specialised committees, each related to specific 
issues, which deal with everyday cases of discrimination that people from ethnic 
minorities face. In addition there is a body of some three hundred personalities 
which provides financial sponsorship to the association. France-Plus is financed 
to a large extent by the FAS (Fonds d'Action Sociale) which in the period 1987- 
90 substantially increased its annual contribution from 370,00() francs to 1.8 
million francs. This coincided with the presence in power between 1986 and 
1988 of a centre-right government under the premiership of Jacques Chirac and 
subsequently of the Socialist government under Michel Rocard which was also 
sympathetic to the association's goals. During the Chirac premiership, the then 
Minister for Social Affairs, Philippe Seguin, was particularly receptive to the 
association's aim of presenting candidates on lists of both the Left and the Right 
for the 1989 municipal elections. Previously in the 1988 Presidential elections, 
surveys carried out after the second round of voting had taken place indicated 
that French youths of Maghrebian origin had voted overwhelmingly for the PS 
candidate, Francois Mitterrand. The benefits that accrued to France-Plus as a 
result of trying to place itself above the Left-Right divide were as follows: 
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[... ] France-Plus negocie la presence de jeunes Franco-Maghrdbins sur 
les listes de candidats de gauche comme de droite. Un oecumCnisme 
politique qui lui vaudra d'ailleurs les faveurs de Philippe Sdguin (RPR) 
lors du passage de celui-ci au ministere des Affaires sociales de 1986 ä 
1988. 
(Passages 1989,24) 
Sdguin, in addition to augmenting the funding for France-Plus, also invited a 
young Beur, Farida Berhaili, to become a councillor on his list in Epinal, which 
she duly accepted. In 1990, when the Socialist government was in office, the 
annual budget for France-Plus totalled more than 3.5 million francs and was 
divided up in the following manner: 1.8 million francs (51.1 % of the total) were 
provided by the FAS; 500,000 francs came from the Ministry for Social Affairs 
(14.2%); 350,000 from Matignon (9.9%); 250,000 from the Ministry of 
Defence (7.1 %); 200,000 francs (5.7%) from the Secretary of State dealing with 
Women's Rights; 170,000 francs (4.8%) from the Secretary of State for Youth 
and Sport; 100,000 francs (2.8%) from the Commission concerned with the 
Harkis; 100,000 francs (2.8%) from the Aquitaine Regional Council; 50,000 
francs (1.4%) from the Gironde Regional Council. (Fonds d'Action Sociale 
1991,2) 
SOS-Racisme also receives its funding from a variety of sources, some of which 
are extremely difficult to quantify. What is clear, though, is that although the 
association is dependent to a large degree on state aid, the proportion of funding 
from the FAS is much smaller than that for France-Plus (51.1 %) for 1990. In 
the period 1985-88 SOS saw its funding from the FAS rise from 50,000 to 
500,00() francs annually. There was a small increase of 10,000 francs in 1989. 
State finance from other sources is more difficult to estimate. It is derived from a 
variety of ministries similar to those drawn on by France-Plus, to which may he 
added the ministries responsible for education; culture; environment; justice; 
training; humanitarian action. Figures have yet to be released publicly providing 
a precise break-down. Funding is secured from its committee of financial 
sponsors, the members of whom pay an annual contribution to the association. 
In the case of events such as the SOS-Racisme concerts finance was obtained 
from the state, TFI and Yves Saint-Laurent. The association has also a far more 
modest income from the sale of its Touche pas a mon pote badges. Given the 
degree of state intervention in funding and that from its origins questions have 
been raised as to the nature of the association's relationship with the PS, the 
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question of the extent to which the party has been able to exert influence has to 
be raised. One former member of the SOS leadership, Kaissa Titous, questions 
whether the relationship was at all prudent. She argues that it has in fact been 
detrimental since financial influence on the part of the PS has resulted in 
political clout being wielded over SOS, which in turn has alienated Beurs from 
remaining in or adhering to the association: 
Je mesure ä quel point notre [celle de SOS-Racisme] elimination des 
choix politiques et noire exclusion de la gestion financiere allaient de 
pair. Le contröle de l'argent par un groupe politique organise [Le PS] a 
fourvoyd le pluralisme en autorisant la mise ä 1'ecart des Beurs et de 
toute voix autonome. Le fric commande la politique SOS comme 
ailleurs. 
(Passages 1989,29) 
Journalistic observers equally noted the alienation of many Beurs from the 
association which they attribute to the close financial links with the PS and its 
sympathisers: 
Soutenue par le pouvoir et patronn&e par des personalitCs du show- 
business, l'association SOS-Racisme allait peu ä peu s'alidner les Beurs 
qu'elle avait d'abord su sdduire. 
(Le Monde, 1 November 1985) 
4.4 Objectives 
4.4.1 France-Plus 
The aims of France-Plus are twofold: 
(a) A primary aim of the organisation was, according to Dahmani, to bring 
together youths from the various nationalities and origins which make up the 
Maghrebian population in France. In particular he sought to unite the children of 
parents who had fought on opposing sides during the Algerian War. Dahmani 
explains it thus: 
L'objectif de France-Plus, c'est qu'une page de l'histoire douloureuse soit 
tournee par les "beurs" et les enfants de harkis. Tous ensemble. Pour 
dcrire une autre histoire, plus juste et plus digne, tout en gardant la 
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memoire. Le principe "diviser pour mieux rdgner" a fait son temps, nous 
l'avons compris. 
(France-Plus n. d. a, 27) 
(b) Secondly, and as mentioned previously, France-Plus had as a major objective 
facilitating the economic, social and political integration of youths of 
Maghrebian origin. Dahmani explains the logic of this approach: 
A France-Plus, on ne parle ni d'assimilation, ni d'insertion. On parle 
d'inttsgration. Les seuls handicaps auxquels se heurtent les jeunes sont 
lids aux conditions sociales de leurs parents. Le devoir - et l'interet - de la 
France, c'est de les aider ä sortir de la marginalisation et de 1'exclusion, 
c'est de les integrer. 
(La Lettre de France-Plus 1989a,. 2) 
Dahmani goes on to define what he means by the term 'integration': 
Integration signitie egalite des droits sociaux et politiques. C'est le droit 
ä la ressemblance qui conduit le jeune ä vivre naturellement sa difference. 
Pour avancer cette idee, nous avons crCC France-Plus, il ya quatre ans en 
prCcisant que l'integration etait ä la fois economique, sociale et politique. 
(La Lettre de France-Plus 1989a, 2) 
Concerning political integration, a Civic Rights campaign, taking a leaf out of the 
African-American movement of the 1960s campaigns, was undertaken. This 
included encouraging the enrolment on the electoral lists of youths of 
Maghrebian origin in addition to presenting candidates on various party lists for 
local and other elections. 
4.4.2 SOS-Racisme 
SOS-Racisme has two principal aims. The primary aim of the association and 
the one for which it was created at the outset is to combat racism. Secondly, 
however, the association realised that the battle against racism was not simply 
one of words, but was more importantly, perhaps, a long-term struggle of 
actions. A second objective thus became a 'pro-integration' stance. 
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The means by which SOS sought to achieve these objectives varied 
considerably. Initially, in order to combat racist opinion, the weapons of the 
media were utilised to the full, as Harlem Desir explains: 
Oui, nous avons dans une premiere phase, lancd SOS-Racisme comme 
une campagne d'opinion en utilisant toutes les ressources mddiatiques 
possibles. 
(Le Monde, 29-30 July 1990 ) 
This involved both large-scale marches in which sympathisers from throughout 
the country converged on Paris and a nation-wide campaign to spread the anti- 
racist message by means of a badge with the slogan, Touche pus ü mon pote. 
Dray was aware that the use of a badge enabled people to demonstrate their 
support for SOS-Racisme even when the association did not have any 
operational framework. He assesses the importance of the badge in the 
following manner: 
Si l'on fait une Campagne pour tous, il faut trouver un moyen qui 
permette de militer sans se rendre ä des reunions. Dans nos tetes l'image 
du badge Solidarnosc fait tilt. Si quelqu'un, chanteur, acteur, intellectuel, 
agraffe le badge devant les cameras, l'effet est immCdiat. 
(Dray 1987,206). 
However, while the above actions met with some degree of success of SOS- 
Racisme to expand its operations, a nationwide organisational structure would 
have to be created. As Dray explains, the movement was transformed into a 
campaigning organisation: 
Il est vrai qu'apres le grand rassemblement de la Concorde en juin 1985 
nous avons optr6 un tournant pour devenir un mouvement militant. Cc 
fut la deuxitme phase de noire action, avec les batailles qui ont suivi 
contre la loi Pasqua, la reforme du code de la nationalite, et la 
participation au mouvement de la Jeunesse de novembre-ddcemhre 1986. 
(Dray 1987,206) 
The organisation's 1986 newsletter explains the importance of its network: 
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SOS avec ses comitds qui se sont ddv6lopds dans toute la France, dans 
les Etablissements scolaires, mais aussi dans les quartiers, dans les 
entreprises, est ainsi un lieu de solidarite active contre les 
discriminations, qui rompt Fisolement de ses victimes. 
(SOS-Racisme 1986,30). 
With an organisational framework in place, SOS-Racisme was then able to 
devote its attentions to a third phase of action where emphasis was placed upon 
concrete actions to support its "pro-integration" stance. Ddsir explains as 
follows: 
Cest Fobjectif de la troisieme phase de notre action: faire entrer 
l'integration dans les faits. 
(Le Monde, 29-30 July 1990). 
This would be achieved in practice with the help of the following two measures: 
-1'aide juridique aux victimes de discrimination et de racisme. 
- la proposition de mesures concretes pour faire avancer 1'int6gration et la 
mobilisation de l'opinion qu'elles entrainent. 
(Le Journal de SOS-Racisme Paris Ile-de-France 1992,3) 
In terms of the second set of proposals, this would entail the following actions: 
En dcveloppant la citoyennetd, donc. Sous toutes formes : par 1'acco's 
plus large ä la nationalite, bien sür. Nous avons propose la creation d'une 
agence nationale pour les naturalisations. Par le droit de vote aux 
elections locales [... ] Aujourd'hui, il faut intervenir tous azimuts, hiev sür. 
Administration, ecole, formation professionnelles, etc. [... ] 
(Le Monde, 29-30 July 1990) 
4.5 Electoral participation of France-Plus 
4.5.1 Civic rights campaigns 
To achieve the majority of its objectives, particularly those pertaining to the 
political domain, it would be necessary for France-Plus to attract the support of 
youths of Maghrebian origin. However, even if politically-motivated goals did 
initially find favour among the youths concerned, there were at least three major 
obstacles which France-Plus would have to overcome: 
82 
i) The first of these was, perhaps, the most difficult and involved the association 
persuading youths that participation within the French political apparatus would 
not be a denial, or even a betrayal of their parents' cultural heritage. Significant 
here was the numerical importance of youths of Algerian origin. In order to 
participate in both local and national elections, youths of Maghrebian origin 
would have to enrol on the electoral lists and this would be possible only if they 
were registered as French nationals. The complexities of the Nationality Code 
meant that the children of Algerians born prior to 1963 would have to make a 
conscious decision to opt for French nationality. This was made especially 
difficult for male youths of Algerian origin who, since they were regarded by the 
authorities in Algeria as natives of that country, could he called upon to do 
military service there. 
ii) Secondly it was necessary to reverse the marked degree of apathy among 
these youths, related in part at least to the above considerations, but due also to 
their comparatively low levels of educational achievement and socio-economic 
status, which meant that there was a lack of knowledge about the political 
process and the benefits that might accrue from it. 
iii) Thirdly France-Plus still had to convince youths that parties on the Right as 
well as those on the Left would be willing to take on board their needs and 
concerns. Previous government actions under the presidency of Giscard did not 
augur well. 
The campaign of civic rights advocated by France-Plus involved travelling 
throughout France, but particularly to those areas in which the proportion of 
citizens of Maghrebian origin was significant, to make the youths concerned 
aware of the need to enrol on the electoral lists. Of note among the various 
campaigns was the sixty-day trip around France from 6 October to 5 December 
1988, the first phase of the so-called 'Eurocharter', during which time a 
coachload of France-Plus activists met youths in Bordeaux, Toulouse, 
Marseilles, Nice, Lyons, Metz, Lille, Nantes and Paris as well as neighbouring 
towns. 
Figures concerning the number of Franco-Maghrebians enrolled on the electoral 
lists before and after France-Plus's registration campaigns vary quite 
considerably and must be treated with caution. As the French state keeps no 
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official figures on the ethnic origins of electors, it is impossible to establish an 
exact figure for those of Maghrebian origin. Dahmani, for his part, estimates the 
figures before and after France-Plus's registration campaign as follows: 
En 1985, nous etions seulement 792 000 inscrits sur les listes 
electorales. Les jeunes, surtout, n'avaient guere conscience de la force 
qu'ils representaient. Aujourd'hui, [1989] nous sommes 1,5 million soit 
environ 4% de 1'61ectorat. 
(Jeune Afrique, 15 March 1989) 
Dahmani gives no indication as to how he has arrived at such figures, nor does 
he explain the composition of the numbers involved. 
The figure of 792,000 may be a somewhat misleading representation of data 
calculated by Georges Morin, whose close involvement with the Socialist 
governments of the 1980s permitted access to unpublished sources of various 
kinds. In 1986, Morin stated: 
11 ya en gros une masse de 800 000 6lecteurs frangais d'origine 
maghrebine. Que l'on peut diviser en trois groupes, encore une fois de 
maniere approximative parce que, Dieu merci, il n'y a pas en France de 
fichiers par religion. Mais on arrive d'une maniere ou d'une autre A 
retrouver ces chiffres. II ya en gros 350 000 A-lecteurs qui sons 
originaires de la communaute des Francais musulmans rapatrids [i. e. les 
harkis et leurs enfants]. 
II ya aussi ä peu pros 350 000 dlecteurs potentiels qui sons fils 
d'immigres. [... ] Et puis on 6value en gros ä 100,120 ä 150 000 le 
troisieme groupe qu'on baptise brutalement `immigres de luxe' - c'est 
un terme que je n'aime pas trop - constitu6 de medecins, d'enseignants, 
d'universitaires, de commergants, et qui n'ont pas connu les drames des 
immigrds et des rapatrids. [... ] Donc en tout, si vous voulez, il n'y a pas 
loin de 800 000 6lecteurs potentiels. 
(IM'media Magazine 1986,17) 
Although Morin begins by speaking of 800,00() electors (a figure very close to 
that cited by Dahmani), it is clear from the remainder of his remarks that this 
denotes the total number of potential Franco-Maghrebian electors, i. e. all adult 
French nationals of Maghrebian origin, as against those who have actually 
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enrolled on the electoral register. Morin later updated these figures, estimating 
that in 1990 there were 500,000 people of harki origin and another 500,000 
Franco-Maghrebians, i. e. first-generation economic migrants who had settled in 
France and taken French nationality combined with immigrant-born children 
enjoying French nationality. With an additional 1.4 million Maghrebians 
retaining their nationality of origin, Morin concluded that in 1990 there were 2.4 
million Muslims of Maghrebian origin resident in France (Lacoste C., Lacoste 
Y. 1991,534). As only about a million of these were adult French nationals, and 
hence eligible to vote, it is difficult to see how 1.5 million Franco-Maghrebians 
could have enrolled on the electoral register, as claimed by France-Plus. 
It does nevertheless seem likely that the major campaign undertaken by France- 
Plus on a nation-wide scale made a significant contribution to improving 
registration figures among young Maghrebians. The impact of these enrolments 
on the electoral lists was felt during the 1989 municipal elections. In the 
municipality of Berre (Bouches-du-Rhone), the incumbent Communist mayor 
refused any kind of dialogue with youths of Maghrebian origin. This in a 
municipality of 12,000 inhabitants of which at least a third are of non-French 
and in particular of North African descent. Local youths reacted to the 
intransigence of the mayor by enrolling and voting en masse for the PS 
candidate, Serge Andrdoni. This enabled the latter to top the poll by a narrow 
margin in the first round, and created the conditions for his second round 
victory. The mayor publically thanked the youths in question (Le Point 24 April 
1989) for their support. Selim Sahli, France-Plus activist in Berre, evaluated the 
contribution of local youths in the following terms: 
Maintenant nous [les jeunes d'origine maghrtbine] sommes conscients 
de notre force. Nous pouvons mepriser ceux qui nous mr prisent. Dd- 
mo-cra-ti-que-ment. Grace au bulletin de vote. 
(Le Point 24 April 1989,78) 
The second phase of the 'Eurocharter' was devoted to meeting political 
figureheads in other European countries. The aims of these meetings differed 
from those within France as the official France-Plus newsletter explains: 
Its [les rcprrsentants de France-Plus] ont pour mission d'aborder avec 
les responsables des etats l'idee de citoyennetC en Europe, le statut des 
non-europeens, l'harmonisation des droits politiques et sociaux. Objectif: 
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la mise en place d'une carte de residence europtenne avec la libert6 de 
circuler et de s'installer dans tout pays des "Etats-Unis d'Europe". 
(La Lettre de France-Plus 1989c, 4) 
Meetings were held in Spain, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark and Belgium. The twelve representatives of 
France-Plus also met with members of ethnic minorities in these nations. This 
was exemplified by their visit to Great Britain where, among others, they held 
discussions with Dianne Abbott, one of the Black British MPs. The global 
objective of these visits was to create the framework for a European movement 
of civic rights which would be called Europe-Plus. A satellite organisation, 
Belgique-Plus, has already been established in that country. 
4.5.2 'Sponsoring' youths on municipal electoral lists 
A potential outcome of youths of Maghrebian origin enrolling in large numbers 
on the electoral lists was that at least some of these would eventually become 
candidates for election to local political office. The opportunity to realise this 
was provided by the 1989 municipal elections. It was not the first time that 
Franco-Maghrebians had put themselves forward as candidates. Several had in 
fact been candidates for the previous municipal elections of 1983, including one 
councillor in our own sample. The major development lay rather, then, in the 
large number of candidates of Maghrebian origin who expressed their desire to 
operate within the political machinery of French society. For Dahmani the 
municipal elections were the ideal platform on which he could put into practice 
his ideas on political integration. An integral feature of his ideology was that 
candidates should be placed on the lists of parties of the Right as well as those 
of the Left, traditionally considered as the allies of Maghrebians in France. 
Dahmani explained his reasoning prior to the elections as follows: 
Je ne crois pas que la democratic soil le monopole de la gauche. Pour sa 
consolidation et 1'inscription de nouveaux droits dins les textes 
Idgislatifs de la France, nous avons besoin de tous ceux qui partagent ces 
valeurs. 11 nous faut convaincre ceux qui ne sont pas convaincus. 
(Politis 16-19 January 1989) 
The three political personalities mentioned at the end of these remarks are the 
mayors of Lyons, Bordeaux and Grenoble respectively and as such wield a great 
deal of influence over their cities. 
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Dahmani laid down two pre-conditions for the placing of young Maghrebians as 
candidates on the lists of political parties. The first was that that the parties 
themselves should not regard the youths merely as 'token' candidates who were 
only on the lists to boost support for that party: 
Ce candidat doit figurer en bonne place. On ne veut pas titre I'Arabe de 
service ou le Portugais de service. 
(Politic 16-19 January 1989) 
The second pre-condition concerned the responsibilities that the successfully 
elected candidates would have. Dahmani believed that any such youths would be 
doing a disservice to the plight of Maghrebians in general if they dealt 
exclusively with matters relating to ethnic minorities since it would pigeon-hole 
them into a distinct category of elected officials who would be there to serve the 
interests of one particular segment of the local community based on ethnic 
origin. Consequently it would undermine the wider mission of those 
Maghrebians elected. Dahmani commented in the following manner: 
La seule chose que nous [France-Plus] leur [aux candidats] demandions, 
c'est de refuser dans les attributions de s'occuper de l'immigration. Nous 
voulons qu'ils soient reconnus pour leur competence. 
(Politic 16-19 January 1989) 
The line taken by France-Plus did not meet with universal approval, however. 
Georges Morin in particular was extremely critical of the tactics adopted by 
Dahmani and this has been the cause of subsequent differences between the two 
individuals and the organisations that they preside over. Morin disagreed with 
the actions of France-Plus for two reasons. First of all the inclusion of ethnic 
minority candidates might mislead parties into thinking this assured them of the 
ethnic minority vote: 
Moi, j'ai eu une explication tres orageuse avec Arezki Dahmani en 
disant : Ecoute, d'abord tu escroques les gens qui t'tcoutent parce tu lour 
fais croire que parce qu'ils auront un beur sur la liste, its vont avoir toutes 
les voix des Maghrdbins de la commune. C'est faux et tu le sais trZs 
bien. 
(Morin: Paris) 
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Secondly Morin argued that Dahmani used candidates as bargaining chips. 
They were put forward indiscriminately across the political spectrum, suggesting 
to political parties and the public at large that the youths in question had no 
deep-rooted ideological convictions and could be taken advantage of by either 
side of the political spectrum: 
Et deuxieme chose, beaucoup plus grave, que je n'ai pas pardonn&e, que 
je n'aime pas du tout, c'est qu'il donnait le sentiment en allant "vendre" 
des candidats aussi bien ä droite qu'a la gauche que les Arahes etaient ä 
"vendre". Et que pour une place ils n'avaient aucune idee politique aussi 
bien ä gauche qu'ä droite indiffdrement. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Differences between Morin and Dahmani became more visibly apparent during 
the municipal election campaign. It was in part in response to Dahmani's 
'sponsorship' of candidates that Morin decided to alert Socialist town halls to the 
possibility of taking on board suitable candidates of Maghrebian origin. In the 
city of Bordeaux this led to candidates of Maghrebian origin figuring on rival 
party lists. Dahmani, after negociations with the Mayor of Bordeaux, Jacques 
Chaban-Delmas, had put forward Hassan El Houlali on a joint RPR-UDF list. 
The PS candidate for mayor, Xavier Bordeaux, was angered by the France-Plus 
member appearing on the opposing list and another youth of Maghrebian origin 
was invited to stand on the PS list. El Houlali, who was successfully elected, 
explains how events unfolded: 
Son [Chaban-Delmas] adversaire socialiste, Xavier Bordeaux, nous a 
reproche nos contacts avec le maire. Nous [France-Plus] lui avons 
repondu que nous frequentions tous les democrates, de droite ou de 
gauche. II [Xavier Bordeaux] n'a pas aimd et a pris un Beur que nous ne 
connaissions pas, en queue de liste, condamnd d'avance. 
(Le Point 24 April 1989) 
Dahmani himself explains the logic of the campaign in Bordeaux: 
Le schema ideal, c'est que Chaban-Delmas prenne un jeune de "France- 
Plus" et les socialistes aussi. Le fait est que le Parti socialiste en a pris 
un, en 40e position, et Chaban un, en position eligible, le geste de 
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Chahan a un impact sur l'opinion publique, sur son electorat. On fait la 
meme chose aver Baudis, Carignon, S6guin, Diligent et j'en passe. Ca 
fait reflechir. Que veut dire ce geste ? L'intdret pour moi, c'est l'interet de 
ce que cela represente pour la France. 
(Bekhouche, Butzbach, Kharmoudi 1989,274) 
From the above case there would appear to be a discrepancy in the practices of 
France-Plus. Dahmani seems to be claiming that the Beur on the PS list and the 
Beur on the Chaban-Delmas list were both France-Plus imports. This may well 
be one example of France-Plus claiming to have sponsored candidates who had 
nothing to do with it (refer to section 4.7.1 for further details). Nevertheless 
France-Plus claims to have enjoyed considerable success in its campaign to 
sponsor candidates of Maghrebian origin on various party lists. In the aftermath 
of the municipal elections, Dahmani made the following assessment: 
Cet engagement de n'etre ni de gauche ni de droite est illustre par les 506 
elus aux dernieres elections municipales a l'occasion desquelles 60% des 
candidats figuraient sur des listes de gauche et 40% sur des lister de 
droite moderee et rCpuhlicaine. 
(France-Plus n. d. a, 28) 
At face value the figures would appear impressive, particularly since France-Plus 
claimed to have put forward 1000 candidates in total and that of the 506 elected, 
54 became maire-adjoints. However, in subsequent interviews the exact 
numbers of candidates and elected councillors have been called into question. In 
an interview given to Liberation on 28 March 1989, Dahmani claims that his 
organisation "sponsored" 386 of the successful candidates. In another article, 
this time with Le Monde on 7 April 1990, Dahmani reduced the figures further 
when making the following estimation: 
La reussite a cte spectaculaire puisque, sur 20(X) candidats d'origine 
maghrebine, plus de 5(X) ont ete elus, dont 350 avec le parrainage de 
France-Plus. 
In my own sample, fewer than 20% of the municipal councillors interviewed (5) 
claim to have been sponsored by France-Plus and only 8 have been members of 
the organisation. Furthermore from my own investigations of the picture on a 
national scale, thus far it seems likely that no more than forty councillors can be 
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identified as members of France-Plus and even this may prove to be an inflated 
figure. When comparing this with France-Plus's claims of 'sponsoring' 506, or 
even 350 councillors, is still some way short of the original total. 
The question of the accuracy of Dahmani's calculations was put to Georges 
Morin, who as president of the CNESOM, has at his disposal a complete list of 
municipal councillors of Maghrebian origin elected on PS lists or joint PS-PC 
lists. Morin expressed his reaction to the figures in unambiguous terms: 
Quand France-Plus declare qu'il a lui 500 elus, je me demande oü il 
[Arezki Dahmani] les cherche, oü on les trouve. Meme s'il compte 
comme membres de France-Plus, qui ne sont pas pour beaucoup d'entre 
eux, les nötres, ceux du PS, je ne connais pas beaucoup d'autres partis 
qui ont fait cet effort. Meme mettons qu'il ya autant de non-Socialistes 
que de Socialistes, ca fait 200 personnes. Oü a-t-il trouve les 500? Je 
crois qu'il ya une large part de fantasme lä-dedans. Peut-titre a-t-il 
recense tous les candidats? Je n'en sais rien. En tout cas 4a me parait trts 
largement exagere. 
(Morin: Paris) 
The speculative figure of around 200 cited here by Morin is an extrapolation 
from the 100 or so councillors of Maghrebian origin elected on PS lists. It is 
important to note that these PS councillors include not only Franco- 
Maghrebians from Muslim families who emigrated to France for economic 
reasons as well as members of the harki community, but also people of pied-noir 
origin, who might more properly be classified as of European rather than 
Maghrebian extraction. It is very doubtful that Dahmani has undertaken a 
comprehensive study of the municipal councillors elected nationwide in all the 
36,000 communes of France. Even if he had studied all the lists, there would still 
be a need to verify the precise origins of each person and there is no systematic 
data available on this. It is perfectly feasible for example that despite a person's 
surname, he or she may not necessarily he of Maghrehian origin. As France- 
Plus has consistently refused to release a full list naming all the councillors 
whose election it claims to have assisted, the figures advanced by the 
organisation must at best be treated with caution and may well prove to be 
incorrect. 
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Whatever the exact figure, the election of an appreciable number of Maghrebian 
municipal councillors was significant for a variety of reasons. France-Plus had 
brought together for the first time children whose parents had fought on 
opposing sides during the Algerian war. The presence of the sons and daughters 
of harkis alongside the children of economic migrants indicated that they too 
had been the victims of discrimination and wished to make their presence felt. It 
was also striking that the candidates put forward by France-Plus reflected the 
full range of the political spectrum, excluding the Front National. Equally 
important in Dahmani's mind was an awareness that French citizens of 
Maghrebian or non-European origin in general had not been the main focus of 
attention during the 1989 elections: 
Reconciliation enfin avec l'opinion publique francaise. Pour la premiere 
fois depuis 1983, l'immigration n'a pas etc un enjeu dans la campagne. 
(La Lettre de France-Plus 1989c, 4) 
Linked to this was the realisation that far from being a hindrance, youths of 
Maghrebian origin who had been put forward as candidates had, in a number of 
cases, contributed to the victory of the local party list: 
Aucun maire n'a dte rejet6 par la population pour avoir inscrit un jeune 
beur sur sa liste. Au contraire, certains maires ont meme gagnd ou 
amplifie leur victoim du fait de ce choix. 
(La Lettre de France-Plus 1989c, 4) 
This was the case in the municipality of Berre-1'Etang (Bouches-du-Rhöne), as 
we have already seen, where the Communist mayor refused any kind of dialogue 
with Maghrebian youths. An estimated 300 of these youths enrolled on the 
electoral lists and voted instead for the PS candidate, Serge Andr&oni. This 
enabled the latter to lead the PC mayor by 108 votes in the first round and 
created the conditions for the second round victory (Le Point, 24 April 1989) 
4.6 Policy issues of France-Plus and SOS-Racisme. 
4.6.1 Political strategies 
The different strategies adopted by France-Plus and SOS-Racisme have led to 
fierce verbal conflicts between the two organisations. SOS-Racisme takes issue 
with the nature of France-Plus and claims that the latter constitutes a Franco- 
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Maghrebian lobby. This, in Desir's view, goes against the former tradition of 
foreigners being integrated into French society: 
Cette logique de vote ethnique est contraire ä 1'integration rtpublicaine 
qui suppose responsabilitd individuelle et vote de conviction. 
(Le Point, 24 April 1989) 
It has also, according to Desir, been badly received by French public opinion 
and may lead to further hostility towards French citizens of Maghrebian origin: 
Crest une demarche qui risque d'etre tres mal percue par l'opinion 
publique qui supporte mal qu'un groupe, une minorite culturelle qui fait 
2,3 ou 5% de 1'electorat veuille servir de bascule pour faire ou defaire 
des majoritds. C'est malheureusement quelque chose qui pourrait 
entrainer des reactions de rejet tres violentes de la part de l'opinion 
frangaise. 
(Bekhouche, Butzbach, Kharmoudi 1989,263) 
This contrasts sharply with Dahmani's endorsement of lobbies if, like those of 
other interest groups, they can be used to further the advancement of 
Maghrebians: 
On parle d'un lobby. Quel lobby? Si c'est un lobby d'intdret g6neral qui 
fait avancer le peuple, qui fait avancer la ddmocratie, pourquoi pas? Est- 
ce qu'il ya quelqu'un qui trouve scandaleux qu'il y ait un lobby 
armenien'! Un lobby protestant? Non, c'est normal, c'est un droit acquis... 
La politique est un rapport de forces permanent, un jeu de contradictions 
d'interets. 
(Bekhouche, Butzbach, Kharmoudi 1989,271) 
SOS-Racisme has been critical of another aspect of Dahmani's approach, 
namely the claims by France-Plus to have 'sponsored' from parties of the 
traditional Right. Dahmani counters any such criticisms by arguing that SOS- 
Racisme and its avowed support for the PS has been counter-productive in the 
organisation's anti-racist approach. Instead Dahmani advocates conciliation and 
dialogue with parties on both sides of the political spectrum: 
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Une vraie politique anti-raciste necessite non pas la guerre, mais le 
dialogue avec 1'ensemble des forces politiques respectueuses de 1'Etat de 
droit. 
(Le Point, 24 April 1989) 
Dahmani expresses in unambiguous terms his refusal to remain tied to one 
particular party in the way that he claims SOS-Racisme is to the PS: 
Quant ä 1'aspect pedagogique, veut-on vendre des Beurs a gauche ou 
faire avancer la France? On ne s'adresse pas a une Beule partie des 
Francais, mais ä tous les Francais. 
(Bekhouche, Butzbach, Kharmoudi 1989,274) 
Dahmani argues that to conceive of an anti-racist approach solely within the 
framework of one political party is too simplistic and condemns the interests of 
ethnic minorities to a subordinate role: 
Si effectivement on decide d'y aller vers un seul parti on est dans une 
logique ethnique. C'est le vote juif, le vote armenien ä vendre ä tel ou tel 
parti. Or, le militant de France-Plus est avant tout un citoyen rCpublicain, 
ä l'image de la France. Certains sont fascinds par le socialisme, d'autres 
par le liberalisme. On ne propose pas un modele d'enfermement. Nous 
considerons que la libertC d'opinion est une liberte fondamentale qui est 
ä 1'origine de tous les autres droits. 
(Bekhouche, Butzbach, Kharmoudi 1989,274) 
Indeed some France-Plus members believe the anti-racist strategy of SOS- 
Racisme has played into the hands of the extreme Right by providing a stimulus 
for racist discourse and actions. The following account by a prominent member 
of France-Plus bears testimony to this: 
Ce n'est pas en criant "Halte au racisme! " ä longueur de journee que tu 
vas l'effacer. Au contraire, tu l'entretiens. A force de dire aux Francais 
qu'ils sont racistes, ceux qui ne le sont pas risquent de se braquer et de 
se rapprocher du Front national. 
(Le Point, 24 April 1989) 
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In response to the criticism voiced by some that France-Plus is composed of the 
elites among the Maghrebian populations in France and consequently is out of 
touch with the grass-roots level reality, Dahmani makes the following 
observations: 
L'idde de 1'dlite a deux interets : eile sert de refs rentiel. Un tel est avocat. 
Donc c'est possible : il suffit de se battre... Deuxieme chose : par rapport 
ä l'opinion publique, il faut que cette elite serve de locomotive pour tirer 
le maximum de jeunes vers le haut. Ma logique nest pas de dire il ya 
d'un cötd la creme et de l'autre ceux qu'on laisse sur le carreau. France- 
Plus rassemble des personnes de toutes conditions, du cardiologue au 
RMiste. 
(Bekhouche, Butzbach, Kharmoudi 1989,277) 
4.6.2 Voting rights for foreigners 
A great deal of debate in the past few years has focused on the question of 
voting rights of non-French nationals in local elections. Opinion within PS 
ranks has been divided on the issue despite the support of President Mitterrand 
himself and another prominent advocate, Pierre Mauroy. However, public 
opinion polls have consistently revealed that French people at large would react 
negatively to the prospect of non-EC nationals being eligible to vote. Division 
within the government is reflected to some extent in the stances adopted by 
France-Plus and SOS-Racisme. 
The former, while supporting in theory the right of non-French citizens who 
have been resident for some time in France to vote in local elections, urges 
caution as to the practicality of this in at least three respects. Firstly Dahmani 
argues that it would he prudent not to consider questions of this nature during 
electoral periods since there are more important issues to be addressed: 
A la lumiere des nouvelles donnks socio-ddmographiques et des enjeux 
politiques de demain, France-Plus choisit de geler la question du droit de 
vote des immigres pendant cette periode electorale, afin que l'on prenne 
en compte les vrais problemes des strangers. 
(France-Plus n. d. b, 1) 
Secondly Dahmani believes that the granting of the right to vote would be 
unpopular with the French public in addition to posing constitutional problems. 
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He would advocate the right to vote as the ultimate proof of what he terms the 
successful 'integration' of non-French citizens, but at present does not think this 
is feasible: 
Le droit de vote n'est pas une prioritd, inutile de se raconter des 
histoires ; aujourd'hui, compte tenu des obstacles constitutionnels et de 
I'etat de l'opinion, le droit de vote est impensable. Il sera la phase ultime 
d'une politique d'integration reussie. 
(Le Monde 7 April 1990). 
Thirdly Dahmani argues that publicly advocating the right to vote for foreigners 
could prove counter-productive and result in the opposite of what is actually 
being sought: 
Si on veut n'obtenir aucun resultat, il n'y a qu'ä brandir ce droit de vote a 
chaque consultation Clectorale. Plus on aggressera les Bens, plus on les 
braquera avec cette idCe, moins eile passera. 
(Le Point 24 April 1989) 
The reticent position of France-Plus contrasts starkly with that of SOS-Racisme. 
Harlem D6sir makes no secret of his support for non-French nationals being 
eligible to vote. He argues that it would be a clear victory for democracy: 
Une partie de I'opinion percoit ce droit de vote comme dtant une 
conquete naturelle de la democratie qui devra venir en son temps parce 
qu'elle est logique: ces immigres vivent parmi nous; ils ont les memes 
devoirs que nous; la seule perspective raisonnable c'est lour integration: ä 
partir de la il faut s'en donner les moyens et la citoyennetC est un de ces 
moyens. 
(Bekhouche, Butzbach, Kharmoudi 1989,258). 
SOS-Racisme has demonstrated its support for the right to vote by organising a 
petition in favour of it. 
Even greater schisms between the two organisations are apparent when 
considering the question of 'associated' municipal councillors, i. e. non-French 
citizens who are elected at municipal level and can express their views on the 
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municipality, but who do not enjoy any of the voting rights or powers of a fully 
fledged municipal councillor. 
Dahmani believes that electing associated councillors is a mascarade which 
deflects attention away from what he perceives to be the more important question 
of councillors of French nationality: 
Je ne suis pas dans cette logique de reprdsentativitd. Je suis dans une 
logique de reflexion sur des problemes concrets. Car j'estime. que la 
commission extramunicipale fonctionne aujourd'hui comme une 
mascarade. C'est le vrai conseil municipal qu'il faut viser. Tant que ces 
conseillers municipaux associCs n'ont pas le bulletin de vote pour 
sanctionner ou adopter, tous les discours restent des discours. 
(Bekhouche, Butzbach, Kharmoudi 1989,272-3) 
An official France-Plus pamphlet goes even further in its condemnation of 
associated councillors. It likens the whole endeavour to one with colonialist 
overtones and condemns it in the clearest possible terms: 
Nous ne voulons pas de cette mascarade. A France-Plus, nous n'avons 
pas la memoire courte. Hier, 1'Alg&rie francaise. On pratiquait dtjä le 
meme systeme : les Europ6ens dans le premier college, les indigenes 
daps le second college. Nous sommes opposes ä la mise en place de 
commissions extra-municipales. Nous voulons un choix clair : soit les 
etrangers votent, soit ils ne votent pas. 
(France-Plus n. d. b, 3) 
A very different opinion was voiced by Harlem Desir. When asked how he 
viewed the results of the first experience of associated councillors in Mons-en- 
Baroeul and Amiens, his response was far more positive: 
C'est tres pddagogique. La demonstration y est faite que 4a peut marcher, 
qu'on ne met pas le monde sens dessus-dessous en donnant aux 
immigrds le droit de participer au conseil municipal, de s'exprimer sur 
tous les points du budget... I1 faut mutiplier ces experiences en sachant 
qu'elles ne peuvent pas titre une finalite, parce qu'elles sont pastes sur 
des colleges Clectoraux separes. 
(Bckhouche, Butzbach, Kharmoudi 1989,262) 
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Not only, then, is SOS-Racisme in favour of associated councillors, but its 
president argues in favour of increasing their number. 
4.6.3 Links with Jewish youth organisations and the Palestinian 
question 
If there is one issue that unites Maghrebians in France above all others, then it is 
the continuing conflict in the Middle East and their support for the Palestinian 
cause. This is particularly the case among French youths of Maghrebian origin 
who identify their own plight with that of Palestinian youths. Both SOS- 
Racisme and France-Plus have been confronted with the issue and in the case of 
the former the problem has been posed from the outset of how to bring together 
French youths of the Jewish and Muslim faiths. Arie Bensemhoun, president of 
the Union des etudiants juifs de France (UEJF), and a member of SOS- 
Racisme explains the inherent problems of accommodating the two groups: 
Au moment oü, en 1985, nous avons decide de creer SOS-Racisme, l'une 
des questions majeures a ete de savoir comment faire s'asseoir cote a 
cote de jeunes juifs sionistes et de jeunes Aralies prohahlement les 
defenseurs de ]a cause palestinienne. 
(L'Express 8 July 1988) 
Despite an awareness of the problem faced, or perhaps because of it, SOS- 
Racisme has attempted to avoid adopting a clearcut position on the Palestinian 
question. When Bensemhoun and Dahmani met to discuss this among other 
topics, the former advanced the argument that expressing views on the Middle 
East had nothing to do with combating racism in France: 
11 n'a jamais ete question pour SOS-Racisme de rtgler le conflit au 
Moyen-Orient! ca n'a rien ä voir avec le racisme en France, avec les 
droits de I'homme en URSS ou en Afrique du Sud. 11 ne faut pas tout 
confondre. 
(L'Express 8 July 1988). 
Dahmani's response was to point out double standards in the behaviour of SOS- 
Racisme: 
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D'accord, mais SOS-Racisme a quand meme manifest6 dans la rue pour 
les juifs d'URSS, de Syrie. Il ne 1'a pas fait pour les territoires ocacups. 
(L'Express 8 July 1988) 
Not only were there divisions between France-Plus and SOS-Racisme over the 
issue, but within the SOS-Racisme leadership, there were calls, notably from 
French youths of Maghrebian origin, for the organisation to support the cause 
of the Palestinians. The views of Kaissa Titous were illustrative of this. In her 
view, it was vital that SOS-Racisme, 
condamne la r6pression, reclame son arret, exige le retrait de l'armee 
[isradlienne] et reconnaisse le droit du peuple palestinien A une terre. 
(L'Express 8 July 1988) 
Arezki Dahmani believes that it was a mistake on the part of SOS-Racisme to 
bring together two groups as manifestly disparate as French youths of the 
Jewish and Muslim faiths and expect them to work in harmony when the 
organisation had no clear directive as to what its policy towards the Middle East 
should be, or indeed whether it should adopt any kind of position on the matter: 
C'est sans doute qu'il ya eu des erreurs au prealable. La volonte de 
depart, c'Ctait bien de regrouper un front uni antiraciste. Seulement il n'y 
a jamais eu de clarification sur le Moyen-Orient. Si la question des 
droits de 1'homme etait claire ä SOS-Racisme, si on avait dit des le depart 
qu'ils sont invisibles partout dans le monde, on n'en seraitjamais arrives 
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(L'Express 8 July 1988) 
Dahmani continues to argue against the logic of grouping together Jews and 
Muslims when expressing the view that French citizens of the two religions do 
not face the same problems of discrimination within French society. Nor do they 
enjoy a similar social status: 
Pour les Franco-Maghrebins, le racisme se vit au quotidien. Lid ä leur 
statut social defavorisd [... ]. Les juifs vivent le racisme A un autre niveau. 
Par leur histoire, par leur mdmoire, ils ont su se structurer. D'une 
manii re genorale, ils ont un statut social en France qui n'est pas celui des 
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Franco-Maghrtbins. 
(L'Express 8 July 1988) 
4.7 The views of councillors on France-Plus and SOS-Racisme 
In the questionnaire which was administered, councillors were asked to express 
their opinions on France-Plus and SOS-Racisme. In addition they were asked to 
answer questions on membership of these associations and to say whether they 
had been supported by either during the municipal election campaign of 1989. 
4.7.1 France-Plus 
Of the 23 councillors in our sample, 8 are, or have been, members of this 
association. One of these has subsequently resigned. Councillors were asked to 
rank on a scale of 1 to 4 their feelings towards the association. These ranged 
from extreme antipathy (=1) to wholehearted endorsement (=4). Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, of the 5 councillors who accorded 4 points to France-Plus, 
all but one were also members. The two councillors who gave France-Plus 3 
points each equally belonged to the association. No fewer than 10 councillors 
(including one member of France-Plus) expressed only lukewarm support for 
France-Plus, giving it 2 points, while the remaining 6 councillors were 
unsympathetic and gave only one point. 
Thus less than a third of our total sample of councillors (7) reacted favourably to 
the association. Of the remainder, the majority were either indifferent (10), or 
hostile (6). In order to explain these figures, councillors were asked during the 
interview to expand upon the views expressed in the questionnaire. Among the 6 
who did not endorse France-Plus, a number of criticisms were voiced 
concerning the association. Prominent among these was dissatisfaction with the 
following: the operational mode of the association; false claims which it was felt 
had been made by the movement; the origins of France-Plus; its links with 
particular sections of the Maghrebian population in France and the extent to 
which the association reflects the reality of life in France for Maghrebians; the 
close identification of the association with the PS; the political-style organisation 
of the movement. 
Several councillors argued that France-Plus had too similar a role to other 
associations such as SOS-Racisme and the CNESOM, as the following two 
testimonies indicate: 
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Je crois que cela [France-Plus] s'inscrit dans la meme We que SOS- 
Racisme. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
Le probleme, c'est qu'Arezki Dahmani avail voulu avoir tout de suite la 
meme mission [la CNESOM]. La meme chose a ett abominable pour 
nous [La CNESOM]. 
(Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
The latter councillor believes that France-Plus went out of its way to enlist the 
support of councillors of Maghrebian origin when often such backing was not 
in fact forthcoming. Moreover she argues that the association has been 
dishonest in painting a false picture of its links with councillors: 
Arezki Dahmani recupere un peu trop les gens. II annonce des chiffres 
qui sont completement faux. Its [France-Plus] annoncent des gens chez 
eux qui ne le sont pas. 
(Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
Another councillor questioned the origins of the association and feels that it may 
have been created artificially: 
Je ne vois pas d'oü ils [France-Plus] tiennent leurs sources. D'oü est ne 
ce mouvement. Tai l'impression que c'est un truc monta par quelqu'un. 
(Bellouch, Gennevillicrs) 
Several councillors reproached the association for being too closely identified 
with a specific segment of the Maghrebian population in France, that of Kabyle 
origin. This, according to the following account, has resulted in a'ghettoisation' 
of the movement vis-ä-vis Maghrebians resident in France as a whole: 
C'est comme une association kabyle. C'est a dire ]a communautd de la 
communaute. Moi, vela me gene personnellement. Je prr fi re quelque 
chose qui s'ouvre comme la CNESOM ou SOS-Racisme et qui ne se 
ferme pas. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
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One councillor, herself of Kabyle descent, echoes the close identification of 
France-Plus with the Kabyle population: 
... ll [Arezki Dahmani] est le fief des Kabyles et cela ne me plait pas non 
plus. Le bureau est compose presque exclusivement de Kabyles. Je suis 
Kabyle moi-meme. Mais on refait un ghetto clans le ghetto. 
(Nadia Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
A number of councillors have taken issue with the dichotomy between, on the 
one hand, the discourse of France-Plus, and on the other its actions in practice. 
In particular the links that France-Plus has had with the PS have been severely 
criticised in that the movement claims to be apolitical. A maire-adjointe, who 
resigned as a member of the association, aired the following views on the 
subject: 
Je n'ai pas apprecie les propos qui ont ett tenus de la part du president 
de France-Plus. Il est ä la fois recu et a des relations aupres de certains 
ministeres dans le PS et se permet de denigrer le PS. Je veux dire qu'il 
faut choisir quelque part. 
(Cocozza, Drancy) 
Linked to the aforementioned criticism, another councillor condemned the 
association for constantly changing and seeking to attract the attention of the 
media: 
Its [France-Plus] sont trop mddiatises. Its sont trop virulents. Its 
changent toujours de position. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
The charge of operating in the same manner as a political party is levelled at 
France-Plus by one of its founder members, a former student at the University 
of Villetaneuse and now a councillor. He argues that not only does it have 
relations with political parties, but that it has now begun to function like one and 
this is something he regrets: 
Ty adhere [ä France-Plus] dans le coeur, mais moins dann la pratique 
parce que j'ai beaucoup aimd les d6buts et si je n'ai pas adhdrtt a un parti 
politique, c'est parce que je refusais la logique et le raisonnement d'un 
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parti politique. Et j'y suis moms ä France-Plus parce que j'ai peur que 
cela devienne, en tout cas Bans son fonctionnement, comme un parti 
politique. 
(Tounsi, Evry) 
Some councillors expressed the opinion that the whole concept of France-Plus 
is out of touch with the reality of life in France for the majority of Maghrebians 
since the members of this association are almost exclusively composed of elites. 
According to the following account, the latter are out of touch with grass-roots 
level: 
Et puis c'est quand meme pas une image de la realite. Cest des elites. 
Cela touche enormement les 61ites. 
(Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
4.7.2 SOS-Racisme 
Given that only two of the councillors in our sample are members of SOS- 
Racisme, it is, perhaps, of little surprise that our interviewees should be reluctant 
to express their opinions on the association. When asked to fill in the 
questionnaire section on the association, only one councillor (who was not one 
of the two SOS-Racisme members) wholeheartedly endorsed SOS-Racisme, 
awarding 4 points. Another two councillors gave the association 3 points, 
indicating at least some degree of support. Of the rest, 7 councillors expressed 
only lukewarm support (=2 points), while a very clear majority (13), according 
one point each, indicating a fundamental lack of sympathy. 
The general absence of discourse on SOS-Racisme during the follow-up 
interviews revealed an indifference rather than an outright hostility to the 
association. This indifference may he attributable in part to SOS-Racisme 
having relatively little contact with Maghrebian councillors. Nevertheless among 
the minority of councillors who did support it, a variety of masons were cited. 
These included endorsement of its anti-racist stance: 
Je suis un sympathisant de tons les mouvements qui cherchent ä avancer 
certaines idees. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
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Others acknowledged the transformation in outlook of the association in 
attempting to tackle more tangible problems and felt this compared favourably 
with France-Plus: 
Je n'ai jamais fait partie [de SOS-Racisme], mais j'ai plus de sympathie 
[pour lui que par rapport ä France-Plus] parce qu'ils font des chores 
concretes qui nous touchent. 
(Bellouch, Gennevilliers). 
On the other hand some councillors did criticise SOS-Racisme. 
One councillor argued, contrary to the previous endorsement of SOS-Racisme, 
that the association did not in fact do enough in practical terms and complained 
that its anti-racist goals had proven counter-productive: 
Pour moi SOS-Racisme ddveloppait des ides de lutte contre le racisme, 
mais ne trouvait aucun champ d'applications. Je pense que les idles ne 
suffisent pas si olles ne peuvent se manifester dans le concret. Pour moi 
c'est [SOS-Racisme] plutöt un slogan de bonne conscience qui sonne 
creux et qui, en plus, est ä double tranchant, car, crier "Halte au racisme" 
tout le temps et sans cesse peut dveiller des consciences endormies 
[racistes ou non] et aboutir ä 1'effet inverse de ce que l'on attendait. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
It needs to be pointed out that the above councillor is a long-time member and 
supporter of France-Plus. Another councillor, who was not a member of either 
association, took issue with SOS-Racisme because of its links with Jewish 
youth organisations and criticised France-Plus which has flirted with Jewish 
organisations for the same reason: 
Parce que bon il ya 1'expdrience de France-Plus et de SOS-Racisme et 
on a vu ce que cela a donnd avec les Juifs. Les Arabes sont toujours 
obliges de faire des concessions et de ne plus tenir ä leurs positions. 
(Rahmouni, Venissieux) 
It should be stresssed that the above testimony is not necessarily shared by all 
councillors in our sample and reflects rather an extreme viewpoint. Nevertheless 
it is true to say that some Maghrebian councillors have been alienated from 
SOS-Racisme by virtue of these links and its ambiguous position vis-A-vis the 
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plight of the Palestinians. In this respect, then, the above views may be the most 
open expression of latent criticisms that councillors were unwilling to air in 
public. One should not forget that the interviews were conducted for the most 
part in the aftermath of the Gulf War and there may have been a marked 
reluctance to criticise SOS-Racisme's links with Jewish organisations since 
several councillors in our sample are resident in municipalities with significant 
numbers of people of the Jewish faith. 
One councillor argued that the well-publicised national associations such as 
SOS-Racisme and France-Plus have occupied too much of the media limelight 
and that as a result disproportionate importance has been attached to their 
opinions in relation to other associations who may have equally valid views they 
wish to voice: 
Qu'on ne donne pas uniquement la parole 1 France-Plus et SOS- 
Racisme. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
4.8 Recent Developments 
4.8.1 France-Plus 
While divisions within France-Plus only began to surface in the national press 
during and after the Gulf War, internal dissensions were apparent as early as 
June 1989, when a delegation was organised by the association to visit the 
Maghreb. The delegation, which was made up of 15 Maghrebians including 8 
municipal councillors, was invited by the Algerian government to explain the 
problems of 'integration' into French society that Maghrebians faced. Among the 
delegation, four councillors on PS lists, including a maire-adjointe in my 
sample, disagreed with the views expressed by the leader, Arezki Dahmani, and 
argued that they were not able to voice their own opinions freely. The maire- 
adjointe, who subsequently resigned from France-Plus as a direct result of these 
differences, expressed her disapproval in the following terms: 
J'ai demissionne. C'dtait lors d'une deldgation organisCe en AlgCrie [... ]. 
Je n'ai pas apprCcie les propos qui ont dte tenus de la part du president 
de France-Plus. 
(Cocozza, Drancy) 
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The maire-adjointe objected to the way in which Dahmani criticised the PS, 
while at the same time maintaining close links with government ministries. 
Upon returning to France a press conference was held during which the four 
councillors articulated the following reservations concerning the trip: 
On a fait six jours avec cette delegation et on a fait une conference de 
presse en disant que nous ne nous reconnaissons pas dans la ddmarche 
de France-Plus teile qu'elle est dtablie. 
(Cocozza, Drancy) 
Divisions within France-Plus became more manifest during the Gulf crisis in the 
period preceding the opening of hostilities. Dahmani endorsed French 
government policy during the hostilities (see section 7.2 for further details) and 
argued that there was overwhelming support among the Maghrebian population 
in France: 
Personne [parmi les populations issues de l'immigration maghrc binc], 
par exemple, ne dit qu'il se refuserait de se battre pour la France contre 
un etat arabe... 
(Le Quotidien de Paris 16 January 1991) 
The above comments contrasted sharply with those of other members of France- 
Plus, of whom the then leader of the regional association in Paris, Farid Smahi, 
was the most vociferous in condemning French military action against fellow 
Arabs: 
Est-ce que la securite de la France est menacee? Non. Pourquoi aller 
combattre d'autres Arabes, alors qu'il existe des violations beaucoup plus 
importantes, et que les medias n'en ont pas alerte l'opinion publique? 
(Le Quotidien de Paris 9 January 1991. ) 
Councillors in our sample who are also members of France-Plus acknowledged 
that opinions on the Gulf crisis were divided among activists. This applied for 
example to one councillor who reflected a more widespread view that support for 
French military intervention would he conditional on the Palestinian question 
being addressed at the same time: 
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Si on s'occupe des Palestiniens, je veux bien partir, sinon je ne pars pas. 
(Le Quotidien de Paris 9 January 1991) 
Another councillor who belonged to the association confirmed that there were 
divisions inside France-Plus's executive committee: 
Il y en avait qui etaient pour l'intervention de la France et il y en avait qui 
etaient contre. 
(Aissiou, St. Ouen) 
In April 1992 Smahi formerly dissolved the Paris committee of France-Plus and 
left to create his own organisation, Arabisme et Francit6. Contrary to Dahmani's 
philosophy of learning from the mistakes of the American model and steering 
away from any 'community' mentality, Smahi instead advocates the African- 
American model of promoting cultural differences. In addition Smahi directly 
criticised Dahmani's leadership which he believed devoted too little time to 
attending to concerns at grass-roots level: 
Arezki a fait une politique de cabinet au lieu d'aller sur le terrain. 
(Liberation 23 April 1992) 
Criticism over the financial handling of the association was expressed, not only 
by Smahi, but also by members of the France-Plus leadership that remained, of 
whom the most prominent was its then vice-president Nadia Amiri. In July 1992 
Amiri was excluded from the association on the grounds that she had refused to 
adhere to a charter drawn up by Dahmani according to which members must not 
break a strict code of secrecy concerning the movement's affairs. Dahmani has 
thus far refrained from commenting publicly on this. Amiri refused to adhere to 
the charter for the following reasons: 
On ne peut plus continuer dans ce climat proche de la malversation du 
point de vue financier et completement opaque du point de vue du 
fonctionnement interne. 
(Liberation 24-25 October 1992) 
She refused to, 
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signer une charte deontologique qui etait un veritable acte d'alltgeance a 
Arezki Dahmani. Cette charte nous soumettait ä un devoir de reserve et 
de discretion par rapport aux activites de France-Plus. 
(Derrieres Nouvelles d'Alsace 24 October 1992) 
In reaction to her exclusion by central headquarters, the Strasbourg section of 
France-Plus, to which Amiri belongs, rejected her dismissal and sent a letter to 
Arezki Dahmani calling for his dismissal. Disapproval among local committee 
heads of the manner in which Amiri was treated and of the secret charter spread 
throughout the country and resulted in the secession of several committees into 
autonomous organisations. Thus the former head of France-Plus in Nice, 
Abdellatif Ben Omar, set up France Euro-Citoyennet&, Arno Ferrati in Lille, 
founded Espace Int6gration and Rachid Kassi in Hauts-de-Seine created 
Ddmocratia. Other local heads resigned including David Sery Deles in 
Vandoeuvre-Les-Nancy and Charles Baudoin Djoudi in Lyons, who expressed 
the following criticism of Dahmani's handling of finances: 
J'ai claque la porte en avril dernier. Ici [au comite de Lyon] on s'est 
dissous. On ne voyait jamais un sou venir de Paris. J'en avais mane 
d'etre de ma poche. 
(L'Evenement du Jeudi, 22-28 October 1992) 
The financial dealings of individual France-Plus members had already been 
called into question in May 1991 when Aziz Sahiri, then president of the 
association in Isere and a maire-adjoint in my sample, had been found guilty of 
embezzling funds (Le Monde 3 April 1992). In July 1992 the Ministry for 
Social Affairs ordered a far more extensive examination of France-Plus's 
finances with a special auditing committee of the FAS being commissioned to 
make a comprehensive report. In the findings of the report a number of major 
criticisms were made of the leadership in its handling of finance of which the 
following three were prominent: 
(i) Financial irregularities had been observed during 1989 and 1990. 
Expenditure claims had been made without sufficient explanation of the nature 
of such claims. 
(ii) Unjustifiable expenditure for the above period totalled 30,0()0 francs and in 
particular exorbitant travel expenses had been incurred by the President of the 
organisation. These accounted for 67.3% of total travel expenses. 
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(iii) Staff payments had not been made in the normal manner. 
In its conclusions the auditing report remarked: 
Nos contröles ont releve plusieurs points qui ne nous semblent pas 
entrer dans Pobjet de 1'association et des niveaux de remboursements de 
frais que l'on trouve rarement dans les associations financ6es par le FAS. 
(Fonds d'Action Sociale 1992,8-9 ) 
Inherent in the committee's conclusions was criticism of the highly centralised 
nature of France-Plus's organisational 'set-up'. This, according to the report's 
findings, greatly hindered relations between headquarters in Paris and the 
regional committees and made the separation of functions within the movement 
problematic: 
Les conventions entre France-Plus et ses comites rrgionaux sont parfois 
inexistantes et leurs modeles ne precisent pas a quel exercice olles se 
rattachent. 
(Fonds d'Action Sociale 1992,9) 
La separation des fonctions de France-Plus West pas satisfaisante car 
extremement centralisCe autour de quelques personnes. 
(Fonds d'Action Sociale 1992,11) 
The report observed that the regular advice of financial experts had not been 
heeded by the France-Plus leadership and recommended that its expenditure 
should therefore be reduced by a substantial amount. 
In the period since its creation France-Plus has experienced great difficulty in 
broadening its support among Maghrebians and this has been recognised by 
public powers controlling the purse-strings of the association. This is, perhaps, 
illustrated also by the association's noticeable reluctance to disclose figures on 
its membership, when in other respects it has been only too eager to produce 
figures on the number of candidates 'sponsored' and youths enrolled on electoral 
lists. However, while the publicised internal divisions higlighted above have 
certainly not helped, the association's failure to attract widespread support 
among the Maghrebian population in France cannot be attributed to this factor 
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alone. Rather the inability of France-Plus to create a network of activists at 
grass-roots level has been a more important factor. As Geisser (1993,12) has 
rightly pointed out, the association has attempted to conceal its lack of appeal 
among Maghrebians by adopting the following approach: 
Pour pallier ä ce deficit [de militants sur le terrain], la direction de 
Fassociation a tente de bätir une "vitrine ethnique" composee d'individus 
issus de l'immigration, censee la representer dans les meetings, les 
emissions de tClCvision ou les diverses manifestations. 
The France-Plus leadership has therefore had to face up to the following 
dilemma: continue as at present with a membership that is at best stagnant and 
which in practice may well be in decline, especially with the fragmentation of the 
association into splinter-groups; or attempt to widen the appeal of the 
association by including non-Maghrebians. Faced with this stark choice, France- 
Plus would appear to have opted for the latter, as Geisser reveals after having 
interviewed the association's leadership: 
Confrontee ä cette crise de representation, eile [France-Plus] a dtd 
obligde de s'ouvrir ä de nouvelles categories d'adhdrents, justifiant son 
ouverture par une argumentation de type : "Nous sommes une 
association qui luttons pour l'intdgration, il est donc normal que nous 
acceptions des Francais de toute origine". 
(Geisser 1993,12) 
Given the emphasis that France-Plus has placed upon electoral goals, this has 
led to a profound change in its policy. If the following testimony of the 
Secretary General of'France-Plus is to be believed, then henceforth the 
association will be prepared to 'sponsor' non-Maghrebians to electoral office for 
the 1995 municipal elections: 
Moi, j'ai demand6 une plus large ouverture. ca consisterait i1 presenter 
des candidats neufs, montrer que les valeurs de France-Plus sont aussi 
dcfendues par des non-beurs [... ]. 11 faut que ca devienne un concept, et 
non pas un rassemblement ethnique. 
(Geisser 1993,13) 
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It remains to be seen whether a new electorate can he attracted to the movement, 
particularly at a time when the activities and achievements of France-Plus have 
been called into question. 
4.8.2 SOS-Racisme 
While internal divisions in SOS have been less pronounced and publicised than 
those in France-Plus, there have nevertheless been significant changes made to 
the composition of the leadership. This culminated in the resignation of Harlem 
D6sir from the post of president on 5 September 1992. Prior to this a number of 
the earliest members of the association had gradually departed from the 
movement, most notably Julien Dray and Isabelle Thomas, to further their 
personal political ambitions in the PS. Desir had become increasingly 
disillusioned with the traditional parties of the Left and in particular with the PS. 
The first signs of this were manifest in May 1990 when at a press conference of 
the Radio station Europe 1, Desir openly criticised comments made by the then 
prime minister, Michel Rocard, concerning ethnic minorities. Dt-tsir complained 
about the endless debates on 'integration' and instead advocated practical action 
on the matter: 
Les annonces du pouvoir ne se traduisent pas sur le terrain car dans les 
cites, F' chec scolaire se poursuit, il n'y a pas d'Cquipements sportifs, et 
les transports sont absents apres 20 heures. 
(Le Monde 8 May 1990) 
Desir was also clearly offended by Rocard's comment that France could no 
longer, "accepter tonte la misere du monde". 
(Le Monde 8 January 1990) 
Ideological differences over the issue of immigration were translated into 
practice during SOS-Racisme's third annual congress between 28 and 30 April 
1990. A series of practical measures designed to "casser les ghettos" was 
approved and, in the closing speech, Desir sent out the following message to the 
PS leadership: 
Nous [SOS-Racisme] constatons que les choses n'ont pas change sur le 
terrain et nous proposons des solutions. S'ils [lc gouvernement] 
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prennent des mesures pour casser les ghettos dans les villes et dans les 
ecoles, its retrouveront notre confiance. 
(Le Monde 3 May 1990) 
A point of no return was reached during the Gulf War when SOS-Racisme 
distanced itself from the government and opposed military intervention (see 
section 7.2 for further details). 
The change in presidency resulted in an almost immediate apolitical stance being 
adopted by the new leadership. In so doing, it has clearly sought to distance 
itself from the PS. Its new president, Fodd Sylla, thirty year old activist of 
Senegalese descent, who played a prominent role in the 1986 student 
demonstrations while at the University of Crelteil, is himself a former member of 
the PS, who became disillusioned with the party and has subsequently 
relinquished all links. Sylla has strived to promote an apolitical image of the 
association. This was reflected in the following comments made concerning the 
1993 legislative elections: 
Nous [la societt francaise] entrerons dans une annee politiquement 
chargee, mais SOS ne donnera aucune consigne de vote. 
(Le Monde 8 September 1992) 
This contrasted, though, with Desir's calls prior to the 1988 presidential 
elections for French nationals to vote for the PS candidate, Francois Mitterrand. 
Desir, upon leaving SOS-Racisme, was involved in an abortive attempt to set up 
a new movement, Action-Egalite. When this failed, he joined Generation 
Ecologic for whom he stood as a candidate in Trappes (Yvelines) during the 
March 1993 legislative elections. A former vice-president of SOS-Racisme, 
Hayette Boudjema, was also a Generation Ecologic candidate at these elections 
in Saint-Denis (Seine-Saint-Denis). Both candidates failed to amass a sufficient 
number of votes to enter the second round. 
4.9 Conclusion 
Discussion in this chapter has centred around the nature of national ethnic 
minority pressure groups and their links with political parties. My analysis of 
France-Plus and SOS-Racisme has revealed that their relationships with political 
parties are both complex and paradoxical; while the associations often criticise 
the visions of society that political parties may have, the need to survive means 
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that collusion is often sought with different political powers. This is particularly 
the case for France-Plus. Geisser (1993,10) in his most recent study of 
Maghrebian elites severely criticises France-Plus for its attempt, a failed one in 
his opinion, to "cultiver un apolitisme de facade". According to Geisser this 
results in the following three outcomes: a lack of change in leadership; low rates 
of activism among members; a tendency among the leadership to personalise 
power which in turn leads to a form of clientelism. My own research would tend 
to back up these findings. 
However, the question of the relationship between ethnic political elites and the 
minority group interests that the former claim to represent still remains largely 
unanswered. To what extent is it possible for the leaders of France-Plus and 
SOS-Racisme to represent minority groups? Are they, as Geisser (1992,136) 
suggests, increasingly perceived by researchers and ethnic minority communities 
alike as, "elites communautaires sans communaute"? What role do ethnic elites 
play with regard to political participation? To attempt to answer these questions, 
one first of all needs to distinguish between different types of ethnic political 
leaders. A number of typologies have been formulated to determine the nature of 
ethnic political elites in the United States and we shall briefly consider the two 
most salient of these for our own research. 
The first of these was put forward by Myrdal (1944) to explain the African- 
American political leadership. It divides ethnic leaders into broadly two groups. 
In the first group, which Myrdal refers to as based on 'accommodation' 
leadership, the socio-economic order in place is not called into question, nor is 
there any attempt to break down harriers of hierarchy. Instead ethnic leaders 
belonging to this category have as their prime objective the best possible 
adaptation of the minority group into mainstream society. As Martiniello (1992) 
has commented, leaders in this group strive via negociation and compromise to 
secure the best possible improvement for the minority group. The second group, 
which Myrdal calls 'protest' leadership, aims rather at destroying the status quo 
and in addition questions both the behaviour and actions of the dominant 
society. My own research on national pressure groups in France suggests that 
the leaders of France-Plus and SOS-Racisme are more likely to belong to the 
former category. Myrdal argues further that it is in the interest of the dominant 
white society to rely on 'accommodation' leaders since such elites can be used to 
help control and pacify the ethnic minority group. 
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While Myrdal's model has contributed significantly to the field in that it has 
enabled political scientists to differentiate between contrasting types of ethnic 
leaders, with respect to the French situation it is, perhaps, an oversimplistic 
model and a somewhat dated one, bearing in mind the development of elite 
models in the United States in the 1960s and in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Higham (1981) provides a more contemporary model which enables a greater 
diversity of elite leadership models to be compared and contrasted. This is 
particularly appropriate for our purposes in that Higham highlights three types 
of ethnic leaders and their relationship vis-ä-vis both the ethnic minority group 
and the dominant society. According to the first type, known as 'received' 
leadership, the pre-existing network of elites in the country of origin is 
transposed to the country of immigration. In the second, referred to as 'internal' 
leadership, ethnic leaders come to the fore within their own ethnic group and act 
as spokespersons for the ethnic minority group in its dealings with the dominant 
society. Thirdly there is what Higham calls a 'projective' leadership. By this he 
makes reference to individuals from the minority group who have attracted 
attention beyond the ethnic group that they are identified with. While leaders 
belonging to this category have gained recognition outside their ethnic group, 
their links with the latter are weak. Nevertheless, despite the tenuous links that 
leaders may have with members of their own ethnic group, they remain a 
symbolic source of pride. Individuals in the 'projective' leadership may be 
artistic, intellectual, sporting, or even business personalities who have gained 
widespread recognition in the dominant society. Both the present leader of 
France-Plus and the former leader of SOS-Racisme may belong to this category 
rather than the preceding two. In the case of Arezki Dahmani, his accession to 
power as the leader of France-Plus was provided, not by any popular 
Maghrebian base of support, but by a disparate group of individuals sympathetic 
to the PS, among whom figure non-Maghrebians occupying positions of power 
within this political party. With regard to Harlem Nsir, while he does not claim 
to represent any one ethnic minority group, the links that Julien Dray was able to 
forge with PS leaders greatly facilitated the development of the association and 
the symbolic aspect of Desir's leadership enabled the anti-racist message to be 
disseminated more effectively. 
The question of representativeness and legitimacy is an important factor that 
needs to be considered. If our sample of councillors is indicative of 
Maghrebians in France in general, then it may be the case that for reasons 
expanded upon in section 4.7.1, Dahmani is perceived in somewhat negative 
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terms. However, the extent to which ethnic leaders can ever hope to be truly 
representative of the minority group they claim to serve is clearly problematic 
and the same question could equally be posed of political leaders in general 
irrespective of race, religion, or nationality. 
Rather, as Martiniello (1992) has argued, there needs to be greater emphasis 
placed on the conditions in which ethnic leaders have emerged. Two 
fundamental questions need to be asked here: who gains access to positions of 
power within the ethnic minority group and how? One hypothesis, referred to as 
the 'situationist' approach, posits that the emergence of ethnic leaders is 
dependent to a large extent upon the characteristics of the situation and period. 
Thus it it feasible that an ethnic leadership may be imposed externally by 
authorities in the dominant society. Huggins (1978) argues that in the American 
case dominant white society has found it easier in terms of social control to 
extract a few personalities from the ethnic minority group and has made leaders 
out of them. Does this model, then, fit the French situation and explain why 
Dahmani, for example, has emerged as a leader? 
The 'situationist' approach contains at least two fundamental weaknesses. Firstly, 
even where an artificial leadership has been created, one still needs to examine 
the reasons which have led to one individual being preferred to another. 
Dahmani for example may have been preferred to other potential candidates 
because of his professional status as a university lecturer. Secondly and 
crucially, however, once in power an ethnic leader may indeed modify his or her 
mode of behaviour and actions. In the specific case of Arezki Dahmani the 
'situationist' approach certainly fails to take account of individual variables. 
While it may be true that Dahmani was initially given the mantle of France-Plus 
leader by Chevalier and Morin to exert some degree of influence over the 
Maghrebian population (and perhaps also because Dahmani, rightly or wrongly, 
may have been perceived as manipulable by the aforementioned individuals), 
once Dahmani took over the leadership role he made it his own and has directed 
the association into areas with which the founder members disagreed. 
Is it possible, then, to define the role(s) that ethnic leaders assume? Do they, as 
some researchers have argued, act as intermediaries between the ethnic minority 
group and the society at large, and if so what is the nature of the intermediary 
relationship? Geisser (1992) urges caution for, in his view, the whole idea of an 
intermediary role makes two major presuppositions. Firstly Geisser questions 
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whether it is normal that ethnic elites should assume such a role, which, in his 
opinion, recalls the colonial context in which an'indigenous' elite worked for the 
colonising administration. Secondly he points to the ambiguous attitude of 
ethnic minority associations such as France-Plus which, while promoting 
minority group candidates to electoral office, have not formulated any clear 
criteria upon which such candidates may be selected. 
Taking on board the above considerations, it nevertheless seems accurate to 
suggest that ethnic leaders do act as intermediaries between the ethnic minority 
group and French society. In the case of Arezki Dahmani, press coverage on the 
opinions of Maghrebians has focused predominantly, if not exclusively, on his 
opinions. In the absence of a clearly designated Maghrebian political leadership, 
any pretentions that Dahmani may have to speak on behalf of the Maghrebian 
population resident in France have only infrequently been called into question 
by the media. Indeed Negrouche (1992) has argued that Dahmani has 
deliberately set out to become a yardstick of opinion on a multiplicity of issues 
related to the Maghrehian population in France. Negrouche believes that the 
attitude adopted by Dahmani vis-ä-vis the media is indicative of 
l'existence d'une forte strategie mddiatique chez cet enseignant en 
dconomie qui ne leine pas sur les interviews, les declarations A la presse 
ou les communiques. A tel point que le president de France-Plus est 
aujourd'hui devenu une sorte de barometre beur sur lesquels les 
journalistes se prdcipitent pour la prdtendue mdtCo communautaire, des 
qu'il est question d'immigration. 
(Negrouche 1992,51) 
Ethnic leaders have, then, enabled some sort of mediation to take place between 
ethnic minority pressure groups and the political party in power. However, even 
if one accepts that ethnic leaders are able to articulate at least some of the 
demands, hopes and fears of the minority group, there remains the question of 
dual loyalty. On the one hand ethnic leaders are perceived by society at large to 
be representatives of the ethnic minority population. On the other hand they are 
at the same time a new segment, a new elite, within society at large. The question 
therefore is raised of whether it is possible to defend the interests of the ethnic 
minority group without in some sense adversely affecting those of the dominant 
society. During the Gulf War, for example, ethnic leaders were faced with a 
dilemma when the views of society at large were not necessarily in unison with 
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those of the minority group. By endorsing French government action, Dahmani 
at the same time ran the risk of alienating Maghrebian youths within his own 
movement who argued that French military intervention was contrary to the 
interests of Maghrebians (in the extended sense to include the populations still 
resident in the Maghreb). The youths in question justified their opposition to 
French government policy in that it was being used against fellow Arabs. 
Ethnic leaders have to some extent been able to define the political strategies of 
the ethnic minority group. In the case of France-Plus this has proven successful 
since the campaigns for electoral registration have mobilised Maghrebian youths 
in large numbers and have encouraged a minority of these youths to put 
themselves forward as candidates for municipal office. The association has 
therefore been able to create, albeit in embryonic form, a Maghrebian electoral 
machine. In seeking to achieve the above political objectives, ethnic leaders like 
Dahmani have been accused of adopting an autocratic style. However, it should 
be remembered, as Martiniello (1991) has noted, that ethnic minority 
communities are rarely strongly structured groups which readily accept the 
leadership of one individual. Rather they display a relative degree of apathy and 
mobilising the group is only possible via a strong and determined leader. 
Finally and no less importantly, it should not be forgotten that the efforts of 
ethnic leaders and their pressure groups have contributed to Maghrehians being 
able to attain political office at municipal level. The efforts of political parties 
themselves should not be underestimated here (for further details on the 
recruitment of municipal councillors by political parties, see section 3.5.1). It 
may be argued that in creating a Maghrebian electoral machine, the potential 
anger and frustration of Maghrebian youths at their socio-economic position 
within French society has been channelled away from the streets. Equally, 
however, as we shall seek to demonstrate in subsequent chapters, this has also 
served as a means for the PS leadership to neutralise political mobilisation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COUNCILLORS' EXPERIENCES IN OFFICE 
5.1 Introduction 
We shall now turn our attention to the day-to-day political life of municipal 
councillors once they have achieved office. Four essential features of their 
activities will be analysed. First of all we need to examine the manner in 
which the municipal council functions and the extent to which this may limit 
the powers that councillors have at their disposal. Secondly we shall highlight 
the various responsibilities that councillors are entrusted with. We shall then 
go on to look at the principal problems that councillors have encountered 
before finally presenting a brief overall assessment of their period in office. 
5.2 Nature of the municipal council 
As chapter 4 has illustrated, it is necessary to distinguish between various 
types of political elites at municipal level. To refresh our memory, the upper 
stratum, or inner core, are those elites who actively participate in major 
decisions. The lower stratum act in effect as mediators between the upper 
stratum and the rest of society by transmitting information in either direction 
and by explaining and/or justifying the reasoning behind the policies 
formulated by the inner core. While fundamental differences undoubtedly 
exist between the two levels, it may nevertheless be possible for members of 
the lower stratum to gain access to the higher level by virtue of the experience 
they have acquired below. 
How does this model apply to my sample of councillors? It is the mayor at 
municipal level who is responsible for the major policy decisions and s/he 
is clearly part of the upper stratum. However, as Mabileau (1989,150) 
indicates, the mayor is not the only player involved: 
In France [at municipal level], most such decisions are taken by 
individuals and not only just by the mayor (who generally keeps 
control of local finances), but also his deputies [adjoints]. The latter 
are given delegated authority in specialised areas of local management 
such as town planning, welfare and culture. 
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The status of the mayor in this respect is peculiar to France, particularly when 
one compares and contrasts it with the British model. Whereas in Britain the 
mayor is -perceived more in terms of an honorary representative of the council, 
in France the mayor is a figure who has great influence. Power may also be 
exerted as a result of prominence at national level (many mayors also serve as 
deputes ). It is the mayor in France who is expected to bring together a variety 
of divergent groups and interests which exist among the local population and 
are officially represented by local councillors. The power of the mayor has 
been described in the following terms by Dupuy: 
Legally the Municipal Council makes decisions, but, in reality, it is the 
mayor who, in the name of the general interest, imposes his decisions. 
The mayor is perceived as independent of all the parties concerned; he 
is presented as the 'father' of the commune and is accorded great 
prestige and attributed exceptional qualities of wisdom and experience. 
The Municipal Council apathetically lends itself to ratifying the 
mayor's decisions, often by a generally unanimous show of hands. 
(Mabileau 1989,149) 
It should be apparent, then, that municipal councillors, who are neither maires 
nor maires-adjoints, have relatively little influence over the decision-making 
process and belong rather to the lower stratum or outer core. However, they 
are able to act as intermediaries between the mayor and the electorate in 
putting forward the views and grievances of the electorate which the mayor 
and his adjoints may be unaware of. In so doing they are able to exert some 
degree of influence, albeit indirect, over future decisions. 
5.3 Responsibilities 
To begin with let us examine the kinds of responsibilities that municipal 
councillors are entrusted with. We shall distinguish between those 
responsibilities which are: (a) of a functional nature; (b) those which involve 
personal involvement with an individual; and (c) those where there is 
interaction between the municipal councillor and a group. 
(a) By functional tasks we refer to those tasks which deal with factors shaping 
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the local political agenda. In practice this involves responsibilities being 
delegated to the municipal councillors within the framework of committees of 
which they are members. Invariably set up under the auspices of the council 
and spokespersons from the community at large, the committees should be 
viewed more as consultative forums rather than as decision-making bodies 
since any recommendations made have, in general, to be ratified by the 
council. Only in cases of minor importance will the committee take a final 
decision after liaising with one of the maire-adjoints and the head of the 
committee (who may also be a maire-adjoint). When decisions of major 
importance have to be taken, however, they can only be approved by the 
council itself and this therefore entails a debate plus vote. Previous to this the 
mayor and his adjoints will engage in preparatory work. 
The committees to which the municipal councillors may belong broadly fall 
into six categories, though there is obviously some overlap between them: 
i) Social - This covers matters such as social security, health, environment, 
infancy, youth and the elderly. 
ii) Urban - This may include transport, traffic and housing. 
iii) Economic - Areas as diverse as professional integration, unemployment 
and commercial markets. 
iv) Education. 
v) Leisure - Sport, culture. 
vi) Law and order, delinquency and crime. 
Among the municipal councillors interviewed within the confines of my 
sample, the overwhelming majority, 83% (19), belong to more than one of 
these committees. Certain patterns emerge concerning the kinds of committees 
of which they are members. Those within the urban and social fields 
predominate with 65% (15) and 52% (12) respectively of my sample 
belonging to at least one of these. Where the former is concerned, crucial to an 
understanding of the high percentage is an awareness of the fact that the 
municipalities under study are almost exclusively situated within the major 
conurbations, most notably Ile-de-France and Rhone-Alpes. Where other 
committees are concerned, 40% (9) of the councillors interviewed belonged to 
committees relating to leisure, 22% (5) were members of committees devoted 
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to education, while another 22% (5) participated in committees dealing with 
economic matters. 
Given the heavy concentration of councillors in the urban and social fields, we 
need to ask how far they were free to choose committees on which they would 
sit. Some councillors said that certain committees had been imposed upon 
them at first: 
Mais c'est vrai qu'ä l'urbanisme, on m'a un peu impose parce qu'on a 
dü se partager les fonctions lors dune reunion. 
(Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
Others argued that the mayor in particular had sought to entrust them with 
membership of specific committees which were not necessarily of prime 
interest to them and consequently they had to express their disapprobation 
forcibly in order that they finally be nominated to a committee of their choice: 
Au depart [... ] il [le maire] envisageait tout de suite de me mettre au 
sein du club de prdvention de la ddlinquance [... ] Mais j'ai tout de suite 
refuse. Je ne voulais pas faire un peu l'immigrCe de service. Je ne veux 
ni faire plaisir au maire ni me donner des responsahilitds qui ne 
m'interessent pas. Je prtfere travailler seulement dans la commission 
culturelle. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
Only one councillor indicated that he was actively encouraged to participate in 
a committee devoted to Maghrebians. This was the case for one councillor in 
the Communist-controlled municipality of Gennevilliers who found this 
wholly unacceptable and refused to he a part of it: 
On a voulu me mettre dans l'immigration et j'ai refust pour des 
principes simples. Je ne suis pas responsable des problemes 
d'immigration. Je ne peux pas supporter cette responsabilitd qui ne 
m'incombe pas. Les communistes aussi voulaient me faire jouer cc 
röle. Le PS a compris plus vite. 
(Bellouch, Gennevilliers) 
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b) A second task of the municipal councillor is that of surgery work involving 
individuals. This tends to be outside the confines of committee responsibilities 
and the councillor concerned assumes the role of broker, relaying the specific 
demands of the individual to the relevant bodies. One malre-adjoint in the 
departement of Seine-Saint-Denis explains the kind of requests he has to deal 
with and how he approaches them: 
Vous rencontrez des individus qui viennent vous voir pour des 
problemes qu'ils rencontrent personnellement, y compris des 
problemes qui dchappent ä votre delegation. Et c'est ä vous ensuite de 
les mettre sur la bonne voie: que ce soit au niveau administratif, au 
niveau de la prefecture ou d'un ministere, pour essayer de rdsoudre leur 
probleme particulier. 
(Sali, St. Denis) 
The nature of the advice given by the councillors often centres around 
facilitating an understanding of official documents which are required by 
individuals, particularly if the latter are of non-French origin and have not 
taken up French nationality. The same maire-adjoint details the type of work 
which he undertakes with individuals on a daily basis: 
Et c'est vrai qu'ä St. Denis la tendance est ü la regularisation de 
papiers. Ce genre de chores. Et pas seulement des Maghrehins. 11 ya 
des Africains noirs qui rencontrent beaucoup de difficultds parce qu'ils 
sont en situation non-reguliere ici. 11 ya le prohleme de logement avec 
tous les formulaires ä remplir pour y avoir acces, les problc mes d'accCs 
ä l'ecole pour les enfants, les prohlemes de couverture sociale. ca, c'est 
du reel. Et ca prend beaucoup de temps. 
(Sali, St. Denis) 
In short, then, the relationship between municipal councillors and individuals 
can be resumed in the following manner: 
The activities of councillors in relation to these individual goods 
consist mainly in mobilising secondary resources to deal with the 
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demands through established administrative procedures, whether by 
giving backing to a request or by getting something done about it when 
there is no statutory provision for dealing with the matter. 
(Mabileau 1989,150) 
c) Thirdly among the tasks that councillors undertake, there may be 
involvement with groups which approach a councillor with the objective of 
obtaining a particular demand. Here the municipal councillor's prior 
associational experience may prove to be invaluable. 
Of particular importance, in this respect, are their associational or 
professional memberships. Such groups enable them in many cases to 
anticipate a demand, and even to formulate it in cases where it 
otherwise might not he openly expressed [... ] Their involvement in the 
social life of the locality is thus fundamental to their capacity to 
articulate demands and often provides them with a better 
understanding of such demands than would result simply from the 
approaches of which they are the targets. 
(Mabileau 1989,150) 
This is illustrated by the account of one young councillor in the Grenoble 
suburb of Gieres who readily acknowledges that her associational experience 
along with her ethnic origins have facilitated contact with the younger 
members of the municipality: 
C'est vrai que quand j'ai fait l'animation des jeunes, j'ai eu au sein de la 
mairie beaucoup moins de problemes que les autres animateurs. Parce 
que du fait que je parlais Parabe - il ya une forte minority maghrebine 
ä Gieres - le courant passait sans probleeme. 
(Chaib, Gieres) 
Associations may, for example, ask for funding for the construction of a local 
community centre, or a place of prayer if no permanent building is currently 
available. This was the case for one councillor in Epinay-sur-Seine: 
11 ya une association de jeunes d'origine maghrdbine qui s'occupe au 
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sein de cette maison de quartier de la population maghrebine en 
general. Et lä j'ai appris re cemment que leur but, c'ttait de demander 
un local, un lieu de culte. Alors c'est en negociation actuellement avec 
le maire. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
In the majority of cases, though, the work that councillors undertake stems 
from their own initiative. This is not altogether surprising when one considers 
that councillors are much more likely than individuals or associations to be 
familiar with government programmes which they can take advantage of. 
Furthermore they may become aware of potential projects via the suggestions 
of either the mayor or his adjoints. 
It is possible, then, to divide for the purposes of analysis, as Mahileau (1989) 
has done, the responsibilities of municipal councillors in this domain into 
three distinct types: 
i) In the first type, which we shall call articulation, the councillor plays a 
double role, that of receiving and then articulating demands. It is the objective 
of the councillor to convert policy into practice and this is achieved by 
becoming involved in the decision-making process internal to the council and 
by mobilising the support of the principal political forces in the locality. 
ii) The second task, that of involving groups in the local decision-making 
process, is part and parcel of the process of local integration. It is incumbent 
upon the councillor to take into consideration the diversity of local interests 
that may exist. This is achieved by the council itself releasing funds and 
resources in order that group objectives are met, while others are denied. 
iii) Finally, as a result of close links between the councillor and local groups, 
the former can gain access to the political arena at a local level. 
5.4 Period in office of councillors 
5.4.1 Initiatives 
I shall now examine some of the initiatives that the councillors in my sample 
have taken. Councillors were asked to rank in order of importance the 
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following objectives that they had in mind at the very beginning of their 
period in office: 
i) Procuring tangible objectives for the Maghrebian population at municipal 
level. 
ii) Promoting equal opportunities for Maghrebians at municipal level. 
iii) Changing the attitudes of the 'white' French population towards 
Maghrebians. 
iv) Serving the interests of the local community irrespective of the race, 
religion or nationality of its inhabitants. 
Councillors were asked to rate on a scale of one to four the importance of 
these objectives, one point equating no importance whatsoever, while four 
points indicated that the objective was an extremely important one. 
Significant differences between men and women councillors became apparent 
in the answers to this question. Whereas women tended to he interested in 
more tangible aims, men placed more emphasis on abstract goals such as 
changing the attitude of the 'white' French population towards Maghrebians. 
Out of the eight women in our study, virtually all (7) attached importance to a 
tangible aim, with 4 of these rating it the joint most important objective. For 
men, however, there was an almost unanimous apparent disregard for tangible 
aims with only 2 out of the 15 men in my sample according more than one 
point to this particular objective. Indeed some gave no points at all, indicating 
a complete lack of interest. 
The results were confirmed by the follow up interviews. Several women 
councillors stressed an interest in tangible projects they had in mind and this 
included some who had only rated them of minimal importance in the 
questionnaire. Typical of the projects started were the following three 
examples: 
Au sein de la deIegation culturelle, je m'int6resse en particulier au 
conservatoire de musique et de danse. Et je travaille dnormdment pour 
ca. D'ailleurs je suis prdsidente de l'association parents-Cleves pour ce 
conservatoire. J'ai des contacts trc's frequents avec le maire-adjoint 
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charge de la culture pour developper ce conservatoire. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
Moi, j'ai fait une proposition pour agrandir un gymnase. 11 y avait des 
travaux qui dtaient ndcessaires. On a entamd une discussion. C'est vrai 
qu'on a ete t coutds et qu'il ya maintenant une salle de reunion. 
(Chaib, Gieres) 
D'abord il y avait le probleme d'un centre social. Il m'a fallu quand 
meme deux ans pour resoudre ce probleme. 
(Boulaouinat, Bron) 
Men, on the other hand, preferred to speak in far vaguer terms about their 
projects: 
Je n'avais pas d'objectifs au depart si ce n'etait de montrer que 
1'integration, 4a passe par ]a politique. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
L'idce de fond que j'ai, c'est de permettre aux jeunes issus de 
1'immigration d'avoir envie de se mobiliser, de prendre en charge leurs 
idles et leur avenir. 
(Sahiri, Grenoble) 
The above comments from men councillors suggest, perhaps, that they in 
particular feel a heavy burden of negative images which they want to overturn. 
This is undoubtedly linked to the unfavourable climate and various negative 
stereotypes that exist within French society concerning Maghrebian men, who 
are often seen as threatening or aggressive. Maghrebian women, on the other 
hand, are perceived in a more favourable light. 
It would seem equally that women adopt a far more pragmatic (and, perhaps, 
realistic) approach to the duties of municipal councillor than is the case for 
men. The underlying reasons behind the contrasting attitudes are complex and 
may be related to the cultural background of Maghrebians. One sociologist, 
Juliette Minces, suggests a possible explanation when examining the progress 
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that women of Maghrebian origin have made relative to their male 
counterparts in French society: 
Elles [les femmes d'origine maghrdbine] ont beaucoup plus ä gagner 
que les garcons. A force de travail et de rdussite scolaire, socialement 
elles montrent une image d'une immigration maghrebine valorisante et 
equilibree par rapport ä leurs freres, qui pour le moment n'offrent 
souvent qu'une image de violence ndgative. 
(Minces 1986,84) 
There was, however, one area in which both men and women were agreed and 
that was that the role of a councillor was to serve the interests of the local 
community as a whole irrespective of ethnic origin, race, or nationality. All 
but one of the councillors in my sample attached major importance towards 
serving the needs of the community in their municipality as a whole. 
Councillors were fully aware of the symbolic nature of their initial election for 
the Maghrebian population, but argued that once this first threshold had been 
crossed, they were concerned to serve the interests of the local community in 
its entirety, as the following account illustrates: 
Peut-eire que le 12 mars [jour du deuxieme tour des t1ections 
municipales de 19891 j'ai dü reprdsenter l'dchantillon beur. 
Certainement mime, je pense de par mon physique et de par mon nom. 
Mais plus le temps avance. Tu as un dialogue avec les Bens, c'est 
Malika Chaib qu'ils voient, pas ]a Beur. 
(Chaib, Gieres) 
Moreover, according to the same councillor, the demands that Maghrehians 
may have are often identical to those of other French nationals in the 
municipality: 
Les demandes des Beurs et des Maghnsbins sont les memes que cellos 
de n'importe qui. On veut un boulot, un appartement. Et puls on veut 
vivre dans une jolie ville, quoi. 
(Chaib, Gieres) 
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The following testimony reflects the general mood of all councillors towards 
the issue of representing the municipality as a whole rather than particular 
sections of it: 
J'ai une vocation gtndrale. Je suis un homme politique issu de cette 
ville qui ai vocation ä defendre des valeurs, ä dtfendre des choix 
politiques pour tous, pour tous ceux qui en tout cas font confiance ä 
notre equipe. 
(Sali, St. Denis) 
It should he added that the same maire-adjoint was prepared to qualify his 
remarks by stating that while Maghrebians would not receive preferential 
treatment, their needs would be given particular consideration: 
Et bien sür j'ai cette preoccupation toute particuliZre de ddfendre cette 
population issue de l'immigration en gCnCral, Bien Cvidemment 
d'origine maghrCbine en particulier [... ] Je suis de ceux qui considLIrent 
qu'il est profondCment inegal de traiter de facon Cgale une situation 
inegale. 
(Sali, St. Denis) 
These remarks imply that the balancing of general interests with sectional 
needs may not always be as easy as some interviewees suggested. 
5.4.2 Problems encountered 
We shall now focus upon the major obstacles that councillors have faced 
during their period in office. In the questionnaire councillors in my sample 
were asked to rank in order of importance on a scale of one to four the 
principal obstacles encountered. Interviewees were asked to evaluate all six 
alternatives in order to determine the importance of each individual obstacle. 
The following potential problems were listed: 
i) Discrimination faced within one's own party. 
ii) Lack of prior political experience. 
iii) Administrative constraints. 
iv) Budgetary/financial restrictions. 
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v) Opposition on the part of the Maghrebian population. 
vi) Opposition on the part of the non-Maghrebian population. 
Space was set aside in the questionnaire for other salient factors and in 
addition all problems encountered were discussed in detail during the follow- 
up interviews. 
As mentioned previously, it should be remembered that by virtue of his or her 
status, the role that a councillor is able to play is limited by the degree of 
power s/he has at his/her disposal. This is something that the councillors are 
acutely aware of as the following accounts reveal: 
Mais cc n'est pas dans les commissions que se d6cident les chores. On 
s'en apercoit rapidement au bout d'un an. Nous sommes uniquement 
des faire-valoir. Tout se decide entre le maire et ses adjoints. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
Je pense qu'au eas de tous ceux qui sont lä pour la premiere fois, c'est 
le meine probleme. C'est-ä-dire qu'on saisit peu ce qui se passe 
recllement au niveau des prises de decision. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
This was a great source of frustration for several councillors as the ahove 
councillor acknowledges in her own case: 
En fait je me suis rendue compte qu'on doit discuter des projets. Mais 
en re alite les decisions sont dejä prises ou sont prctes a Titre. Moi, je 
me sens un peu frustrde. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
5.4.3 Administration and finance 
The two major obstacles which are cited in almost equal proportions by 
councillors are adminstrative constraints and financial restrictions. Indeed 
several councillors apportioned equal weight to both factors in the 
questionnaire. This is doubtless explained by the extent to which the two 
factors are interlinked. One example of this is the difficulty which councillors 
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face in obtaining funds for a specific purpose since there are strictly defined 
rules which dictate how the administration shall operate. The account of one 
maire-adjoint in the depurtement of Essonne is illustrative of this point: 
C'est une administration qui a ses regles. Il ya par exemple un circuit 
de 1'argent qui ne peut pas tout se permettre. 11 n'y a pas un chtquier 
entre les mains du service qui va acheter n'importe quoi pour rtparer la 
chose. Tout est contröle. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
The same maire-adjoint acknowledges that municipal councillors have to face 
up to the economic realities of a limited budget and that consequently only a 
small percentage of potential projects can be undertaken: 
On est en face de la realite. On voit le c6t6 budget, le cftt rtpartition. 
Ce n'est pas Mastique. On ne peut pas tout faire. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
Other councillors argued that it was rather administrative red-tape which 
constituted the major handicap in their ability to carry out projects effectively. 
5.4.4 Lack of prior political experience 
It was noticeable that a pertinent comment on how to overcome administrative 
hurdles came from a maire-adjoint who himself works in administration at the 
Ministry of Youth and Sport. He argues that it is above all a question of 
gaining experience and perhaps more to the point knowing how, where and 
when to ask for a given favour: 
Je connais le circuit, a savoir Si on frappe ä la mauvaise porte ou pas, 
et si on sait taper lä oü il faut au hon moment. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
This conveniently leads us on to a third factor cited by councillors, especially 
those within the 21-30 age bracket, namely the lack of prior political 
experience. One councillor in the departement of Hauts-de-Seine explains the 
difficulties which he came up against at the beginning of his period of office: 
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Au debut ca n'a pas ete facile. 11 ya chaque clan dans chaque groupe. Il 
ya des anciens chefs qui etaient les detenteurs de tous les pouvoirs. (a 
m'a pris un certain temps pour comprendre le fonctionnement de 
l'appareil politique. 
(Bellouch, Genncvilliers) 
Only a tiny minority of councillors received specific training concerning the 
post and consequently many were forced along with other newly appointed 
councillors on their party list, to train themselves: 
On a laisse passer un trimestre. on a vu un peu cc qu'on nous 
demandait de faire et ensuite on s'est donne la formation ntcessaire. 
(Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
As a result of a lack of expertise in the mechanisms involved and of the issues 
at stake, councillors among my sample often had to vote on subjects they 
knew little or nothing about. One councillor in the departement of Seine St. 
Denis explains it thus: 
On est lä pour donner une voix au moment du vote en stance du 
Conseil municipal. Et souvent j'avoue qu'on discute comme 4a avec 
d'autres conseillers municipaux dont c'est la premiere experience. Eh 
bien ils votent pour des choses qu'ils ignorent, et dont ils Wont jamais 
entendu parler. Quand on vote par exemple des subventions aux 
associations. 11 ya beaucoup d'associations avec des sigles. On ne sait 
memo pas ce que sont ces sigles. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
It is often the case that for reasons of party loyalty, councillors are required to 
vote on matters about which they are very unclear: 
II faut respecter la discipline de groupe. Mais on vote pour des choses 
qu'on ignore. Personnellementje vis ca tres mal. C'est trts ddsagrdable. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
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Councillors were often expected to follow the party line on certain policy 
matters and this is something that the younger councillors had particular 
difficulty in coming to terms with as the following account illustrates: 
Au debut de mon mandat, il y avait une association qui voulait faire un 
contre-vote [au sein du Conseil municipal]. Moi, je voulais sauver 
cette association (... ) J'ai voulu lever la main et on [les autres 
conseillers municipaux du PC] me 1'a retenue en disant : "Ce West pas 
la peine de voter. Vous serez perdant". Cela m'a beaucoup choqud. Il 
m'a decu. Je venais de me rendre compte que je n'avais pas le droit de 
vote en realite. 
(Dendoune, Ile-St-Denis) 
The other PC councillor in the depurtement of Seine-Saint-Denis argued that 
the major obstacle he faced was having committees in which he was not 
necessarily interested imposed on him: 
J'ai eta dcartd des commissions interessantes. Les commissions m'ont 
dte attribuees sans que je puisse donner mon avis. C'est pour cola que 
je ne peux m'interesser ä 100%. 
(Hiaoui, Bondy) 
5.4.5 Discrimination within one's own party 
For four of the municipal councillors in my study, the major obstacle 
encountered was that of discrimination within their own local party. For three 
out of the four councillors concerned, this was the PS. The remaining 
councillor was elected on a PC list, although he is not a member of that party. 
Two of the councillors on PS lists believe that they have been treated merely 
as tokenist symbols and their views and experiences have not been taken into 
consideration. One of these councillors from the elepurtement of Seine-Saint- 
Denis expressed his frustration in the following manner: 
L'obstacle numdro un ä mon avis, c'est ddjä que le gouvernement 
socialiste, le Parti socialiste nous donne, me donne en tout cas, 
1'impression qu'il se sert plutöt de nous. 
(Touabi, Aulnay-sous-Bois) 
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The same councillor goes on to substantiate his argument: 
C'est-ä-dire pour attirer 1'electorat maghr6bin qui est important. Nous 
sommes deux millions et demi dans la socidte francaise dont au moins 
1,2 millions en age de voter, qui peuvent voter et qui votent pour la 
plupart. Donc on sert un petit peu d'alibi. 
(Touabi, Aulnay-sous-Bois) 
The same councillor argues that councillors of Maghrebian origin in general 
have been under-used and his own situation is but one example: 
Je pense que le PS n'a jamais fait un effort important pour nous donner 
les posies, les responsabilites que nous mt ritons. A la fois pour notre 
militantisme et notre formation professionnelle. 
(Touabi, Aulnay-sous-Bois) 
For one of the other three councillors on a PS list, this also meant being 
deprived of the means to effectively carry out her duties: 
Ce que je leur [aux responsables du PS] reproche, c'est qu'ils Wont pas 
fait le travail indispensable [... ] et dans mon mandat depuis deux ans, 
on ne me donne pas du tout les moyens, ni d'aider les Bens de ma 
communaute dans quelque domaine que ce soit, ni d'essayer de crier 
des structures pour eux. Et moi, chaque fois que je demande quelque 
chose, c'est vraiment mis de cötd. 
(Rahmouni, Venissieux) 
Indeed relations between the councillor in question at Venissieux and the local 
party sank to such depths that her membership of the stallholders' (marchd 
forrain) committee was withdrawn. The councillor, who was interested in the 
committee because of the number of youths of Maghrebian origin involved in 
the profession, explains what happened subsequently: 
Et donc ca m'inttressait en ce sens que je pouvais les [les jeunes] aider. 
Mais malheureusement on m'avait mis des batons dans les roues et de 
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facto on m'a retire ma delegation, ce qui fait que depuis un an je n'ai 
plus cette ddldgation. 
(Rahmouni, Vdnissieux) 
It is important here to provide a brief description of the background of various 
incidents that occurred in the early part of this councillor's period in office and 
which have as a result soured relations with the local party. After having 
received little help when she requested it at the beginning of her period of 
office, unlike some councillors elsewhere, the councillor in question gradually 
came to the conclusion that she was not being treated with the same degree of 
respect that other councillors were afforded: 
Bon je me suis apercue ä un certain moment qu'on me considerait pas 
du tout comme une Blue ä part entiere. 
(Rahmouni, Venissieux) 
Differences between the councillor and the local party section became visible 
on at least two occasions. The first of these was during the visit of the then 
Prime Minister, Michel Rocard, to the neighbouring municipality of Bron in 
December, 1990. Via a friend who was another councillor of Maghrebian 
origin in Bron, the councillor from Venissieux was able to secure an 
invitation. However, because the maires-adjoints in Venissieux were unable to 
secure similar invitations, this became the source of a grudge that they held 
against her according to the following account by the councillor: 
On m'a traitee de magouilleuse parce que j'avais magouille pour avoir 
cette invitation. Alors que moi, je n'avais vraiment rien fait. La preuve, 
c'est que je ne me suis pas deplacee. 
(Rahmouni, Venissieux) 
This was by no means an isolated incident for she was similarly reproached 
for having gone on holiday to Libya along with a local cultural association. 
Consequently the councillor in question believes that within the local party 
section she has been marginalised: 
J'ai vraiment une position a part. Je suis vraiment dans mon coin. A 
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chaque fois qu'il ya un probleme avec moi, on ne me le pose jamais is 
moi. C'est eux qui parlent entre eux et quelquefois [... ] ils me font une 
reflexion. 
(Rahmouni, Ve nissieux) 
An impasse was reached during the Gulf War when the councillor in question 
adopted a position contrary to that of the French government which was fully 
endorsed by the local party (see section 7.2 for further details). As a result of 
her opinions being aired in the Municipal Council the councillor was told that 
she would be punished by the maires-adjoints. Henceforth she was not 
informed about events which under normal circumstances she would have 
been eligible to attend. In addition the councillor in question claims to have 
received racist abuse from the wife of one of the maires-adjoints who worked 
as a local party secretary. The latter is alleged to have called the councillor 
"une sale arabe" (Rahmouni, Venissieux). 
In response to this, the councillor from Vt nissieux, in addition to refusing to 
attend council sittings, asked one of the two Maghrehian pressure groups 
within the PS, the Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane (CSCM), to 
intervene on her behalf. The councillor also started court proceedings against 
the secretary which were quickly dropped since there was no witness. The 
CSCM sent a delegation to the Lyons suburb to discuss the matter with local 
party heads. The president of the CSCM, Sultana Cheurfa, said it was 
unacceptable for a councillor on a PS list to be treated in this manner by 
another member of the party. The local party heads came to an agreement on 
this, and it was decided that the councillor from Venissieux would he re- 
integrated into the local party section. The councillor was subsequently 
allowed to speak in the council chamber with the support of other councillors. 
For the councillor elected on a PC list, alleged discrimination against 
Maghrebians took an altogether different form. The councillor in question 
argues that he became aware of prejudice when a football team made up 
exclusively of youths of Maghrebian origin from the municipality was due to 
undertake a tour of Germany, sponsored by the town hall. The trip was 
cancelled and instead another team of white youths including the children of 
PC councillors took its place. When the councillor in question inquired as to 
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why the Maghrebian team was not allowed to tour, he was given the following 
explanation: 
On a annule ce voyage parce qu'on a estime que 70% de 1'equipe ne 
pouvait pas partir. Alors j'ai cherche ä comprendre. On m'a dit ; "Ne 
cherche pas ä comprendre". J'ai explique cela ä la commission [de 
sport] et une semaine plus tard les dirigeants m'ont attaqud en disant: 
"Tu m'as traitd de raciste ä la mairie". Eux [les conseillers municipaux 
au sein du PC], ils pouvaient se permettre de partir avec une tquipe 
differente. Et lautre equipe avec leur famille et leurs enfants. 
(Dendoune, Ile-St-Denis) 
The councillor in question sought to find out whether any misdemeanours had 
been committed by members of the Maghrebian team, but none could be 
found to explain their exclusion from the tour. The failure of the local PC 
party section to provide a justifiable explanation of events leads the councillor 
to make the following conclusion about the behaviour of local PC councillors: 
C'est sür qu'au sein du groupe [du PC] il ya des racistes. 11 ya 
vraiment des gens qui ne peuvent pas nous sentir. C'est-ä-dire le 
groupe de 1'equipe de football dejä. 
(Dendoune, Ile-St-Denis) 
The councillor cites a second example of alleged institutionalised racism by 
the local PC council when he attempted to find a dwelling for an immigrant 
family of Maghrebian origin. Upon contacting the relevant authorities in the 
municipality, he was told that it would not be possible to house the family in 
question. However, the same official indicated that if the councillor himself 
wished to obtain accommodation, then this could be provided without any 
difficulty. 
The councillor believes that such double standards are symptomatic of PC 
discourse regarding ethnic minorities. This is illustrated in the councillor's 
view by PC leaflets concerning immigration. One leaflet entitled 
"Immigration: 1'opinion des communistes", which was distributed in June 
1991, contains the following comments: 
135 
Alors que toute immigration nouvelle aurait dü ttre arretee depuis 
longtemps (les communistes le disent depuis 1974), une immigration 
clandestine est organisee au mepris de la loi. [... ] Avec 3,5 millions de 
chömeurs, il faut arreter toute immigration nouvelle [... ] Un immigrc 
peut t galement decider de retourner dans son pays. Des accords 
nouveaux bases sur l'interet mutuel avec les pays d'origine doivent lui 
permettre de rdussir sa reinsertion. 
(Parti communiste 1991,1) 
The leaflet was condemned immediately in the strongest possible terms by the 
anti-racist organisation Mouvement contre le Racisme et pour I'Amitid entre 
les Peuples (MRAP): 
Depuis une semaine, les adherents et sympathisants du MRAP font 
part au Mouvement de leurs sentiments concernant le tract sur 
1'immigration public par le Parti Communiste Francais. Ces sentiments 
vont de la stupefaction incrCdule ä l'indignation et a la condemnation 
sans appel. [... ] Le MRAP espere que ce tract donnera lieu de la part de 
ces auteurs ä une analyse critique et sera sans dClai retire de la 
circulation. 
(MRAP 1991) 
When shown the same PC leaflet, the councillor in question made the 
following observation: 
Le discours officiel vis-d-vis de 1'immigration est favorable. C'est [le 
tract] ddsolant. C'est sür qu'ä un moment donne j'avais dtji1 des doutes 
apres un [autre] article qu'on m'avait donn6. 
(Dendoune, Ile-St-Denis) 
The other councillor in my sample elected on a PC list and a member of the 
party has not encountered discrimination from his own ranks. 
5.4.6 Opposition from the Maghrebian population 
French citizens of Maghrebian origin are perceived as a homogeneous group 
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by the generality of the French population and as such are the victims of the 
same types of discrimination as among the Maghrebian population. There is in 
fact a wide diversity of nationalities, ethnic groups and political beliefs. 
This is borne out by the experiences of at least four councillors in my sample. 
We shall take one specific example of a councillor in Dijon to illustrate this 
point. The councillor, born and raised in France, is of Algerian origin. In the 
municipality of Dijon in which the councillor works, she has encountered 
opposition from the Maghrebian population which is predominantly 
Moroccan. The councillor has few dealings with the Moroccans in the locality 
since in her opinion they are totally opposed to what she terms 'integration', a 
concept which she endorses for all Maghrebians. Rather than asking the 
councillor for advice and help, Moroccans tend to rely instead on the 
consulate in the town. In addition the Moroccan population tends in large part 
to be sympathetic towards the conservative RPR, whereas the councillor in 
question is a member of the PS. Not surprisingly, then, there is little contact 
betwen the two as the councillor readily acknowledges: 
Il ya une forte communaute marocaine, mail comme ils sont contre 
1'int6gration, honnetement je ne m'en occupe pas. Et en outre on ne 
m'invite pas non plus. Parce que pour eux, je ne suis pas un exemple 
[... ] Par contre il ya quelques Algdriens et lä j'ai eta revue tout de suite. 
(Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
While the councillor has been immediately accepted by the smaller Algerian 
population, this in turn has created its own problems. The councillor in 
question was asked by members of the Algerian population to become the 
local president of Recherches-Perspectives-Expression-Societe (REPERES), 
an extension in France of the Amicale des Algeriens en Europe, an 
organisation for Algerian expatriates controlled by the Algerian government. 
She refused this invitation for the following reasons: 
Parce que je ne veux pas etre encore utilist e par l'Algtrie. Dtja je me 
bats en tant que francaise en France en disant que je ne suis pas la 
petite bougnoule, je ne suis pas la beurette. Je suis francaise a part 
entiere, mais avec un plus. Et ce plus, je veux le garder. Et je pense 
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que je risque de le perdre si je rentre dans ce genre d'association. 
(Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
5.4.7 Opposition from the non-Maghrebian population 
Few councillors cited this as a major problem. Only in three municipalities did 
councillors indicate difficulties and this tended to be verbal abuse from the 
Front National (FN) party councillors. However, in general councillors 
acknowledged that in the Municipal Council opposition parties treated them 
with courtesy. The one noticeable exception to this is the PC and it is the 
relationship between this party and the PS which we shall examine in the final 
section on problems encountered. 
5.4.8 Municipal politics: PC-PS relations 
The importance of the relationship between the PC and the PS in my sample 
can be guaged from the fact that of the 23 councillors questioned, no less than 
16 perform their duties in a Communist-controlled municipality. Indeed 11 of 
the councillors alone are to be found in the PC-controlled departement of 
Seine-Saint-Denis and two of these are on PC lists. 
Under an agreement concluded by the PC and PS prior to the March 1989 
municipal elections, it was decided that a Union of the Left should operate, 
but that individual municipalities should decide the exact framework of how 
this operated. Once in office, several councillors discovered that the 
relationship between the two parties was somewhat less than fraternal and 
they themselves became the potential targets of abuse. One councillor from 
the Seine-Saint-Denis municipality of Aubervilliers explains his own 
predicament as follows: 
L'accueil du PC a ett beaucoup plus froid [que celui du PS]. En fait il 
faut dire beaucoup plus agressif. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
When pressed to explain this statement, he made the following observations: 
Its [les communistes] font prise [ma candidature sur une liste du PS] 
comme une trahison. Dans la mesure oü j'ai toujours vdcu dans cette 
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ville [... ] Que le fils se retrouve dans un autre parti que celui de la 
majoritd. Ce n'&tait pas comprehensible pour eux. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
In practical terms the PC has provided a formidable obstacle in the Municipal 
Council proceedings: 
C'est bizarre, mais ils [les communistes] sont contre tout, quoi. Its ont 
les moyens pour tout contröler et nos propositions Wont pas beaucoup 
de r6sultats. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
The councillor in question has subsequently gone on to become a regional 
councillor for G6n6ration Ecologie while remaining'a municipal councillor 
elected on a PC-PS list. 
For one of the councillors elected on a PC list, attempts to work with a PS 
Maghrebian maire-adjoint on a joint project to find a dwelling for one family 
were thwarted by the PC local party section. When asked about the manner in 
which the PC reacted to the project, the councillor's reply was as follows: 
Mal. Tu leur [au PC] fait une proposition d'un projet par exemple. Tout 
seul cela n'avance pas. Alors quand je leur annonce que je vais 
travailler avec S. L. [maire-adjoint; PS], cela avancera plus vite. Its (les 
responsables locaux du PC] ne veulent pas que cela [le projet 
commun] aboutisse avec S. L., un candidat du PS. 
(Dendoune, Ile-St-Denis) 
The aforementioned interpretation of PC reluctance to co-operate with PS 
councillors would appear to be supported not only by other councillors in the 
departement, but equally by Maghrebian councillors elsewhere in PC- 
controlled municipalities. One councillor in the Hauts-de-Seine departement 
explains the difficulty that he has encountered in even finding out what 
projects the PC local party list has in mind: 
C'est une difficulte de travailler avec les communistes parce qu'ils ne 
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nous aident pas. Tout est cache, tout est camouflC. Donc c'est le flou. 
On est nul. On est fantoche, quoi. On ne sait pas ce qui se passe. On ne 
sait pas ce qui se trame. 
(Bellouch, Gennevilliers) 
The councillor concludes that the relationship between the PC and PS at 
municipal level can be resumed in the following terms: 
Its [les communistes] ont un monopole, ils gardent leur systrme. C'est 
donc pour ca que nous [dans le PS] sommes la minoritd dans la 
majoritd. 
(Bellouch, Gennevilliers) 
It is as a direct result of the impasse created by the PC's actions that the 
councillor in question has decided to take the initiative and carry out the 
projects that he has in mind by other means: 
C'est pour cela que j'ai cree une association dans ce quartier pour 
essayer d'etre plus libre. 
(Bellouch, Gennevilliers) 
5.5 Overall assessment of councillors' period in office 
In the final part of this chapter we shall provide an overall assessment of the 
councillors' period in office. This will include not simply the views of the 
councillors themselves, but also those of non-councillors who in various 
capacities are interested in, or have frequent dealings with, the councillors in 
question. 
It should be evident from what has so far been said that the PS in particular 
took a decisive step in putting forward candidates of Maghrebian origin on its 
party lists at municipal level in the 1989 elections. Was this done for purely 
electoral reasons, though, and once the initial symbolic stage has been passed, 
has the party followed through its support for Maghrebian candidates to its 
logical conclusion? With reference to the first of these questions, the views 
were sought of three principal actors within the PS: Sultana Cheurfa, president 
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of the Maghrebian pressure group within the party, Le Cercle des Socialistes 
de Culture Musulmane; Mohamed Meb Toul, a member of the comite 
directeur of the PS, and former TV presenter of the "Mosaique" programme 
aimed at Muslims in France; Georges Morin, President of the Conference 
Nationale des Elus Socialistes Originaires du Maghreb (CNESOM). Cheurfa 
is under no illusions about why the councillors of Maghrebian origin were 
selected: 
Its [les conseillers municipaux] ont dtd beaucoup plus choisis en 
fonction de 1'idee que ce sont des agents electoraux plutöt que sur le 
fond... 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
She goes on to explain how the candidates were recruited: 
On a cherche dans les associations des gens qui avaient fair 
sympathique et qui ttaient plutöt jeunes pour comprendre comment 
cela marche dans les conseils municipaux. 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
This view is supported by Mohamed Meb Toul and equally by Georges 
Morin, who was instrumental in telephoning mayors in order that candidates 
of Maghrebian origin should be put forward on their lists. Morin argues that 
he specified that candidates should be chosen according to their competence. 
When asked what he said to the mayors, he made the following remark: 
J'ai dit: "Ecoutez. Je pense qu'il est tres important que le PS donne 
enfin un signe qu'il prend en consideration les Maghrdbins de France. 
Donc plus il y aura de Maghr6bins sur les listes, plus j'en serai satisfait. 
Mais il ne faut pas que ce soit artificiel. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Meb Toul is under no illusions about the tokenist nature of the candidates in 
question being elected: 
On s'est rendu compte qu'on a canalise les "leaders" de mouvements 
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revendicatifs. On leur permet de se creer une petite association. On 
leur donne un petit budget. On leur donne un petit coin et ils rentrent. 
Et ils nous foutent la paix. Et aujourd'hui cette histoire des conseillers 
municipaux est ä l'instar de ce qu'a dte la loi d'association de 1901. 
(Meb Toul, Paris) 
In other words according to Meb Toul's testimony, councillors of Maghrebian 
origin have been used as pawns to channel the potential anger of Maghrehian 
youths in France into non-violent avenues. 
This leads us on to the second question of whether the views of Maghrebians 
in France have been given sufficient expression in the political arena. By 
virtue of the limited powers accorded to municipal councillors, the voices of 
Maghrebians are virtually absent from political discourse at national level. 
Cheurfa believes that the decision to take on councillors of Maghrehian origin 
was not sufficiently thought through: 
Cela n'a pas ltd suffisamment reflechi ou il n'y a pas assez 
d'engagement de la part des socialistes qui sont dirigeants au sein de la 
municipalit6 pour que ce soit plus efficace. 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
This view is endorsed by some of the more experienced and politically aware 
councillors as the following opinion indicates: 
A mon avis its [les conseillers municipaux] se rendent compte qu'iI ya 
du travail ä faire. Qu'ils doivent se former eux-memes. Its doivent 
s'impliquer dans un cadre qu'ils ne connaissent absolument pas. 
(Sali, St. Denis) 
Consequently Cheurfa argues that the councillors themselves have suffered in 
terms of low self-esteem and have interiorised negative perceptions that the 
French population as a whole has of them: 
De la meine maniere qu'on ne reconnait pas dans la socidte francaise 
Pidentite musulmane de certains Francais, les flus eux-memes ont 
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integre cette image defavorable et devalorisante dc ce qu'ils sont, de 
leur famille. Et cela, ils le vivent tres mal. 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
Mohamed Meb Toul argues that the crucial question of giving Maghrebians 
positions of real responsibility has been avoided: 
Ce n'est pas par ces intermediaires-lä [les conseillers municipaux] 
qu'on va acceder ä ce qu'on appelle '1'integration' des Francais d'origine 
maghrebine. On y aceddera en faisant acceder des gens emerites, selon 
leurs comp&tences, ä des postes de responsahilit6 institutionnels. 
(Meb Toul, Paris) 
Meb Toul outlines the five key institutions which are concerned with the 
plight of Maghrebians: the Fonds d'Action Sociale; the Direction de la 
Population et des Migrations; SONACOTRA; the Office des Migrations 
Internationales; the Ministry of Integration. There is a not a single person of 
Maghrebian origin occupying an official post of responsibility in any of these 
institutions, according to Meb Toul. 
Meb Toul believes that the PS made a serious mistake in allowing the whole 
process of putting forward the candidates in question to be covered by the 
mass media. This, he argues, has proven to be counterproductive for it has 
raised false hopes among both the councillors concerned and the Maghrebian 
population in general. He advocates rather a lower profile approach and cites 
the RPR as pursuing a more effective policy. When asked whether he thought 
the visibility of Maghrebians elected on PS lists created problems, Meb Toul 
made the following reply: 
Quelque part oui. Parce qu'il y en a autant au RPR, mais ils sons moins 
visibles. C'est une erreur tactique de notre part. Peut-titre qu'on a voulu 
titre trop m'as-tu-vu et qu'il vaudrait mieux avoir des postes de 
responsabilite anonymes dans la societt francaise. On aurait dü exister 
sans parler trop de nous. 
(Meb Toul, Paris) 
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What of the councillors' views on their period of office? A wide diversity of 
opinions on the matter is expressed, from those who feel they have 
accomplished at least some of the objectives they set out to achieve by 
limiting their aims to specific purposes, to those who are disenchanted and 
threaten either to leave their party list and join another party, or who at the end 
of their six-year term will not seek to renew their mandate. Despite these 
differences, there seems to be a general consensus that once the symbolic 
threshold had been crossed, there then begins a period of apprenticeship, and 
it is only after two years in office that they have been able to put into practice 
some of their projects. Some, for reasons already mentioned, have been 
thwarted in such attempts. 
There is, then, a general awareness of the problems that are inherent in the 
post of a municipal councillor and of the fact that there remains a great deal of 
work to be done. It may in fact only be at the end of their period of office that 
we will be able to determine with exactitude the achievements of the 
councillors in question and the extent to which they have been able to 
overcome the obstacles that have been placed in their way. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MAGHREBIAN PRESSURE GROUPS WITHIN THE PS 
6.1 Introduction 
Pressure groups are by no means a phenomenon peculiar to ethnic minorities. 
Organisations claiming to represent the interests of agriculture, business, 
labour, women or other groups largely pre-date ethnic minority pressure 
groups. We may define pressure groups as being 
a categoric group whose members are to some extent conscious of 
their common characteristics, regard themselves as having a common 
value or 'interest' arising from these characteristics and to some extent 
direct their behaviour to advance their common interest. 
(Walton 1969,140) 
Shukra (1990) in her study of black sections in Great Britain defines the aims 
of ethnic minority pressure groups as follows: 
i) Electoral objectives. This may mean both attracting members of an ethnic 
minority to a political party and increasing the number of elected 
representatives from that ethnic minority. 
ii) Policy/campaigning objectives which aim at mobilising the support of the 
ethnic minority outside the electoral process. 
iii) Self-development objectives of the organisation. This can he used as a 
platform for personal promotion. 
The logic of ethnic minority pressure groups is to provide an alternative for 
minorities to being submerged by the dominant host society in which they find 
themselves. By organising pressure groups within a political party of this host 
nation, the aim is to transform that party by operating from within. 
This chapter will concentrate upon the two principal Maghrebian pressure 
groups within the PS, the Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 
(CSCM) and the Conference Nationale des Elus Originaires du Maghreb 
(CNESOM). We will focus upon the first and third aims as defined by Shukra 
(the second aim is examined in chapter 4 on national organisations, dealing 
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specifically with France-Plus and SOS-Racisme). We shall begin by 
chronicling the origins of the two organisations and explaining the manner in 
which they operate and their objectives. The chapter will then go on to 
highlight ideological differences that exist between the two and which are 
attributable in part to their links with the various courants or tendencies in the 
PS. This will involve analysis of the manner in which the CSCM and 
CNESOM function. In the final part of the chapter the views of the two 
organisations will be compared and contrasted with respect to the right to vote 
of immigrants in municipal elections. (Differences between the two 
concerning the Gulf War and the 'headscarf affair are referred to in chapter 7. ) 
Before we examine these themes, however, it is necessary to briefly examine 
one other pressure group within the PS which relates to Maghrehians, Club 
Emergence, which was set up in 1989 by Mohamed Meb Toul, former 
producer of the magazine programme Mosaique on the third television 
channel, FR 3, and a member of the comite directeur of the party. Club 
Emergence was an attempt to provide a forum for debate on incorporating 
Maghrebians into mainstream political parties. Meb Toul in a speech delivered 
at the first meeting of Club Emergence, on 25 November 1989 at the National 
Assembly, described the aims of the organisation thus: 
Nous pensons que jusqu'ä prdsent ils [les Francais d'origine 
maghrebine] ont dtd en dehors des partis politiques et que les 
politiques les concernant s'elaboraient en dehors d'eux. 
(Club Emergence 1989,7) 
Despite some initial success in attracting party leaders (Lionel Jospin and 
Louis Mermaz), municipal councillors (of which two, Georges Sali and Henri 
Touabi, belong to my sample) and other party members sympathetic to the 
cause including the president of the CNESOM, Georges Morin, Club 
Emergence never attracted widespread support. This is perhaps attributable in 
part to its failure to publicise itself throughout France, but also to the existence 
of other politically-oriented associations such as France-Plus. Club Emergence 
ceased in reality to function as an effective force once the CSCM and 
CNESOM came into existence. It is for this reason that we shall focus 
attention upon these two organisations exclusively. 
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6.2 Origins and development 
6.2.1 Le Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 
The origins of the Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane, created on 23 
June 1990, date back to the period between elections in 1986-87 and in 
particular to a face-to-face television debate between Francois Leotard, a 
senior member of the UDF, and Jack Lang, Minister of Culture. During the 
debate, Leotard, according to the now president of the Cercle, Sultana 
Cheurfa, commented that the Rights of Islam are incompatible with the Rights 
of Man and those of Women. Cheurfa, a PS activist and member of the branch 
committee in the 19th arrondissement of Paris, was angered by these 
comments since she believed that they denied her very existence. In response 
to this Cheurfa, along with a friend in the PS, wrote an open letter to Ldotard 
in Le Monde. The newspaper refused to publish the letter. This proved to be a 
revealing experience for Cheurfa: 
Cela a montrt les limites de la reflexion ä tous niveaux dans notre 
societe. Et notamment de ceux qui s'exprimaient. 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
This perception was reinforced during the so-called affaire du foulard in the 
autumn of 1989, for in her opinion it revealed that there was division and 
crisis within French society as a whole and within the PS in particular. She 
explained her reasoning thus: 
11 ya deux parties de la socidtd francaise : on est d'une France contre 
l'autre France. Un Parti socialiste meme contre un autre Parti 
socialiste, de droite A gauche. Done on se d6 finit par des poles. 
(Cheurfa, Paris). 
Cheurfa attempted to express her opinions publicly by means of an article in 
Le Monde. However, the article, though published this time, was modified and 
the title was changed from 'Voile sur la France, Troubles au PS' to 'Contre 
1'assimilation' (Le Monde 24 November 1989). In addition Cheurfa circulated 
a document within the PS which attempted to bring together members of the 
party who were of the Muslim faith. The document was duly printed in a party 
journal, Vendredi, but again modifications were made, most notably the 
omission of any signatures and the addition of an insignia showing a nude 
woman wearing a veil. Neither change had been made with Cheurfa's 
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approval. Before a PS congress meeting on the secular nature of the state took 
place in 1989, Cheurfa met with friends in the party to discuss the whole 
affair. 
The affaire du foulard would provide the stimulus for the creation of the 
CSCM. Its President is convinced that what was at stake in the affair was the 
future status of Maghrebians in France. In its first newsletter the CSCM 
argued that the affair was in fact an affront to Muslims: 
Les Musulmans de France ont Bubi un veritable ddferlement d'hostilitt s 
dans lequel la prdsentation faite de 1'Islam tenait de la caricature, et oü 
mcme 1'insulte ne fut pas evitee. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 5) 
A subsequent meeting with municipal councillors of Maghrebian origin took 
place in January 1990 during the first national conference held by the 
Federation Nationale des Elus Socialistes et Re publicains (FNESR). Cheurfa 
attended the conference presided over by Georges Morin, but claims to have 
been prevented from speaking. This was one example of the clash of 
personalities between the two future leaders of Maghrebian pressure groups 
within the PS, although Cheurfa claims there was an antecedent to this when 
at a previous FNESR meeting over which Morin presided, she was prevented 
from entering. It was directly after Cheurfa was not allowed to express her 
opinions at the second meeting in January 1990 that she left the chamber 
along with a small group of councillors to discuss the creation of the CSCM. 
Cheurfa made the following observation: 
A ce moment-1a on a combine les rapports et notamment la frustration 
politique qu'ils [les conseillers municipaux d'origine maghrdhine] ont 
au sein du PS. D'abord de l'expression et du pouvoir qu'ils ont, du peu 
de valorisation. Les Maghrebins en general sont dCvalorisCs. Donc 
eux-memes [les conseillers municipaux] le ressentent. 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
The CSCM is headed by a bureau which is called the Comite d'Orientation. 
The tasks which the Comite d'Orientation performs are as follows: 
C'est le Comite d'Orientation qui determine et conduit, entre deux 
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Assembldes Gengrales, et dans le cadre des d6cisions qui y sont prises, 
la politique du CSCM. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane n. d., 2) 
The members of the Comite d'Orientation are elected by the Assemblee 
Generale for a three year-period in office. 
The Comite d'Orientation chooses a bureau which is made up of the following 
members: 
-A President who prepares the work that the Comite d'Orientation will 
undertake and supervises the carrying out of decisions. It is the President who 
represents the CSCM in its dealings with external elements. 
- One or more vice-presidents to assist or take over from the president in case 
of emergency. 
-A Secretary-General who deals with the internal administration of the 
organisation and may be aided by a deputy. 
-A Treasurer concerned with the organisation's finances and who may also be 
supported by a deputy. 
Below this is the conseil d'administration comprising twelve members. The 
meetings of the CSCM may take place at three levels: an Assemblee Generale 
at national level which normally takes place once a year; various Assemblee 
Regionales; Assemblees Locales for members within a specific municipality 
or town/city. 
The CSCM is made up of fully-fledged members enjoying full voting rights 
and associated members sympathetic to the organisation's goals. The latter 
may participate in discussions, but do not have the right to vote. Among the 
full members are a disparate group of individuals of the Muslim faith 
(principally, though not exclusively, of Maghrebian origin) which include 
associational leaders such as Nordine Cherif (Generation Beur), intellectuals 
such as the philosopher Sadek Sellam and the sociologist Rachid Alaoui, as 
well as PS activists at departmental level and various municipal councillors 
including maires-adjoints throughout the country. 
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The CSCM aims at encouraging the cultural, ideological and social expression 
of Socialists who are of the Muslim faith. In order to achieve this, a three- 
pronged approach is pursued as article 3 of the preamble sets out: 
- Rassembler lcs musulmans vivant en France et qui se reconnaissent 
dans le Parti socialiste, pour en etre membre ou proche. 
- Oeuvrer pour une meilleure connaissance de 1'Islam et du patrimoine 
culturel, social et familial lid ä sa civilisation. 
- Combattre les prdjugds auxquels se heurte la communautd 
musulmane de France, apporter aide et soutien a ses membres, et 
combattre pour que l'egalite de droits et de devoirs leur soit reconnue. 
(Cercle des Socialistes ce Culture Musulmane n. d., 1) 
The logic of the Cercle is explained in the first newsletter. There was first of 
all a feeling that decisions were being taken for the Maghrehian population by 
people of non-Maghrebian origin and that this situation needed to be reversed: 
Une teile structure parait necessaire face au constat d'exclusion de la 
communaute musulmane de la sphere politique, qui persiste malgrd la 
presence d'elus et de militants dans les divers partis, et notamment au 
P. S. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 1). 
Secondly, Maghrebians were perceived to be under-represented in 
organisations concerned with the plight of ethnic minority groups: 
Aucun membre de la communaute n'est present dans rette institution 
[le Haut Conseil ä 1'IntCgration]. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 1) 
Thirdly, Maghrebians were not allowed to express themselves freely in the 
media and instead unrepresentative figures were given the opportunity to 
express their opinions, often inflamming the debate and furthering the 
misperceptions and stereotypical images that the French population as a whole 
may have of Maghrebians in France (for examples see section 7.2). Therefore: 
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Pour exister, il faut se faire entendre : ce n'est pas d'une protection dont 
nous avons besoin, c'est d'une expression [... ] 11 nous faut, 
publiquement, titre nous-memes 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 4). 
Fourthly, the Cercle felt the need to make the PS aware of the existence of 
Maghrebians in France: 
Le PS en a sans doute besoin pour prendre la mesure de cette rdalitd, 
nouvelle et definitive : la presence d'une communautC culturelle et 
religieuse minoritaire, en France et au sein de la classe ouvric re. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes (le Culture Musulmane 1990a, 5). 
With the setting-up of the Cercle, municipal councillors, association 
representatives, regional heads and intellectuals who belonged to, or were 
sympathetic toward, the PS could henceforth meet to discuss matters of 
importance concerning the Maghrebian and other Muslim populations in 
France. It would be independent of the party courants and secular individuals 
of Maghrebian origin would he allowed to join. 
6.2.2 Conference Nationales des Elus Socialistes Originaires du Maghreb 
The CNESOM, set up in March 1990, is the brainchild of Georges Morin, a 
pied-noir, and conseiller delegue under Louis Mermaz at the Ministry for 
Agriculture. Its origins date hack to 1983 when a network of PS activists 
including the sons and daughters of North African immigrants, made up of 
Beurs and harkis as well as pieds-noirs, was started at the request of Lionel 
Jospin and Pierre Mauroy. The aim of the network was as follows: 
Nous tentions, ensemble, de ddfinir ce que devrait titre la politique du 
parti et du gouvernement pour une meilleure integration a la 
communautd nationale des populations originaires du Maghreb. 
(Conference Nationale des Elus Socialistes Originaires du Maghreb 
1992,1) 
A more formal structure for the activists was created with the setting-up by 
Morin of the little known Groupe des trente in 1987. Made up of thirty 
original members, the body sought to reflect on issues concerning the 
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Maghrebian population. Geisser (1993,14) argues that the short-lived 
existence of the Groupe des trente should not be underestimated in the wider 
context of Maghrehian political activism and evaluates its importance in the 
following terms: 
C'est la premiere fois qu'une forme d'ethnicitd maghrdbine apparait en 
tant que teile, en dehors des luttes inter-courants et des querelles de 
leaders. 
With the extension of Morin's responsibilities under Pierre Mauroy in 1988 
(henceforth Morin would be responsible to the PS General Secretary for 
elected representatives originating from the Maghreb), a joint venture was 
undertaken between the party and the FNESR. This sought to bring together 
Socialist elected representatives at national and local level (though as yet there 
were and still are no deputes of Maghrebian origin in the PS) as well as 
affiliated representatives originating from the Maghreb or apparente. c. This 
action was achieved with the agreement of Pierre Mauroy, president of the 
FNESR, and Guy Vadepied, its General Secretary. Between June and 
September of 1989 a survey was undertaken by Georges Morin, by telephone 
and letter, to determine the number of municipal councillors originating from 
the Maghreb (including pieds-noirs as well as those of Muslim origin) and the 
following figures were arrived at: 
Par le triple canal des federations du PS, de celles de la FNESR et des 
maires socialistes, nous arrivions ä collecter, en trois mois, les 
coordonnees d'environ 300 d1us, nationaux et locaux, dont une centaine 
d'origine maghrdbine. 
(Conference Nationale des Elus Socialistes Originaires du Maghreb 
1992,1) 
While all 300 became members of the CNESOM, only 100 were of 
Maghrebian origin. Of the other 200 elected officials all were sympathetic 
towards people of Maghrebian origin and had links with the Maghreb (e. g. 
pieds-noirs who had formerly resided in the Maghreb). 
On 4 November 1989 the first national meeting of the 300 municipal 
councillors took place under the aegis of the FNESR in the National Assembly 
and nine working parties, each devoted to a specific theme, were established. 
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As Morin explains, they were divided up into the following three categories: 
3 de nature economique et sociale [logement, ecole, emploi], 3 de 
nature culturelle [programmes d'enseignement, role des medias, Islam 
de France], et 3 touchant la vie publique [rapports avec la justice et la 
police, rapports avec l'armde, integration politique]. 
(Conference Nationale des Elus Socialistes Originaires du Maghreb 
1992,1) 
This first meeting served as a preparatory session for the second meeting, 
which was again held at the National Assembly and organised by the FNESR, 
from 5 to 7 January 1990. It was at this meeting that ministers of the 
government were to enter into discussions, based on the nine themes, with the 
elected representatives. In March of the same year the F6dc"ration Nationale 
des Elus Socialistes et Republicains originating from the Maghreb was 
officially created. 
The president of the CNESOM, Georges Morin, has been unwilling to provide 
me with a copy of the organisation's charter. However, despite the absence of 
this document, it is possible broadly outline the two major objectives of the 
CNESOM: 
i) The first of these is to provide a mouthpiece for the 'Maghrebian' voice 
within the PS, taking into account all constituent parts of the populations that 
have previously resided in, or originate from the Maghreb. Morin, while quick 
to deny any claims of purporting to represent Maghrebian opinion as a whole, 
acknowledges this when making the following the comments: 
Sans prdtendre aucunement "reprdsenter" 1'ensemble des populations 
dont nous sommes issus, nous sommes ä meme de traduire pour nos 
interlocuteurs les attentes et les espoirs de nos compatriotes, et de 
reagir aux actions et aux projets que les ministres ont engagtes ou 
nous font connaitre. 
(Conference Nationale des Elus Socialistes Originaires du Maghreb 
1992,1) 
In other words the CNESOM can act as a forum to relay Maghrebian opinion 
from grass-roots level to the highest echelons of the PS leadership. 
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ii) Secondly, the organisation aims at promoting a positive image of 
maghrebinite in French society. This is required since the diverse groups 
which make up the Maghrebian population in France are united in terms of 
identity only on the basis of their rejection by large parts of French society. 
Geisser (1993,15) argues that one of the reasons for the CNESOM being set 
up is to combat the negative perception in French society of anything 
associated with the Maghreb: 
Pour repondre ä cette forme de stigmatisation, la CNESOM entend 
promouvoir "une maghrdbinitd positive" qui intdgrerait pole-mole 
enfants de l'immigration, juifs sepharades, et rapatrids d'Afrique du 
Nord. 
However, Morin's concept of bringing together disparate and some would 
even say opposing populations is a problematic one. Critics of the CNESOM 
have argued that the idea of bringing together the different constituent parts 
which make up the CNESOM is at best an idealistic one, harking hack to a 
colonial past which has little to do with the present reality. Geisser (1993,15) 
clearly subscribes to this view when he makes the following comments: 
La nouvelle association [la CNESOM] repose sur une vision iddale 
voire idyllique du "Maghreb d'avant les independances", vision 
transposee ä la France d'aujourd'hui. Elle est propre ä une generation 
de militants et de dirigeants socialistes pour lesquels la situation 
actuelle doit titre decodee avec les clefs ideologiques d'une socidtd 
passee. 
6.3 Organisational Resources 
In terms of the composition of their members, the CNESOM and CSCM differ 
quite radically. Numerically the CNESOM is the larger of the two with almost 
three hundred members and includes among its ranks various nationalities, 
origins and denominations. 
These include pieds-noirs, the sons and daughters of harkis and members of 
Muslim families of economic migrants, both Arab and Berber. Additionally 
there are members of mixed French and North African origin. 
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The CSCM, on the other hand, has a more strictly defined membership based 
rather on Islam. While Maghrebians predominate within the Cercle, it also has 
members of other nationalities and origins, such as Black African 
Muslims: 
La reference musulmane apparait comme 1'element commun et durable 
autour duquel se trouve notre communaute. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 4) 
This does not mean, however, that only practising Muslims can adhere to the 
organisation. As one newsletter explains, membership of the CSCM is not 
confined to those having a strong attachment to Islam (Cheurfa herself is not a 
practising Muslim, although she says that she is a believer). The CSCM has a 
membership of 50, of which 25 are municipal councillors (four of whom 
feature in my sample). The majority of the councillors in the CSCM exercise 
their functions outside the city of Paris and this explains the relatively small 
number among my sample of councillors. In addition the Cercle distributes its 
newsletter to 350 'contacts', 100 'personalities' (either interested in, or who 
have close allegances with, the Arab world), 50 associations and institutions, 
50 occasional correspondents, leaders within the party, deputes and a selected 
number of PS mayors. 
Both the CNESOM and the CSCM are primarily Paris-based and neither has 
any regional sub-divisions, though the latter does state in its constitution that 
regional meetings can in theory take place. While members come from 
throughout France, those from Ile-de-France are by far the most numerous. 
Both organisations consist of a bureau with a president, vice-presidents (of 
which there are three municipal councillors of Maghrebian origin in the 
CNESOM and one in the CSCM), and a Conseil d'administration (with twelve 
Maghrebian councillors in the CNESOM and two in the CSCM). In the 
CNESOM the members of the Conseil d'administration are divided up into the 
three committees already mentioned. 
In the CNESOM one national meeting is held per annum. This has attracted 
on average between one hundred and fifty and one hundred and eighty 
members. In addition there are bi-monthly meetings attended by the thirty 
members of the Conseil d 'administration. Discussion draws on the detailed 
work of the individual committees. The CSCM meets once a month on 
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average and it discusses themes relevant to Muslims resident in France. There 
has also been discussion of the mandates of municipal councillors who are 
members of the CSCM. These discussions have concerned the ideological 
bases of the party and senior members of the CSCM have explained the nature 
and logic of the various tendencies. On two occasions the CSCM has directly 
intervened in local party section dealings on behalf of municipal councillors 
belonging to the CSCM when there has been a dispute (see section 5.4.5. ). 
Such action is justified by the CSCM according to article three of its 
constitution which states that the organisation is committed to combating 
prejudice and ensuring equal rights for all. The CNESOM, apart from 
debating issues, organised a trip to the Maghreb immediately following the 
end of the Gulf War (see section 7.2.2 for further details) and has been 
involved in the campaign to oppose the Front National during the 1992 
regional elections in the Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur region. 
The finances of the CNESOM and CSCM reflect the different attitudes that 
the party leaders have towards these organisations. The CNESOM is financed 
largely by a quango, the Fonds d'Action Sociale, and has continued to benefit 
from the support of Pierre Mauroy and Louis Mermaz. While the Fonds 
d'Action Sociale is not an instrument of the PS, it does nevertheless reflect the 
political complexions of the day. The CSCM, on the other hand, has not 
enjoyed any such support and consequently has had to rely upon a variety of 
sources including membership subscription fees, receipts from organised 
activities, donations and any subsidies that might be granted. 
6.4 Ideological affinities 
Both organisations claim not to belong to any particular courant or tendency 
within the PS and the two presidents, when interviewed, were at pains to stress 
their opposition to any influence from these courants. Morin made the 
following comments: 
Si vous donnez une couleur ä cette association, vous allez la saborder. 
Chaque clan du PS va etre tentd de crier son propre mouvement. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Cheurfa argued that to take sides within the party would be a futile exercise, 
particularly when seeking to open up a dialogue with the party as a whole: 
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Notre expression commune ne doit pas titre soumise aux stratdgies 
d'une tendance particuliere. Tel est le seul moyen d'engager un 
dialogue utile avec tout le parti. 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
Nevertheless despite the claims of both organisations to be above party 
factionalism, they are, to some extent, influenced by the heads of particular 
courants, or at the very least are sympathetic towards the ideology of these 
tendencies. The CNESOM was initiated with the support of Lionel Jospin and 
Pierre Mauroy, who belong to the tendency within the PS known as the Jospin 
- Mauroy - Mermaz courant. The other party leader in this tendency, Louis 
Mermaz, is in fact the head of the Ministry of Agriculture under whom 
Georges Morin worked as a conseiller-delegue until the change of government 
in March 1993. Prior to this Morin was and still remains a maire-adjoint in the 
municipality of Gieres (Isere). Mermaz was influential in the region as 
president of the Conseil Regional between 1976 and 1985. Morin is also a 
member of the comite directeur of the PS and access to this level invariably 
necessitates being put forward by a prominent individual in a particular 
tendency. 
The CSCM, while avowedly non-factionalist, shows a marked ideological 
leaning towards the Socialisme et Republique courant, headed by Jean-Pierre 
Chevenement, which is to the far left of the party. Cheurfa, president of the 
CSCM and herself a member of the Chevenement tendency, said in 
unambiguous terms where she thought the Cercle stood within the political 
spectrum. In answer to the question of whether hers was an organisation above 
party factionalism, Cheurfa replied, 
Oui, mais qui est Kien socialiste et qui est Kien ä gauche. 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
Sympathies towards the Chevenement courant were displayed in private 
during the Gulf War by several municipal councillors who were members of 
the Cercle, and who telephoned Chevenement to express their personal 
support for the stance that he had adopted during hostilities. In particular they 
applauded, according to Cheurfa's account, his decision to resign as Minister 
of Defence. While Sultana Cheurfa was personally informed by the 
councillors of this support, she has been unwilling to disclose their names for 
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my research purposes. 
Indeed, though no member of the CSCM resigned as a result of French 
involvement, the discourse and actions of the Cercle during the Gulf War 
closely mirrored those of the former Defence Minister with respect to 
opposition to French and American military participation. One of the main 
ideological tenets behind the Socialisme et Republique tendency is a 
reluctance to endorse liberalism or US hegemony, and this is implicitly stated 
in a PS document charting the origins of the various courants (Parti Socialiste 
Section Jean Jaures 1990). Before, during and after the conflict, the CSCM 
criticised the United States for its behaviour and the French government and 
PS for its support of American participation (for further details see section 
7.2.1). In November 1990 the Cercle issued the following warning to the party 
in its conference-debate pamphlet on the Gulf crisis: 
La France doit savoir resister aux pressions du "lobby atlantiste". A cet 
egard nous souhaitons que le Parti socialiste contribue a eclaircr 
1'opinion. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990f, 3) 
The suggestion was made that the United States was leading world opinion 
into a logique de guerre and that their allies in France were advocating a close 
Atlantic alliance. The Cercle voiced its disapproval in the clearest possible 
terms: 
Les Socialistes de Culture Musulmane s'efforceront, pour leur part, de 
combattre dans l'opinion la "logique de guerre" dans laquelle la France 
a beaucoup ä perdre et fort peu ä gagner. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmune 1990f, 3). 
This view was reiterated immediately after the end of hostilities when the 
Cercle, in a special newsletter devoted to the Gulf War, criticised the French 
government for having a change in policy (i. e. military intervention) imposed 
upon it as a result of American pressure: 
Globalement, la France s'est vu imposer, par la cohdrence de la 
politique americaine, un chamboulement complet de ses positions 
stratdgiques : la plupart de ses amis et allies se sont retrouvds dans le 
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camp oppose. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 199 1f, 4) 
At the conference-debate held by the CSCM at the National Assembly on 14 
June 1991, a prominent member of the Chevenement courant, Max Gallo, was 
invited to speak. He was defined in the accompanying pamphlet as being 
firmly opposed to a Franco-American coalition in the Gulf War, a position 
identical to the views expressed by the Cercle: 
Cette coherence 1'a conduit ä prendre position contre 1'alignement de la 
France dans la coalition americaine dans la Guerre du Golfe. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1991h, 1) 
Further evidence of links between Chevc'nementiste ideology and that of the 
Cercle is to be found in criticism of other tendencies within the party, 
especially the courant headed by Michel Rocard. Philippe and Hubseher 
(1991,71), in their study of the internal workings of the PS, highlight the 
principal criticism made by the Socialisme et Republique tendency of Michel 
Rocard's ideology: 
Une politique d'alliance avec la droite et une renonciation route 
perspective de transformation de la societ6. Un nouvel ennemi 
apparait : le rocardisme. 
(Hubscher, Philippe 1991,71) 
Cheurfa, in a letter to Michel Rocard, criticised his speech made on 9 January 
1990 at the CNESOM national conference at the National Assembly in which 
Prime Minister stated that France could not continue to accept immigrants into 
the country. This reflects the similar nature of the criticisms levelled at the 
Rocard courant as the following comments attest: 
Notre demande est sociale et culturelle : nous ne voulons pas que 
1'identit6 francaise de demain se fasse sans nous, ni contre nous. 
Devons-nous comprendre votre amalgame comme un argument pour la 
refuser? 
(Cheurfa, 1990) 
The above comments are consistent with the Socialisme et Republique 
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tendency strategy; denounce the enemy and name it in terms which already 
constitute a condemnation. 
6.5 The right to vote for immigrants 
With the ratification of the Maastricht treaty requiring a modification in the 
French Constitution (henceforth other EC member state nationals will be 
eligible to vote and stand as candidates in local and European elections), the 
whole debate has re-opened as to whether foreigners resident in France, 
particularly those of Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian nationality, should have 
the right to vote. President Mitterrand, while affirming his support for this 
right to be granted to non-EC nationals resident in France for a number of 
years, has not attempted to translate this commitment into law, due to the 
unfavourable reaction of the French public as revealed by opinion polls on the 
subject in the press. Both the CNESOM and CSCM have debated the question 
at length, and while sharing the same desire for Maghrebian nationals to be 
able to vote, they differ both on the means to achieve this and on the 
timescale. The position of the President of the CNESOM, Georges Morin, has 
shifted from one of hostility to a gradual acceptance of this right. He explains 
his intial position as follows: 
Moi, au depart, j'etais tres "Rdpublicain". C'est-ä-dire, je disais que le 
droit de vote n'Ctait que pour les citoyens francais. 
(Morin, Paris) 
However, his position changed when he began to listen to the arguments of 
municipal councillors within the CNESOM such as Zair Kedadouche 
(Aubervilliers), who convinced him that non-EC nationals who had worked in 
France for a considerable length of time and who had contributed to the well- 
being of the nation deserved to have the right to vote. Morin paraphrases 
Kedadouche's views as follows: 
Je pense ä Zair [Kedadouche] ou a d'autres : 'Moi, je suis Francais 
parce que mon seul merite, c'etait d'etre ne dans ce pays. Mon pore qui 
a trimd pendant trente ans pour que ce pays avance n'a pas le droit de 
vote. Il a cent fois plus le droit de voter que moi. ' 
(Morin, Paris) 
Given the current debate on allowing other EC member nationals the right to 
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vote, Morin believes that it would be illogical not to allow non-EC nationals, 
resident in France for a far longer period of time than the former, the 
possibility of voting. Therefore he now argues that: 
Majoritairement nous sommes pour le droit de vote aux elections 
municipales. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Nevertheless he recognises that there would at least two drawbacks if this 
right did become law. First of all Morin argues that if the right to vote at 
municipal level is granted, then the next logical progression would he to allow 
foreigners to vote in regional or national elections. This is an objection that 
some, if not necessarily all, on the Right have put forward. Indeed there are 
adversaries on the Left as well. Secondly Morin recognises that the French 
population is not at present ready to accept the idea of foreigners voting in 
French elections and is particularly hostile to Maghrebian nationals acquiring 
this right. Morin argues that the PS should set an example and has already 
done so, implementing the intermediate stage of associate municipal 
councillors experimented with at Mons-en-Baroeul and then at Amiens. Morin 
explains his position thus: 
11 faudrait aussi que les communes socialistes donnent 1'exemple en 
creant partout des conseillers consultatifs qui permettent justement a 
ces etrangers qui ne peuvent pas voter de designer des reprCsentants 
qui siegent aux conseils municipaux pour y parler. Cest deja un 
progres. 
(Morin, Paris) 
The position of the CSCM, by contrast, has remained the same throughout. 
Part of its policy has been to oppose the creation of associate municipal 
councillors for the following reasons: 
Elles [les dlections de conseillers municipaux associ6s] ont permis une 
prise en compte officielle des populations etrangeres, mais ne peuvent 
etre une fin ä long terme, parce qu'elles maintiennent une division 
legale entre Francais et etrangers. C'est done Bien ä tort que le PS a cru 
pouvoir utiliser ces experiences - et promettre lour extension- pour 
justifier le recul sur le droit de vote egal. 
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(L, u Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990b, 10) 
In the same newsletter the CSCM argues that accepting the concept of 
conseillers municipaux associes would be an extremely unpopular decision 
among Maghrebians. The CSCM believes this is illustrated by the opposition 
of the association Memoire Fertile which called for them to be boycotted. The 
CSCM concludes that the implementation of conseillers municipaux associes 
is merely a front to attempt to conceal what it perceives to be the real problem 
facing the PS, namely informing the general public in the clearest possible 
terms about the right of non-French nationals to vote and furthermore having 
the necessary courage to do so. 
The CSCM believes that the postponing of any decision on the right of non- 
EC nationals to vote is a retrograde step. It issued the following warning on 
how this would be interpreted at grass roots level: 
A la base, les critiques n'ont tout de meme pas manqut, comprenant 
qu'il s'agit d'un nouvel ecart par rapport aux valeurs de Ja Gauche. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990b, 9) 
In fact the CSCM argues that by excluding foreigners from the political 
decision-making process, the effect of government inaction is to legitimise 
racist discourse and practice. In so doing the Cercle clearly disagrees with the 
view that, because of negative public feedback, the government should 
advance cautiously, as advocated by members of the party including Georges 
Morin. It explains its reasoning in the following manner: 
Le racisme est prdsentd comme un obstacle ä la reconnaissance du 
droit de vote : "1'opinion nest pas prete". C'est, a l'inverse, l'exclusion 
des etrangers qui renforce l'impact politique des reactions racistes [... ]. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmune 1990b, 9) 
Ne tournons pas autour du pot : ou bien la Gauche croit qu'il est 
possible de dire la verite aux Francais ; les immigr6s resteront, la 
France doit leur faire leur place et la reconnaissance du droit de vote 
aux elections locales est un point de passage normal. Ou hien, le PS 
prCfere reculer tactiquement, mais l'iddologie raciste est un peu plus 
legitimisee. Parce que ses theories d'exclusion ont la force de s'appuyer 
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sur la realite sociale de discriminations admises. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990b,. 10) 
6.6 Conclusion 
How far have ethnic minority pressure groups within the PS succeeded in 
influencing decision-making processes within the party? The CSCM and the 
CNESOM have adopted contrasting strategies, neither of which appears to 
have met with very much success. The CSCM has attempted to influence the 
party hierarchy from below, while the CNESOM has hoped to benefit from its 
close links with senior members of the party. The question of voting rights for 
foreigners is one of several important issues on which the CSCM has failed to 
persuade party leaders to follow its line. Another was the Gulf War (see 
section 7.2), when the CSCM's pleas against French military intervention 
went unheeded. While the establishment of the CNESOM owed much to 
senior party figures such as Georges Morin, it does not appear to have 
impacted significantly on policy decisions. On both the Gulf War and voting 
rights for foreigners, the CNESOM has largely followed the official party line. 
The control which the party hierarchy was to exercise over the CNESOM was 
only too apparent during the conference held by the FNESR in January 1990, 
which was to a large extent stage-managed by the PS leadership. Prior to the 
conference councillors had met with PS leaders in private to fix the agenda 
and indeed to provide the exact wording of questions that Maghrebian 
councillors would pose to the party leaders. Ever since then, as Geisser (1993) 
points out, the CNESOM has appeared reluctant to express its opinions freely, 
preferring to sit on the*political fence on various issues: 
En effet, sur un certain nombre de questions politiques, dconomiques 
et sociales, 1'association de Georges Morin []a CNESOM] a rcfusd de 
se positionner clairement, se rdfugiant dans un attentisme 
"reconfortant", mais auto-destructeur. 
In a situation where the CNESOM has been perceived by Maghrebian 
councillors to follow PS leadership policy rather than formulating its own, this 
has resulted in a significant decrease in attendance at CNESOM meetings. 
One councillor from Orleans, outside my own sample, acknowledged this 
when questioned by Geisser (1993): 
Sur ces differents points [le droit de vote des immigrds, la politique 
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sociale du gouvernement et la "politique arabe" de la France], la 
CNESOM a adopte une politique de suivisme a I'egard des dirigeants 
socialistes, suivisme qui a parfois decu les elus franco-maghrebins de 
base. 
One potential avenue by which Maghrebian councillors might try to achieve 
greater success could be by forming coalitions with: 
i) Other ethnic minority pressure groups 
ii) Non-ethnic minority pressure groups. 
The former path would entail forming coalitions between Maghrebian 
pressure groups and/or other minority pressure groups such as Black Africans 
or Turks. However, the likelihood of the two Maghrebian pressure groups 
within the PS coming together, or even alliances between them and either 
France-Plus or SOS-Racisme is somewhat unlikely given personality 
differences between the leaders. Furthermore the heterogeneous nature of the 
Maghrebian population makes this an even more remote possibility. 
First of all divisions between the two principal Maghrebian pressure groups 
within the PS are symptomatic of ideological differences that permeate the 
party at all levels. These have important repercussions for the ability of 
Maghrebians to express grievances and to attract a non-Maghrebian audience 
which is both sympathetic and receptive to their particular needs. Different 
and often opposing strategies deployed by the CSCM and CNESOM make 
any attempt to define and shape a specific Maghrebian agenda within the party 
problematic. 
This is illustrated further by the divergent positions adopted vis-a-vis the 
principle of incorporating French nationals of the Jewish faith who originate 
from the Maghreb into the two pressure groups. Whereas the CNESOM 
considers them an integral feature of the organisation, the CSCM displays a 
marked reluctance to incorporate people of the Jewish faith into its midst. The 
comments of one councillor in my sample who is a member of the Conseil 
d'administration in the CSCM illustrate the depth of feeling on this issue: 
Dans noire groupe [le CSCM] on n'accepte pas les Juifs. On ne veut 
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pas de sionistes. Meme s'il ya des Juifs qui sont pour la Palestine. On 
n'en doute pas. Mais on se refuse ä cela. On a des Frangais de souche 
qui sont avec nous, mais les Juifs non. Parce que bon il ya 1'exptrience 
de France-Plus et de SOS-Racisme et on a vu ce que cela a donniS avec 
les Juifs. Les Arabes sont toujours obliges de faire des concessions et 
de ne plus tenir ä leurs positions. 
(Rahmouni, Vdnissieux) 
The President of the CSCM echoed these sentiments after having been 
interviewed for my study. She criticised in no uncertain terms one Maghrebian 
councillor in the CNESOM who had continued to work within that 
organisation alongside a councillor of the Jewish faith during the Gulf War. In 
general the CSCM argues that, unlike French Muslims, French nationals of the 
Jewish faith enjoy a privileged position within both the PS and French society 
at large. 
No one voice is able to speak on behalf of all Maghrebians in the PS and this 
seriously weakens the potential force that they might wield. Mohamed Meb 
Toul was the president of the now defunct Club Emergence, and is the only 
member of the comite directeur of the PS of Maghrebian origin, a position he 
achieved thanks to the support of one of the party leaders, Henri Emmanuelli. 
Meb Toul recognises this lack of unity: 
Je voulais parler de cette incapacity ä s'organiser. D'une part le Cercle. 
D'autre part la CNESOM. 11 n'y a pas de veritable porte-paroles de 
Francais d'origine maghrCbine au PS. 
(Meb Toul, Paris) 
It is possible to make a comparison here with Hispanics in the United States 
who, like Maghrebians in France, are made up of different nationalities and 
whose entry into the political arena has been a relatively recent phenomenon. 
As Garcia (1989) has observed, the development of a national Hispanic 
community (Chicano, Cuban and Puerto Rican populations) has contributed 
significantly to the directions and content of their leadership and 
organisations. This has enabled a clearly defined national agenda to he laid 
down. However, in the case of the PS, even when the CSCM and CNESOM 
are in broad agreement on an agenda, as is the case concerning the right to 
vote of immigrants, leadership personality clashes prevent the pursuance of a 
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united approach. There is, then, acknowledgement by both organisations of 
the need to initiate change from within the party with regard to the perception 
and treatment of Maghrebians in French society, yet at the same time an 
inability to exert any major degree of influence. 
Secondly, and despite statements to the contrary, the CSCM and CNESOM 
have inevitably, perhaps, become caught up in the wider struggle between 
tendencies in the party. The CNESOM in particular, by virtue of its leaders' 
and backers' affiliations, may be identified with the Jospin-Mauroy-Mermaz 
courant, and this can engender problems when general support is sought 
within the party for new initiatives. At the very least the clear support of party 
leaders belonging to one tendency creates resentment among others. The 
CSCM, while less visibly reliant on the support of one individual courant, 
reveals a marked ideological affinity with the Chevenement courant and like 
this tendency is made to feel marginalised from the rest of the party. Both the 
CSCM and CNESOM are further adversely affected in that the ideological 
battles between tendencies have taken precedence over other issues, and 
among the latter the plight of Maghrebians has been reduced to one of 
secondary importance. 
Thirdly, the lack of unity between the two organisations has sent out 
confusing signals to non-Maghrebians both within and outside the PS. The 
absence of a single, united agenda has meant that the views of Maghrebians 
from outside the two PS pressure groups have been sought by the media and 
other spokespersons, most notably Arezki Dahmani of France-Plus, have been 
consulted. Consequently this has distracted attention away from the demands 
put forward by the CSCM and CNESOM and instead has focused attention 
upon an organisation, France-Plus, which is criticised by not only the two 
pressure group leaders, but also by the majority of municipal councillors in 
our sample, as being unrepresentative of Maghrebians in France. Meb Toul 
believes that internal divisions between Maghrebians within the PS profit 
external organisations claiming to represent Maghrebians. 
It is clear, then, that if Maghrebians within the PS hope to become a force to 
be reckoned with and to operate with the same weight that other so-called 
lobbies do, personality and even ideological differences will have to he 
relegated to a rank of lesser importance. Some semblance of unity is all the 
more important given that on the governing bodies which deal with ethnic 
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minorities, of which Maghrebians constitute the largest percentage, such as 
the Haut Conseil ä l'Intdgration, the Office des Migrations Internationales 
(OMI), Fonds d'Action Sociale (FAS), the Direction de la Population et des 
Migrations (DPM), or SONACOTRA, no Maghrehians hold positions of 
responsibility. 
It is equally clear, however, that as long as the PS is perceived, whether 
correctly or incorrectly, to be side-stepping and/or neglecting major issues that 
concern Maghrebians in France, the two pressure groups, particularly the 
Cercle, will strive to continue. The political contradiction in which the 
existence of both is rooted is not lost upon the president of the Cercle, Sultana 
Cheurfa. Mohamed Meb Toul explains a conversation that he had with her on 
the subject: 
La contradiction du Cercle, Sultana d'ailleurs la reconnait. Elle m'a dit: 
"Moi, j'ai appele ca Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane. LA 
je ne suis pas plus musulmane que tu es catholique dans le sens oü mes 
parents dtaient d'origine maghrt bine, on est travers6s culturellement 
par l'Islam" [... ] Done cette appellation musulmane, eile 1'a fait un peu 
pour provoquer. C'est de la provocation, mais consciente. Parce qu'A 
partir du moment oü ils [les Maghrebins de France] sont exclus, ils 
provoquent. 
(Meb Toul, Paris) 
The CSCM, despite seeming on the surface to be organised on religious 
grounds (some do in fact participate in the organisation's activities), is rather a 
medium which enables its members to voice their opinions on what is 
perceived to be the exclusion of Maghrehians from mainstream French 
society. The religious factor is more a means of mobilising support than a 
deeply-held conviction among members. This seems to be implied by the 
following comments contained within an official CSCM document: 
Notre objectif nest pas religieux. Chacun d'entre nous reste maitre dc 
ses choix. Mais nous croyons ä la necessitt de notre expression 
commune. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1991 a) 
The lesson for the PS and indeed other political parties is self-evident; failure 
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to recognise and acknowledge the specific needs of Maghrehians in French 
society will inevitably lead to conflictual relations between, on the one hand, 
the political formations in question and, on the other, those of Maghrebian 
origin who operate within these parties and endeavour to change the status 
quo. Meb Toul concludes with the following analysis: 
Le Parti socialiste, comme tous les autres partis d'ailleurs, a inttret a ne 
pas exclure. Parce que si tu exclus, ca crde apres des mouvements de 
revendication negatifs et conflictuels. 
(Meb Toul, Paris) 
The repercussions of a refusal to take on board such political considerations 
could be dramatic for the future development of political participation and 
inter-ethnic relations in France with particular reference to Maghrebians. The 
CSCM has already hinted at how French citizens of Maghrebian origin might 
react if they perceive their specific concerns to be ignored: 
De son cotd, la communaute musulmane, qui est aujourd'hui 
majoritairement acquise a la Gauche, peut s'en eloigner, en mesurant 
soudain combien eile en est incomprise. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990b,. 1) 
Can Maghrebian pressure groups hope to achieve greater success by breaking 
links with the PS? Is it detrimental to the overall prospects for the socio- 
economic advancement of Maghrebians to remain so heavily concentrated 
within one political party? At least three potential alternatives to the present 
situation may be envisaged. 
In the first instance a reformist trend within the PS, which might involve 
Maghrebians, may he able to push the conservative wing of the party into a 
centre-right alignment. Consequently the PS would become qualitatively a 
labour party. 
A second and perhaps more likely scenario is the emergence of a coherent 
bloc within the PS which at some future point will become organisationally 
capable of splitting from the Socialists. 
Another change in the status quo may take place if, as is now the case, the 
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traditional Right is returned to power. Maghrebians may feel that their 
interests are better served in other parties. The attempt by several Maghrebian 
candidates at regional level to be elected on the lists of the two main ecology 
parties, G6neration Ecologie and Les Verts, should be seen within this 
context. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE STUDIES 
7.1 Introduction 
The late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed an unprecedented number of events in 
French society and on the world stage where the interests of Muslims were 
partly or primarily at issue. By far the two most notable of these for French 
Muslims were the 'headscarf' ffair in 1989 and the Gulf War in 1991. In the 
former the very status of Muslims in French society was being called into 
question. The latter debate focused on potentially divided loyalties between, on 
the one hand the nation in which they live and one of the Allied partners, France, 
and on the other hand an Arab state, Iraq, with which Maghrebians share the 
same faith and similar origins. In this chapter we shall examine these two events 
from the viewpoint of Maghrebian councillors in my sample, and discover what 
this might tell us about the perception that white French society has of 
Maghrebians residing in France. Given the importance of both events, they will 
be analysed separately. The Gulf War will be examined first, with a variety of 
viewpoints being highlighted: Maghrebian pressure groups inside and outside 
the PS; Maghrebian councillors' reactions to the manner in which events 
unfolded. With respect to the 'headscarf' ffair, analysis will he made at two 
levels: the underlying issues at stake in the affair and reaction to them from 
Maghrebian pressure groups in the PS of which councillors in my sample are 
members; evaluation at a more general level of the place of Islam in French 
society. While the Gulf War and the 'headscarf affair are sufficiently complex 
in nature to merit separate analysis, common features nonetheless exist between 
the two and these will be studied in the final section. Given that a number of 
councillors in my sample belong to the above pressure groups, there will 
obviously be some degree of overlap in sections. This is particularly the case for 
the CNESOM delegation's trip to the Maghreb. 
7.2 The Gulf War 
7.2.1 Maghrebian pressure groups 
Among political elites within the Maghrebian population, three main groups may 
be distinguished: national organisations claiming to represent the interests of 
Maghrebians in France across the political spectrum; national pressure groups 
operating within mainstream parties, principally the PS; and locally elected 
representatives. We shall begin by considering the first two types. The most 
important national organisation of Maghrebians without any specific party 
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affiliation is France-Plus. It gave whole-hearted support to the policy of the 
French government during the war. France Plus's president, Arezki Dahmani, 
was quick to defend the record of present and past French citizens of 
Maghrebian origin from charges of actual or potential disloyalty towards the 
French state: 
... 
Je ne vois pas pourquoi on nous renverrait nos origines ä la figure 
chaque fois qu'il ya une crise [... ] De la Premiere a la Seconde Guerre 
mondiale en passant par l'Indochine et 1'Algerie, nos parents et nos 
grands-parents ont suffisamment verse leur sang pour la France pour 
que, deux ou trois generations plus tard, on ne remette pas en cause notre 
patriotisme. 
(Le Quotidien de Paris 16 January 1991) 
According to Dahmani, who was given ample opportunity to express his views 
on television and radio, as well as the national press, French youths of 
Maghrebian origin in general supported the government line: 
Si je considere les sondages que nous avons pu faire ä Fintdrieur de 
notre association, la moitits des jeunes ne conteste pas en soi ]a logique 
de guerre. 
(Le Quotidien de Paris 16 January 1991) 
As Geisser (1991) has pointed out, it should not be assumed that the opinions of 
young Maghrebians as a whole are in line with those of France-Plus. While 
claiming to speak for the wider Maghrebian community, the leaders of France- 
Plus may in fact be quite remote from grass-roots opinion. 
Political activists of Maghrebian origin are concentrated in the PS more than in 
any other party, and within its ranks one finds the best organised ethnic pressure 
groups of a party nature. The two most important of these are the CSCM and 
the CNESOM (see chapter 6 for details on their organisational structure and 
ideologies). While the former concerns only Muslim members of the PS, the 
latter embraces a wider range of French citizens linked to the Maghreb. 
Differences between the CSCM and the CNESOM were visible both during and 
directly after the Gulf War. Views were at variance even before French forces 
became involved and these divergences reflected the fundamental ideological 
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differences referred to in chapter 6. The CSCM from the very outset of the 
conflict drew a connection between events in Kuwait and the Palestinian issue. 
In its second newsletter, the CSCM gave its undivided support to the Palestinian 
struggle and in particular to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO): 
Le CSCM affirme sa solidaritt sans faille avec l'Intifada, avec ceux qui 
luttent pour la reconnaissance d'un dtat independant, et avec kur 
representant legitime: 1'OLP. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990b, 13) 
Indeed representatives of the PLO were invited to a debate on the Gulf War 
organised by the CSCM in the aftermath of hostilities at its Assemblee Generale 
on 14 June 1991. The CSCM's position was reaffirmed and clarified further in 
the circular of the CSCM distributed at its committee meeting on 15 June 1991: 
La question palestinienne est le centre, ä la fois symbolique et reel, des 
crises qui traversent le Proche-Orient. Le Cercle a adoptd, de`s Forigine, le 
principe d'une solidarite complete avec le peuple palestinien, et de soutien 
aux decisions de ses representants, 1'OLP. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1991i, 4) 
The CNESOM, on the other hand, was far more nuanced in any support of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). While it is certainly true that 
individual councillors within the CNESOM expressed their solidarity and 
identified their own plight with that of Palestinians in general, Morin, when 
interviewed, appeared to distance himself from the PLO. When asked why 
Maghrebians in France were depicted in such a negative manner by the media 
and public, among his explanations was the following comment: 
11 ya des phdnomenes dttestables que sont 1'Imam Khomeni, Kaddaf i ou 
ce qu'a dte le terrorisme palestinien. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Clearly these were not the comments of a man who gave his unconditional 
support to the PLO. Indeed they take on added significance with the comments 
of Pierre Mauroy (instrumental in the setting up of the CNESOM), who called 
into question the legitimacy of Yasser Arafat as leader of the Palestinians on a 
television programme while visiting Israel during the war. The CSCM reacted 
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sharply to Mauroy's comments by issuing a statement which was published by 
several newspapers in South East France and which protested against the 
declarations of the party leader: 
C'etait [la remise en question de la legitimite d'Arafat par Mauroy] pas 
grave uniquement vis-ä-vis des Maghr- bins de France. C'dtait grave 
meme vis-ä-vis de la socidte francaise [... ]. Il [Mauroy] aurait pu le dire 
en France. Mais c'est vrai que nous avons pris acte. Nous avons sorti un 
communiqu6 de presse. 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
Initially the CSCM was supportive of the stance adopted by Francois 
Mitterrand, congratulating him after one speech when he made it clear that 
France was not engaged in a war with Islam: 
La mise-au-point est heureuse car nous relevons avec inquietude les 
discours, commentaires ou analyses qui amalgament sans vergogne la 
Guerre du Golfe, les risques de terrorisme en Occident et les sentiments 
reels ou supposes des musulmans en France 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 25 January 1991) 
However, the CSCM subsequently adopted a far more critical tone than the 
CNESOM with respect to the French government position. On 7 November 
1990 the Cercle organised its first conference on the Gulf crisis and what the 
implications would be for the PS. Six days later on 13 November it issued its 
first press release entitled, "Que la crise du Golfe ne devienne pas la guerre du 
petrole", arguing against French involvement in military intervention (Cercle Iles 
Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990g). 
Another communique, dated 6 December 1990, and entitled "Que les houches 
s'ouvrent", expressed its support for former Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson 
and Max Gallo, a PS depute, who criticised the change in French government 
policy from advocating an embargo to calling for an ultimatum. The CSCM 
became increasingly dissatisfied at the distinct absence of Muslim viewpoints 
being aired by the French media: 
En effet, la plupart des musulmans de France ont l'impression que lour 
expression politique n'etait pas tenue pour legitime, que lours droits de 
173 
citoyens n'6taient pas enders. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990h) 
Moreover the CSCM argued that sections of the press were calling into question 
the loyalty of French Muslims: 
Il faut, immediatement et sans reserves, prouver son allCgeance ä la 
communaute nationale. Certains mCdias ont public des papiers qui 
declinaient 1'idCe que les musulmans de France dtaient la "cinquic me 
colonne de Saddam Hussein". 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1991 g, 4) 
At the same time, the CSCM denied that there was strong support for Saddam 
Hussein among Maghrebians in France: 
Dans leur grande masse, les musulmans francais n'ýprouvaient pourtant 
pas de sympathie particuliere pour le regime irakien, ddja coupable 
leurs yeux de cette premiere guerre, stupide et terrible, qu'il a mend huit 
ans durant contre Uran. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1991g, 4) 
The CSCM expressed its anger and frustration outside the confines of the party 
apparatus as well. On 12 January it joined an anti-war demonstration in Paris 
and signed the Forum pour une Paix Juste et Globale au Proche-Orient peace 
petition. On 26 January it participated in the 'Forum' demonstration and on 1 
and 3 February 1991 put forward its ideas on the Maghrehian FM radio stations 
Radio Beur and Radio Soleil in Paris. 
On 25 January a new press release entitled, "Pourquoi faire passer les 
musulmans de France pour la 5e colonne de Saddam Hussein? " was issued and 
there was criticism of party leaders who feared conflict within France between 
minorities from the Muslim and Jewish denominations. The following 
comments were made: 
Plusieurs instances associatives ou politiques se mobilisent pour le 
'dialogue Beurs/Feujs'. Le Cercle ne croit pas aux risques de 'guerre des 
communautds'. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1991 b) 
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A further press release, dated 31 January 1991, protested against the comments 
of Pierre Mauroy in Israel when questioning the representativeness of the PLO. 
On 21 February the CSCM distributed a petition among PS members to voice 
disapproval of the party leadership's position and asked people to sign the 
petition in order that a debate be held on the matter. The petition objected 
strongly to the French government's pursuance of the war, believing that it would 
create deep divisions within the party. Moreover it was explicitly stated that 
decisions made by the party leadership were not in tune with party activists at 
grass roms level: 
Le quasi-unaninisme des ddcisions de sommet ne s'appuie pas sur une 
conviction comparable dans la base du parti. 
(Cercle (les Socialistes de Culture Musulnulne 1991e, 4) 
To issue a statement of this nature was as far as the CSCM could reasonably 
expect to go without incurring the wrath of party leaders. It is in this context that 
one should view the toned-down criticisms of French government policy. 
Contrary to the CNESOM, which was willing to acquiesce in French 
involvement, albeit with certain conditions attached, the CSCM could not bring 
itself to support French military involvement: 
Nous ne pennons pas que la seule voie de reponse ä l'annexion du 
Koweit par Saddam Hussein soil 1'entrde en guerre de la France sous 
commandement amdricain [... ] Nous ne croyons pas ä la lil ration d'un 
pays ou d'un peuple quand ils sont pris en otages et rcduits ä un tas de 
cendres [... ] Nous ne percevons aucune perspective en dehors de la 
recherche d'un Ccssez-le-feu [... ] Nous voyons 1A le message qui devrait 
ctre celui du Parti, nous voyons lä la politique qui devrait eire celle de la 
France. 
(Cercle Iles Socialistes de Culture Mustilnuine 199le, 2) 
The CSC, NI organised a debate on the Gulf War in the National Assembly 
building on 16 April. The PS leadership, conspicuous by its absence, was 
represented by two deputes who were members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committcc. 
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Once hostilities had ended in the Gulf, the Cercle, in a special newsletter printed 
on 9 March 1991, made a post-war analysis of events, and this included the 
manner in which the party had conducted itself. The Cercle indicated that it was 
not alone among the PS faithful in opposing the leadership policy before and 
during the war. Furthermore it argued that with the conflict ending, others, 
hitherto unable to express their opinions publicly, would also begin to criticise 
the behaviour of the party. This, the CSCM'S newsletter continued, would 
inevitably lead to divisions within party ranks: 
La guerre- a ouvert des failles plus importantes qu'il n'y paralt. Les 
opinions que le Cercle veut defendre n'y sont pas isoldes, surtout, parce 
que le "tabou" qui pesait sur tout debat lie au Proche Orient est tomtit. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 199 1f, 6) 
Morin, in the CNESOM newsletter of 16 February 1991, indicated that the 
CNESOM on the whole supported the position of the French government with 
particular respect to the following actions: 
Approbation chaleureuse du discours prononce le 24 septembre A New 
York par le president de la Republique et qui devrait rester la charte de 
notre action [ ... 
] Ndcessitd d'imposer 1'evacuation du Koweit mais sans 
humilier pour autant le peuple irakien. 
(Conference Nationale des Elus Socialistes Originaires du Maghreb 
1991) 
However, he did acknowledge differences between members of the CNESOM 
over the effectiveness of the embargo, the need to go to war, the extent of the 
combat zone required for the liberation of Kuweit and the role that France would 
be able to play in the region in the post-war period. 
The CNESOM view, then, was a delicate balance between on the one hand 
support for the government position globally, and on the other hand sensitivity 
towards the feelings of Arab nations involved in the conflict. This therefore 
contrasted with the far less conciliatory tone adopted by the CSCM with respect 
to the French government position. 
7.2.2 Maghrebian Councillors 
Following the end of hostilities in the Gulf, interviews were held with a sub-set 
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of my sample of councillors. This group consisted of 13 PS councillors, nine of 
whom held seats in Seine-Saint-Denis; the four others were from provincial 
departements. None said they had given unconditional support to Saddam 
Hussein. The reaction of one councillor from a suburb of Grenoble expressed a 
widely held attitude towards the Iraqi leader: 
[Saddam Hussein nest] certainement pas un heros [... ] 11 n'est pas 
integre. Il prcche un etat laic pendant toute la guerre Iran-Irak et puffs 
juste avant le conflit il fait la priere devant toutes les tdldvisions du 
monde. 
(Chaib, Gieres) 
The interviews elicited little evidence in support of the idea that there was a pro- 
Saddam 'fifth column' in France. When asked how people within their locality 
had reacted to events in the Gulf, only two of the 13 interviewees in my sub- 
sample acknowledged that there had been disturbances within their municipality, 
and one of these, when pressed for additional information, asserted that the 
problem had been caused by a minority of white French youths who were 
supporters of the extreme Right and who had deliberately engaged in acts of 
provocation. In general the interviewees stressed the peaceful and law-abiding 
behaviour of individuals and emphasized that any divisions which may have 
existed between Maghrebians and other French citizens were rarely expressed 
publicly, but rather behind closed doors in the presence of family and friends. 
This was suggested by the following comments of one maire-adjoint who 
sought out the opinions of youths of Maghrebian origin in his municipality: 
Its [les jeunes] m'avaient dit: "Mais pour nous la position est claire. On a 
les meines sentiments, mais ils restent entre nous. On n'a pas ä parler A 
l'exterieur. " 
(Safi, St. Denis) 
Another councillor argued that it was in response to white French fears about the 
potential for inter-ethnic conflict and the possible consequences for French 
Muslims that the latter kept their opinions to themselves: 
II y avait un moment de panique. Ce sont des gens qui se sont regroupds 
sur eux-memes. Le silence. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
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Most of the councillors interviewed gave their unequivocal support to the policy 
adopted by Mitterrand. Others, such as a schoolteacher from Aubervilliers, 
expressed their support, but with nuances: 
Si vous voulez connaitre ma position personnelle, j'ttais sur la ligne du 
President de la Republique aver des nuances [... ] Sur la position que 
pouvait avoir un President de la Republique aver des Americains j'ai ete ä 
la fois Chevenementiste et Mitterrandiste. J'ai dte entre les deux et il y 
avait un 6quilibre ä trouver. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
Those who were opposed to French policy stressed the theme of France being 
too closely aligned with the United States: 
J'ai dit que je n'etais pas d'accord avec la politique de Mitterrand qui 
consiste a faire allegeance totale avec les Americains, aller suivre et aller 
faire une guerre contre un pays du tiers monde qui n'ttait pas si fort que 
l'on pretend. 
(Touabi, Aulnay-sous-Bois) 
Despite these criticisms and the threats to resign made by some councillors 
during the crisis, none in fact did resign; nor to my knowledge has any done so 
to date. This does not mean, however, that there were no reservations concerning 
the way in which the PS conducted itself. Many Maghrehian activists within the 
party felt frustrated and angry at the fact that they were not allowed to express 
themselves freely during the war. One councillor recalled what happened when, 
along with other colleagues in his local party section, he attempted to make a 
public announcement on events, criticising certain aspects of government policy: 
On a fait un texte. On a essay6 de faire des choses. mais manifestement 
tout est boucld. 11 y avait un plan vigipirate qui marchait A 1'int&rieur du 
PS, partout. Et puis on discutait avec nos voisins, mais pas d'opinions 
qui sortent dans la rue alors qu'il n'y avait aucun danger. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
Another councillor, a maire-adjoint, in Seine-Saint-Denis, who opposed French 
government policy, but did not want to speak out publicly, chose a more 
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symbolic avenue to express his disapproval: 
Dans la mairie communiste, il n'y avail pas de portrait du Prensident de la 
Republique et moi, je me suis dit qu'il doit y en avoir. Au debut je 1'avais 
mis comme un Mi. Mais je 1'ai enlevd parce que je considc re que dans 
cette affaire du Golfe, la France a pris une position avec laquelle je ne 
suis absolumment pas d'accord [... ] J'etais fou de rage, furieux. C'Ctait 
ties profonddment ressenti. 
(Safi, St. Denis) 
Several interviewees told me that they believed that a confidential directive had 
been sent out by the upper echelons of the PS national leadership instructing 
local party officials that discussion and in particular criticism of government 
policy on the Gulf should be confined within party structures, i. e. such 
criticisms should not be voiced publicly. Pressures of this kind appear to be 
reflected in the very limited extent to which interviewees in my sample had 
spoken publicly about the conflict in the Gulf. One even refused to speak about 
the matter during my interview. Among the others, six said they had not 
expressed their opinions in public at all. Of the six who had done so, three had 
voiced their opinions only after hostilities had ended; among the three others 
who had spoken out during the war, one of these did so in order to express 
unconditional support for the government. Thus only two interviewees were 
openly critical of the government position during the events in the Gulf and for 
one of these, a municipal councillor in the Lyons suburb of Vdnissieux, the 
result was a considerable strain in her relations with the local PS section: 
Tous les grouper se sont exprimds sur la guerre et moi, je me suis 
exprimee aussi. Moi, je ne me suis pas exprimce dans le sens du PS. Pas 
du tout. Je suis allee ä l'encontre. J'ai meme attaquC lc PrMident de la 
Republique [... ] et ca a ete tres mal pris. 
(Rahmouni, Venissieux) 
Rahmouni had shown her written intervention to the local party representatives 
prior to the Council session in which she proposed to deliver the speech and had 
been expressly told not to proceed with it. Instead, she was urged to condemn 
Saddam Hussein and to demand his withdrawl from Kuwait. When she refused 
to do this and read out her prepared remarks, party officials told her she would 
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be punished: 
On m'a dit qu'il ya une discipline de groupe "et tu ne Fas pas respectee. 
Tu seras sanctionnee". 
(Rahmouni, VWnissieux) 
Rahmouni was subsequently marginalised from the local party meetings (see 
section 5.4.5 for further details) and it is only recently that she has been re- 
integrated into the local party after the CSCM intervened on her behalf. 
The other councillor who openly spoke out against the PS line did so first of all 
within the confines of the local party section, before airing his dissatisfaction in 
public. He was under no illusions as to the possible repercussions: 
Au mois de mars je Fai fait publiquement au conseil municipal. Alors il y 
a eu des collegues qui ont dit qu'ils m'ont reprocht de l'avoir fait et puis 
qui voulaient meme m'exclure du PS. 
(Touabi, Aulnay-sous-Bois) 
Several interviewees expressed anger at the fact that within the PS their views 
were as far as possible suppressed and/or discounted. This was extremely 
frustrating in the eyes of those who saw a profound injustice in other, 
numerically smaller, minorities in France being consulted and having the 
freedom to express themselves in the media: 
C'est quand meme inadmissible dans une democratic quand il ya une 
minorite de 2 millions et demi de personnes et on n'en tient pas compte. 
On ne cherche meme pas ä savoir ce qu'ils pensent. 11 ya 150 000 
ArmCniens en France. Its constituent un veritable lobby [... ] On se fiche 
completement de ce qu'on pense. Et qa a etC vraiment un grand coup pour 
moi. J'aurai du mal ä pardonner qa au PS. 
(Touabi, Aulnay-sous-Bois) 
One of the most sensitive issues thrown up by the Gulf conflict concerned 
relations between citizens of the Jewish and Muslim faiths in France. The 
Palestinian issue, on which they are deeply divided, was repeatedly played upon 
by Saddam Hussein. To counter media speculation about possible inter- 
communal fighting, pressure group leaders such as France-Plus's Arezki 
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Dahmani met openly with the representatives of Jewish organisations and made 
joint appeals for calm. The CSCM was more guarded about 'fraternisation' of 
this kind: 
Nous n'avons surtout pas cru qu'il dtait juste de deplacer sur le terrain de 
Popposition entre les communautds juives et arabes le seul vrai probleme 
pose: la divergence reelle apparue entre la communautd nationale prise 
dans son ensemble, et les citoyens frangais d'origine arabe. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 25 January 1991) 
It is clear, however, that there were strong pressures from within the PS towards 
inter-communal co-operation. One interviewee, a maire-adjoint in the 
departement of Seine-Saint-Denis, which contains the largest concentration of 
people of Algerian origin in the Paris region, disclosed that behind closed doors 
meetings between representatives of the two religions did take place locally and 
that the discussions were based to a large extent upon preventing potential 
conflict from arising. Misgivings over meetings of this kind were voiced by one 
councillor in Hauts-de-Seine who, when asked who had invited him to one such 
meeting, replied: 
Le groupe socialiste chez nous pendant la reunion de section [... ] Aller 
rencontrer la communaute juive par example, ce prntexte qu'est le conflit 
au Koweit, et qu'il faut y aller voir cette communautd pour dire que nous 
nous aimons. Moi je vois pas l'intdret. Nous savons pertinement que 
nous ne nous haissons pas. Mais nous avons un litige en commun qui 
est le probleme palestinien. En tant que communautes vivant en France il 
n'y a aucun probleme. Ceci dit, on sait oü sont nos limites. Donc je vois 
pas pourquoi je devrais aller voir 1'autre pour 1'embrasser et lui dire 
"faisons la paix". [... ] C'est pour ca que j'ai refusd inttgralement de 
cautionner cette opdration qui me paraissait dCbile. 
(Bellouch, Gennevilliers) 
All my interviewees were incensed by the remarks of the PS General Secretary, 
Pierre Mauroy, when he visited Israel during the Gulf War. Mauroy argued 
during a television interview that Yasser Arafat could not be considered to be the 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. A typical reaction was the 
following: 
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Les paroles qu'ont prononcdes Mauroy en Israel sont totalement 
inadmissibles [... ) Et j'etais dans son courant, Mauroy-Jospin. Je ne le 
suis plus d'ailleurs. Je trouve inadmissible qu'un homme politique qui 
repr&ente un parti au pouvoir tient un langage comme ca. 
(Touabi, Aulnay-sous-Bois) 
Councillors of Maghrebian origin clearly identified their own plight with that of 
Palestinians on the West Bank. Although they recognised that Saddam Hussein 
was attempting to manipulate the Palestinian question in order to gain support 
for his position in Kuwait, this did not in any way dilute the strength of their 
commitment to the Palestinian cause: 
Oui, on peut faire le lien puisque Saddam Hussein s'en est bien servi. On 
dtait bien oblig6 d'en tenir compte [... ] Moi, je suis pour qu'il y ait un tat 
palestinien. C'est dvident. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
If condemnation of what were perceived as double standards on the part of the 
United Nations was widespread, it was equally unanimous concerning the 
manner in which the media covered events during the Gulf War and in particular 
the image that was portrayed of Maghrebians both inside and outside France. 
Most significantly there was considerable annoyance among councillors at not 
being able to express themselves freely in the French press. As one interviewee 
put it: 
Je ne me suis pas exprimd aussi parce que c'etait difficile de s'exprimer. 
Les mddias n'ont pas donnd la parole aux heurs. Les medias ont fait voir 
des trucs completement caricaturaux, des reactions hystCriques. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
However, opinions on another aspect of the war - the sending of a PS delegation 
to the Maghreb in the aftermath of hostilities - were divided and were the subject 
of heated debate among councillors. The delegation was organised by the 
CNESOM. Its 15 members were selected on a quota basis to represent the 
various groups of PS activists who have links with the Maghreb. The objectives 
of the mission were twofold: 
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i) To correct the erroneous image that North Africans and French citizens had of 
one another through media coverage of the war and reactions on either side of 
the Mediterranean. 
ii) To participate in what the delegates perceived to be a more global process of 
decreasing tension in order that the Palestinian problem be addressed. 
Morin, in a newsletter sent to councillors in the CNESOM dated 16 February 
1991, explained why he believed the trip to be necessary: 
Cette mission d'dlus socialistes originaires du Maghreb aupres de nos 
collegues dlus des partis democrates d'Outre-Mediterrande visera ä 
mieux nous informer mutuellement de nos analyses, ä maintenir le 
dialogue et ä studier ensemble la meilleure maniere, pour nos peuples 
respectifs, de surmonter 1'6preuve et de retrouver trZs vite les voles de 
l'amitid et de la cooperation. 
(Conference Nationale des Elus Socialistes Originaires du Maghreb 
1991) 
The CSCM, however, took a radically different view of the trip and severely 
criticised those who organised it and allowed it to go ahead. This was spelt out 
in part of a newsletter devoted to the consequences of the Gulf War for the PS 
in March 1991 : 
Il est scandaleux que les hommes politiques, peu soucieux de se 
confronter aux sentiments des peuples maghrebins, aient imagine 
d'envoyer des dlus "rapatriCs, juifs, beurs ou musulmans" leur expliquer 
I "injustice" de leurjugement. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 199 1f, 6) 
Cheurfa, when interviewed on the subject, qualified the trip as "une erreur 
monumentale... ". 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
Four of the councillors who made up the delegation were among my sample of 
interviewees. All of these believed there was a need to rectify the erroneous 
version of events in the Gulf as portrayed by the western media: 
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Moi, je pense qu'on leur a donnas une autre image. Les mddias ont causa 
enorm ment de d6gdts et donc il fallait regler ce probleme. 
(Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
They also feared that people in the Maghreb were receiving a misleading view of 
the French position: 
On s'est rendu compte qu'il y avait un derapage. Que les populations 
avaient pu avoir une image les unes des autres qui etait completement 
erronnee et pour le moins caricaturale. 
(Chaib, Gieres) 
The aim of the trip was, therefore, "d'aller voir si le dialogue 6tait encore 
possible". (Chaib, Gieres) 
A prime reason cited by at least two councillors for making the trip was to make 
their own personal contribution to resolving the Palestinian question: 
Moi, je pense qu'il ya quelque chose de fondamental qu'il faut vice regler 
et je m'en suis rendu campte ä Tissue du voyage. C'est qu'il faut, si la 
France veut avoir encore une image positive au Maghreb, qu'on propose 
quelque chose pour la question palestinienne. 
(Nadia Hammadi-Denis, Dijon) 
Another councillor, who was instrumental in organising the trip, went even 
further: 
II ne fallait pas rester sur le Maghreb. Il fallait aussi aller en Israel. 
Puisque le point central pour nous, c'est le probleme palestinien [... ] Et 
on s'est dit qu'il fallait absolument qu'on aille dans les territoires 
occupes. 
(Kedadouche, Aubervilliers) 
Councillors who made up the delegation acknowledged that there were indeed 
plans to visit Israel, but these were subsequently shelved. In addition, members 
of the delegation also felt that its composition was symbolic in that it showed 
how ethnic groups that were often at loggerheads could actually he united. 
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This apparent unity was, however, disputed by Maghrebian activists who did not 
participate in the trip. Some objected strongly to the very existence of a 
delegation on the grounds that it might be perceived by the authorities in the 
Maghreb as the legitimate representative of the French government. 
Commenting on this, one interviewee said: 
Ce n'ztait pas au Maghrtbins d'expliquer la politique fran4aise. C'dtait au 
gouvernement francais d'expliquer la politique francaise. 
(Bellouch, Gennevilliers) 
7.3 The 'headscarf affair and the place of Islam in French society 
Divisions within PS ranks were never more visible or pronounced than during 
the 'headscarf' ffair. At stake in the affair were two opposing conceptions of 
society. On the one hand, there were those within the PS who championed the 
Jacobinist notion of the one and indivisible Republic and the concept of 
secularity. The latter became part of the Left's tradition during the Third 
Republic when, by virtue of the laws of 1881 and 1882, national unity was 
cemented by a system of secular schools. The separation of 'church and state' 
was made into law in 1905. The partisans of this approach were opposed to the 
idea of Muslim girls wearing veils at school on the grounds that it (and by 
extension Islam) was a negation of Republican values. The defenders of this 
approach believed that at best Islam should be practised in private and that 
preferably Muslims should be persuaded to espouse secular values. On the 
other hand, there were those in the PS who were active in the associational 
network and in regular contact with ethnic groups. Among these were activists of 
the Muslim faith. The partisans of the latter approach argued that Islam was not 
incompatible with the rules, institutions and values of French society. 
For both the CSCM and the CNESOM, the affair revealed the stereotypical and 
often distorted manner in which Maghrebians are perceived within French 
society. It also raised more fundamental issues. These included the need to 
redefine former values and explain how Islam could be incorporated into a 
nation which was by tradition predominantly Catholic. The CSCM took issue 
with the lack of opportunity for ordinary Muslims to air their views on the 
subject in the media: 
Les premiers interesses - il ya4 millions de musulmans clans notre pays 
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- ont ete totalement exclus du ddbat. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 5) 
Instead others, who in the eyes of the CSCM gave a distorted and 
unrepresentative account of the issues, were allowed to express their opinions: 
Dis l'origine, la pol6mique a valoris6 considdrablement les groupes 
politiques islamistes. Les mddias leur ont ete ouverts ; ils ont pu, sans 
contestation, usurper la qualitd de defenseurs des musulmans de France. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 5) 
With the extremist opinions of Islamic fundamentalists being aired, 
consequently the views of Muslims as a whole were stifled according to the 
CSCM. 
The second major criticism made by the Cercle was the extent to which the 
debate on secularity intruded upon the question of the presence of ethnic groups 
in French society. The confusing of the two issues, in Cheurfa's opinion, sent 
out the following message to the French public: 
Musulmans - pas - Francais, 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 5) 
Cheurfa believed that the debate on the nationality of Maghrebians was sending 
out a misleading message since Muslims in France are, in their overwhelming 
majority, no longer migrants and have settled down in the country permanently. 
This leads her to the following conclusion concerning the'headscarf affair: 
La'question islamique' est desormais un proble'me franco-francais 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 5). 
Thirdly, the CSCM questions the views of those within the PS who argue that 
the values they stand for are diametrically opposed to those of persons adhering 
to the Islamic faith: 
Ce sont des valeurs de gauche qu'on a opposees au respect de la 
personnalite musulmane : laicize, feminisme, Republique. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 5) 
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In other words the political choices made by Muslims, who identified with or 
were members of the PS, were being called into question. Cheurfa, as a woman, 
wished to respond to the specific criticism that to adhere to Islam implicitly 
meant opposing greater freedom for women: 
Si le 'voile' est un symbole de l'alienation de la femme musulmane, les 
trois jeunes flues de Creil en ont fait un symbole, inverse, de assistance. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990a, 6) 
Fourthly Cheurfa argues that double standards are being employed when 
applying the principle of secularity in practice. She cites the example of French 
children of the Jewish faith who wear the kippa when at school without this 
being reported in the press or provoking calls for such pupils to be expelled. 
The CSCM argued that the basis upon which the notion of secularity was based, 
the separation of state and religion, was outdated. The reasoning for this was 
that: 
les concepts laics se sont Minis dans un contexte culturel impregne de 
culture catholique ; leur validite vis-ä-vis d'autres spheres culturelles n'a 
pas ete historiquement prouvde. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1991 i, 7) 
The Cercle thus advocates a redefinition of secularity which will take into 
account the status of men and women of Muslim origin and culture. It argues 
that the following matters will have to be re-examined: 
- les references et Ics connaissances enseignees (de's 1'ucole), 
- la vision du monde (teile que vdhiculte, par exemple, dans les mtdias), 
- des criteres qui d&finissent la ligitimite des expressions dans le ddbat 
politique. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1991 i, 9) 
At the heart of the matter, for the CSCM, is the pluralistic acceptance of a 
diversity of cultures within French society. The organisation believes the 
'headscarf affair demonstrated that French public opinion was not yet ready to 
accept the reality of a permanent Muslim presence: 
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L"'affaire du Voile" a montre que cette rt alitt n'est pas admise par la 
socidte francaise. Le pluralisme culturel est refuse par de largos secteurs 
de l'opinion. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990b, 1) 
Furthermore the CSCM recognises that there are deep divisions within PS ranks 
over the issue: 
Le respect de l'identite musulmane en France est d'autant plus necessaire 
que son refus a pu prendre pi-4-texte de certaines valeurs de Gauche. 
(La Lettre des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1990b, 1) 
The CSCM argues that the Left in France must come to terms with the 
contradictions in policy that it was unable to resolve during the colonial period. 
The organisation therefore poses the following question from which French 
society cannot escape and which will determine the future for Maghrebians and 
indeed Muslims in general in France: 
Confrontee ä l'apparition d'une forte minorite musulmane, la France doit 
se reddfinir [... ] L'enjeu de la periode actuelle est de savoir si 1'identitel 
francaise de demain se fera avec ou contre les musulmans; mais il est 
clair qu'elle ne pourra plus se faire sans eux. 
(Cercle des Socialistes de Culture Musulmane 1991h, 5) 
The CNESOM, on the issue of the 'headscarf affair, adopted a position which is 
not altogether dissimilar to that of the CSCM, although once one enters into the 
finer detail differences do nevertheless emerge. Morin, more than Cheurfa, 
affirms his personal adherence to secular values, which reflects in no small part 
his former occupation: 
Moi, je Buis instituteur d'origine. Je suis profond6ment lafque. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Given his support for secularity, his opposition to the creation of separate 
schools for children of different denominations is quite logical: 
Et la pire des choses pour mon pays serait que les gosses de France 
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frdquentent des ecoles confessionnelles. C'est la catastrophe. On va 
s'adonner au Liban. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Furthermore Morin believes that what he terms 'secular extremists', those who 
advocated separate schools for children whose parents did not adhere to secular 
values, were the best allies of religious extremists: 
Je dis qu'au moment de l'affaire du voile, les integristes laics etaient les 
meilleurs allies des integristes religieux. Parce que chacun d'entre eux 
poussait la creation des ecoles confessionnelles. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Like Cheurfa, Morin argues in favour of the same treatment for all 
denominations: 
Il ne fallait pas deux poids deux mesures. 
(Morin, Paris) 
Equally he believes that it does not serve the interests of Maghrehians or indeed 
French society in general to have internal (both within France and the PS) 
arguments of such passion since they tend to polarise debate. Morin likens the 
arguments that were fought out to almost war-like proportions: 
C'dtait fou de voir la societd francaise prete a une quasi-guerre civile 
pour six jeunes filles dans trois colleges de France. 
(Morin, Paris) 
This is a view echoed by the CSCM with respect to the PS: 
Il ya deux parties de la socidte francaise. On est dune France contre 
1'autre France. Un Parti socialiste meme contre un autre Parti socialiste, 
de droite a gauche. Donc on se dtfinit par des poles. 
(Cheurfa, Paris) 
In a brief statement published at the time of the preparatory meeting organised 
by the FNESR on 4 November 1989, providing the framework upon which the 
CNESOM could be created, it was explicitly stated that French society should 
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come to terms with the reality of Islam in its midst: 
La majorite de la population francaise, de tradition culturelle chr&tienne 
doit faire 1'effort, en s'appuyant sur les valeurs de tolerance et de 
dtmocratie qui sont fondatrices de la notion de laicitt, d'assumer le fait 
que l'Islam est la seconde religion de France et s'habituer ä un 
environment nouveau pour eux, en particulier les mosqudes. 
(Federation Nationale des Elus Socialistes et Republicains 1989) 
Nonetheless despite the above call, the position of the CNESOM is more 
nuanced and cautious than that of the CSCM. Whilst at the same time appearing 
to encourage French society to adapt to the presence of Islam, the CNESOM, 
suggests that Islam as practised by Muslims in France should also be adapted to 
the secular values of French society: 
Les musulmans d'autre part, doivent faire 1'effort de vivre leur religion 
autrement que dans leur pays d'origine [ou de ceux de leurs parents] en 
intdriorisant les valeurs de la laicite et en faisant leur la distinction entre 
la sphere publique et la sphere privee. 
(Conference Nationale des Elus Socialistes Originaires du Maghreb 
1989) 
In this respect not only does the CNESOM reaffirm its support for secular 
values as they stand; contrary to the CSCM, it also calls for an up-dated re- 
definition of Islam and warns Muslims about practising their religion in too 
visible a manner. These statements suggest the CNESOM adopted a more 
guarded position than the CSCM. 
7.4 Maghrebian councillors and general issues concerning the place of 
Islam in France 
The 'headscarf affair brought into the open a number of more general issues 
relating to the place of Islam in French society. Rather than attempting an 
exhaustive analysis of all areas, we shall instead focus on a more limited number 
of the most salient of these, seeking the views of councillors on specific topics. 
These include the following: finding a legitimate mouthpiece for Islam; reducing 
the influence of external forces on French Muslims; attempts to modernise the 
organisational framework of the faith in France; establishing the legitimacy of 
Islam in French society; examining claims of a potential Islamic backlash in 
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France. 
A major issue is which body should be considered as the legitimate voice of 
Muslims in France. Unlike the Christian faiths, Islam has no one leader as 
Khellil (1991,156) points out: 
Ce qui distingue 1'Islam moderd des autres religions monothdistes, c'cst 
l'absence de 1'Eglise precisdment, avec un clcrgd. 
Indeed even the manner in which Islam is practised differs from one country to 
another as Khellil (1991,153) again explains: 
Meme sur le plan religieux la division [interieur de I'Islam] se fait sentir 
ä plusieurs niveaux. Par exemple, les musulmans de France ne fetent pas 
la rupture du jeüne du Ramadan [une des Aid] en meme temps : la 
distinction entre les chiites et les sunnites [majoritaires] est trZs nette; 
mais surtout, chaque nationalitt fete 1'Aid en meme temps que son pays 
d'origine. 
One maire-adjoint in my sample describes the consequences of a vacuum in 
religious leadership: 
Il n'existe pas de consistoire musulman, contrairement aux autres 
religions monothdistes, et donc il ya un vide. Tout depend du hon 
vouloir de ministre de 1'Intdrieur qui est aussi le ministre des Cultes. A 
aucun moment 1'Islam n'a etC la "tasse de the" d'un quelconque ministre 
de 1'Interieur. L'absence d'une hierarchie dans 1'Islam arrange finalement 
tout le monde [la gauche comme la droite]. 
(Loudhini, Ile-St-Denis) 
Councillors were in general quick to agree that a vacuum does indeed exist, 
leaving the religion open to external influences, and this was a matter of some 
concern to them. The following views of one councillor were representative of 
the majority of councillors interviewed: 
Moi, ce qui m'inquic'te, c'est le contröle [... ] Je ne voudrais pas qu'on 
mette ä la tete quelqu'un qui ne soit pas francais, qui ne soit pas un 
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musulman francais. ca, j'en fais vraiment une question de principe. On 
ne peut pas mettre ä la tete des mosqudes des gens originaires'des pays 
musulmans. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
In this councillor's view it is criticial for the future of Maghrebians in France that 
a French Muslim should be chosen as the head of the Muslim community rather 
than non-French and/or extremist elements: 
Par exemple la mosqude de Paris est toujours confiee ä un Algerien. Je 
suis contre. Je crois que c'est important pour l'int6gration des 
musulmans en France que ce soit un Francais [ä la tote]. Sinon on peut 
aller a toutes les derives. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
For one councillor in the municipality of Evry, the financial participation of 
Muslim countries in the building of an Islamic cultural centre in his constituency 
led to conflict which, in the councillor's view, not only presented the wrong 
image for Islam, but ultimately resulted in the centre failing to open: 
11 ya eu un conflit interne, un conflit de gestion. A la limite ce West pas 
une bonne image pour ceux qui pretendent dcfendre I'Islam. I1 ya un 
conflit parce qu'il ya une mainmise des pays d'origine [le Maroc et 
1'Arabie Saoudite]. Les problemes de gestion se retournent contre eux 
parce que depuis un an ou deux, cela [le centre] reste ferme. 
(Tounsi, Evry) 
My sample of councillors includes three of the original four members of the 
CNESOM committee on Islam. An additional councillor among my interviewees 
has since become a member of the committee. The latter not only endorsed the 
above comments, but went on to explain that discussions between the CNESOM 
and the then Socialist government took place in the summer of 1991 to attempt 
to resolve the question of outside countries influencing Islam in France: 
Ce qu'on a constatd nous [les musulmans franrais], c'est qu'on n'a pas 
les moyens pour la construction de mosquees. Et on laisse 1'Arahie 
Saoudite, la Libye et le Maroc ä payer ces mosquees-lä. Comme on voit 
aujourd'hui la mosquee de Paris est sous le contröle de Testat alg&rien, il 
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nous a semble hon de proposer au ministre [de l'Interieur A 1'epoque, 
Philippe Marchand] comment trouver des solutions, comment ne pas 
laisser un pays tiers gerer 1'Islam de France. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
One possible solution would be to create an official institution with a recognised 
hierarchy which could then act on behalf of Muslims in France. Since no such 
structure presently exists, any project of this nature would entail modifying the 
way in which Islam is organised and this may divide opinion and encounter 
opposition as the following reflection suggests: 
Nombreux, en effet, sont ceux qui, parmi les musulmans, estiment que la 
crtation d'une Eglise musulmane serait contraire A la tradition islamique. 
(Khellil 1991,156) 
It is extremely difficult to quantify the degree of opposition that may, in practice, 
exist. It seems likely, however, that traditionalists among the Muslim population 
would oppose the above reforms. Nevertheless, among my sample of 
councillors, the majority reacted favourably to the up-dating of the organisation 
of Islam to more accurately reflect the reality of life in France. This is illustrated 
by the following comments of one councillor: 
Le probleme, c'est le retard de le religion musulmane qui n'a pas fait sa 
re forme [... ] Il faut que lcs gens democrates aident cette troisieme 
religion de France [quatrieme pour ce qui est de I'anciennetd si 1'on 
comprend le protestantisme] ä sen sortir et ä faire ses reformer [... ] 
L'histoire fait que cette religion s'est toujours adaptte. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
Among the suggestions made by the councillors on the CNESOM committee 
was that there should be a national campaign to open a debate on the issue. The 
CNESOM would contribute by publicising its own ideas on modernising Islam: 
Pour normaliser nos rapports avec 1'Islam, on [la CNESOM] a propose 
qu'on fasse de la publicite. Fabriquer une affiche pendant une semaine 
sur comment la France peut normaliser ses rapports aver I'Islam. Je parle 
de normalisation parce qu'actuellement ce n'est pas le cas. 
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(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
To my knowledge this proposal along with others put forward to the then Home 
Office Minister, Philippe Marchand, in June 1991 has yet to be put into practice. 
The councillor in question believed that while Marchand was disposed to resolve 
the major issues for discussion, the problem lay in the provisions of the French 
constitution, which make a clear distinction between the state and church: 
Lä oü il ya un probleme, je crois que c'est au niveau de la constitution. 
C'est ä dire l'Etat francais ne peut pas aider a la construction de 
mosquees pusqu'il ya la loi de 1905 qui dit qu'ils font de la separation. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
With the change in government in March 1993 it remains to he seen how the 
new administration will lend itself to the above ideas. The failure of French 
government to contribute in practical terms to the modernisation of the Islamic 
faith raises, perhaps, a more fundamental issue, that of the legitimacy of Islam in 
French society. 
The issue was raised by a number of councillors in their day-to-day dealings. 
One illustration of this was the question of the provision of a place of worship in 
the municipality of Evry (Essonne). The local Maghrehian population (in Evry), 
made up predominantly of Moroccans, demanded that there should he a building 
(in a similar style to that of a traditional mosque, if not enjoying the same status) 
in which they could pray and practice their faith. At the same time a cathedral for 
the Catholic population was being built. The French Ministry of Culture 
decided to contribute to the financing of the cathedral on the grounds that it 
constituted a work of art, but was unwilling to play any part in financing the 
Muslim centre of worship. Maghrebian councillors inside and outside the 
municipality took issue with what they perceived to he double standards in the 
treatment of the two religious bulidings, resulting in the marginalisation of Islam 
in French society: 
C'est le ministere de la culture qui a investi pour la catht drale. Et c'est 
1'Arabie Saoudite avec le Maroc qui a investi sur la mosqude. Et on 
trouve lä, il ya un probleme. Pourquoi le minister; de la culture aide une 
cathedrale a se monier. Bien sür c'est une oeuvre artistique etc, je 
comprends. Et ]a mosque eA cote on laisse l'Arabie Saoudite, des gens 
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qui ne sont pas democratiques du tout construire une mosquee a nous. 
Je trouve que cela cree une exclusion. 
(Hanana, Chilly-Mazarin) 
The councillor whose seat is in the municipality of Evry made the following 
comments: 
La construction dune cathedrale fait moins peur [que Celle d'un centre 
culturel pour l'Islam]. Que le ministere de la culture a participd au 
financement, je trouve cela un peu scandaleux. 
(Tounsi, Evry) 
When asked whether they would favour the building of a mosque in their 
municipality, councillors responded in the affirmative, but expressed reservations 
about any place of worship being too visible in case it might attract adverse 
reaction: 
Moi, je serais personnellement [en faveur de la construction d'une 
mosqude]. C'est tres ddlicat [... ] Moi, ce que je souhaitais, c'est que ce ne 
soit pas trop visible. C'est-ä-dire qu'on essaye quand meme d'etre discret 
et de permettre aux musulmans qui le souhaitent de prier collectivement. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
One maire-adjoint draws the following conclusion about the manner in which 
the provision of Islamic places of worship, and by extension Islam itself, are 
considered by French authorities: 
L'Islam est la deuxieme religion en France [en terme du nombre de 
pratiquants], mais sa reprdsentativitd est tr`es limitde par rapport a son 
poids reel dans la socidtd que ce soit au niveau du nombre de lieux de 
culte ou au niveau des mCdias. Un maire peut accepter ou refuser 
d'octroyer une Salle de priere pour les administrCs de confession 
musulmane. L'Islam en tant que religion est tolert , mais non admis. 
(Loudhini, Ile-St-Denis) 
Councillors object, then, to the inferior status assigned to Islam in French 
society which fails to take into account the sheer number of Muslims. This 
inferior status is exemplified in the councillors' opinion, by the degree of control 
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that authorities can exert over facilities for the faith. 
Among my sample, several councillors are wary about Islam having too large a 
profile in their municipality for fear of attracting adverse reaction. The majority 
of these have been members of the CNESOM, which, for reasons described 
earlier, has advocated a low profile for the religion. However, most councillors 
were agreed that provision should be made for a place of prayer. This was the 
case for one councillor who, while not claiming to be a practising Muslim, 
nonetheless refuted the idea of being the council spokesperson for Islam: 
Je m'intdresse sur le fait que c'est [le centre culturel] une construction sur 
la ville et que c'est une bonne idee. Un centre culturel peut en donner une 
autre image. Mais comme je ne suis pas du tout religieux et musulman, 
sur la dimension qu'on voudrait me donner dans l'affiliation par rapport 1 
mes origines ethniques, cela ne me concerne ahsolument pas. J'ai 
prdvenu le maire et ses adjoints que j'Ctais 1'61u de tous les citoyens de la 
municipalitC. Je ne suis pas 1'elu des MaghrCbins, des Musulmans 
charge de 1'Islam. 
(Tounsi, Evry) 
In the final part of this chapter we shall briefly discuss councillors' views of the 
fears that some sections of French society have about Islam. The councillors, 
when interviewed, were acutely aware of the negative image that Islam has in 
France (hence the desire to promote a more positive image by means of publicity 
campaigns for example) and of the calculation that Muslim equals 
fundamentalist. This was reflected in the comments of one moire-udjo nt:: 
L'islam en France b6neficie d'une image manich&nne dans l'opinion. 
- un arabe est egal ä un musulman, 
- un musulman est Cgal ä un intcgriste, 
- un integriste est egal ä un danger pour la sociCte. 
Malheureusement pour les musulmans, cette opinion largement vehiculee 
se trouve confortCe par ce qui s'est passe hier en Iran et aujourd'hui en 
Algdrie et en Egypte. 
(Loudhini, Ile-St-Denis) 
While it was not the expressed aim of my study to engage in a detailed survey of 
the beliefs of French Muslims, as part of the questionnaire which Maghrebian 
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councillors were asked to fill in there was a question asking how they would 
view the creation of an Islamic party. The overwhelming majority, 21 councillors, 
stated that they would certainly not want to belong to any such party. None of 
the councillors stated that they would definitely want to become members. Only 
2 councillors said they might join an Islamic party. 
It would, however, be incorrect to assume that opposition to Islamic 
fundamentalism is synonmous with a rejection of Islam per se. Virtually all the 
councillors in my sample consider themselves to be Muslims, although several 
stressed that they were not practicing Muslims. Neither the CSCM nor* the 
CNESOM have sought to actively increase the number of practising Muslims. 
Rather they have limited themselves to promoting a more positive image of the 
religion and this is a goal that councillors, both inside and outside these 
organisations, are agreed upon. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Two years have passed since the formal ending of hostilities in the Gulf, and it is 
over four years since the 'headscarf affair came to prominence. With hindsight 
what lessons can be learnt from the two events regarding the future prospects for 
Maghrebians in France? A number of points emerge. 
Perhaps the most significant among these is first of all that both events forced 
French Muslims to question their own place within French society as Geisser 
(1991,454) suggests with reference to the Gulf War: 
Situation paroxystique, la crise du Golfe a joud un role de rtvelateur, 
obligeant les acteurs [musulmans] ä s'interroger sur lour relation ä 1'Etat- 
nation. 
The fact that Maghrebians on the whole did not support the activities of Saddam 
during the Gulf War and did not engage, as some feared, in inter-ethnic conflict 
suggests, perhaps, that they acknowledge their permanent place within French 
society. What is at issue is rather the nature of their place within that society. 
In the case of the 'headscarf affair, perhaps the most fundamental question of all 
was being posed. Can one be both Muslim and French? Cesari (1991,126) 
argues that the fact that Muslims in France were publicly debating the issue was 
in itself a revealing factor in that it indicated a desire to be a permanent feature of 
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French society: 
C'est ainsi que la demande de l'Islam brise en quelque Sorte le repli 
traditionnel de ce groupe par rapport ä l'espace public francais. [... ] Tout 
se passe comme si la revendication de salles de pritres, de carrels 
musulmans [... ] dtaient les signes [... ] d'une reconnaissance implicite de 
l'installation definitive. 
What seems to have been at stake, then, in both events is a renegotiation of the 
place of Muslims in French society in a way that will he more acceptable to 
them. 
Secondly, the two events indicated the extent to which both governmental 
authorities and the media are able to influence discourse on ethnic groups. The 
problematic concept of distinct 'communities' was partially legitimised in official 
circles during the Gulf War by President Mitterrand himself, who, when 
speaking to the French nation on 3 March 1991, thanked French citizens of the 
Jewish and Muslim faiths for their restraint. The term 'community' was indeed 
repeatedly used by the media before, during and after hostilities. It was 
somewhat paradoxical that even some Maghrebian councillors, who emphasised 
their desire to serve all sections of their respective municipalities, irrespective of 
race, nationality, or religion, should interiorise the notion of 'community' when 
referring to the diverse populations residing in their place of office. The 
following comment by a maire-adjoint from Villeurbanne is illustrative of this: 
Deux communautes [juive et musulmane] dans notre cite comme dans 
d'autres villes ailleurs, ont jusqu'ä ce jour domint leur angoisse, leur peur 
et ont fait preuve de sang froid exemplaire, facilitant le travail du maire et 
les forces de s6curite. 
(Geisser 1991,460) 
The partial legitimisation of this concept in political circles during hostilities in 
the Gulf reveals a clear development from arguments put forward during the 
'headscarf' affair and leads on to a third factor which featured in the two events. 
There has, perhaps, been a redefinition during both events, but particularly 
during the Gulf War, of the Jacobin conception of the 'one and indivisible 
Republic' with the idea of a pluralistic French nation-state seemingly gaining 
favour. In this respect, rather than insisting upon the shared characteristics and 
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values of French citizens, as was the case during the 'headscarf' ffair, 
differences between the various constituent parts of French society are 
acknowledged, as Geisser (1991,454) has observed with reference to the 
aforementioned speech by Mitterrand: 
Derriere ces propos apparemment anodins, se trame, selon nous, une 
representation plus gdndrale, tendant ä imposer une vision de la rdalitd 
sociale en terme de coexistence entre communautes particuliC'res. 
However, as the Gulf War and the 'headscarf affair demonstrated, the Arab and 
Islamic world is still largely perceived in negative terms by western society, with 
Islam seen as backward and dangerous. Even when western authorities have 
acknowledged the existence of Muslims in western society, it has seemed to be a 
begrudging acceptance. What French Muslims want, however, is a more positive 
official recognition of their existence. 
Thirdly and with specific reference to the hostilities in the Gulf, the war 
highlighted the preoccupation of French Muslims with the Palestinian question. 
Indeed the former made a clear parallel between the war and the plight of 
Palestinians, which they supported. 
Finally, the Gulf War demonstrated the heterogeneous nature of the Maghrebian 
population in France. Feelings among the Maghrebians were clearly far more 
complex and diverse than the media generally suggested at the time. 
Some activists, such as Arezki Dahmani, believe that the restraint displayed by 
Maghrebians when their loyalty was called into question may prove to he a 
turning-point: 
Je dirais paradoxalement que cette situation du Golfe est salutaire (... ] 
J'ai 1'impression que nous sommes en train de viva: le dernier test. 
(France-Inter 5 February 1991) 
A minority of interviewees in my sample, invariably those who were also 
members of France-Plus, agreed with this analysis, according to which the Gulf 
War had served to demonstrate that young Maghrebians were now wholly 
committed to their future in France. One councillor expressed the following 
View: 
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Je crois que c'dtait important de dire qu'on est francais [... ] Je suis 
engagee. Je suis francaise. 
(Plantade, Epinay-sur-Seine) 
In contrast, some interviewees believed that Maghrebians had been betrayed by 
the PS, and that this augured badly for their future representation within the 
party. This view was aired by one councillor as follows: 
Je pense que 90% de ces jeunes Beurs, ces Franco -Maghrdbins [... ] 
vous diront la meme chose. Un ecoeurement total par rapport [au PSI. 
Cest pour ca que l'integration se fera desormais pas seulement aver le 
PS - ce sera avec d'autres partis aussi. 
(Touabi, Aulnay-sous-Bois) 
Describing his own position, the same councillor remarked: 
Moi-meme en particulier. Je suis pret a aller dans d'autres partis et je le 
ferai si d'ici un an ou deux le PS ne change pas, ne s'amcliore pas, ne fait 
pas son autocritique [... ] Je le quitterai et j'irai ailleurs. C'est sür et sans 
regrets. 
(Touabi, Aulnay-sous-Bois) 
Yet even comments of this kind fall well short of an outright break with France. 
While both the 'headscarf' affair and the Gulf War may have led some 
Maghrebians to re-examine the precise nature of their relationship with French 
society, few, if any, among them appear to have been forced into a situation of 
rupture or open revolt. This was, perhaps, best illustrated by the comments of the 
maire-adjoint in St. Denis who, while symbolically taking down a portrait of 
Francois Mitterrand in his town hall office to express his opposition to French 
government policy during hostilities in the Gulf, still pledged allegiance to the 
then party of government on whose list he was elected and of which he is an 
active member: 
Il faut mettre les chosen dans leurjuste place. A titre symbolique 
je ne supportais plus le portrait de Mitterrand. Mais j'aurais fait une 
campagne d'enfer pour lui. Ca, c'est rtvelateur. 
(Sali, St. Denis) 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
8.1 Principal issues considered 
Chapter one began by outlining the objectives and logic of my research. The 
limits of studies undertaken thus far on political participation in France were 
highlighted and the usefulness of considering models from other countries was 
stressed. 
Chapter two focused on factors faciltating political mobilisation prior to the 
March 1989 municipal elections. Prominent among these were the anti-racist 
marches of the mid-1980s. However, they also revealed the limits of such action 
and the need for mobilisation in the political arena. The coming to power of the 
Socialists in 1981 and the repealing of the law on foreign associations created 
the framework within which youths of Maghrebian origin gained associational 
experience. 
Chapter three highlighted the processes by which Maghrebians became 
candidates for electoral office. The PS actively sought to promote Maghrebian 
candidates for municipal office and recruited among either associational or party 
activists. The majority of candidates were invited by the local party section to 
seek office. The promotion of Maghrehians to positions of responsibility at 
local and national level has thus far proven problematic. Maghrebian councillors, 
while clearly constituting a socio-economic elite, do not actively participate in the 
decision-making process and as such cannot be considered as belonging to the 
upper stratum of political elites. 
Nationally-based organisations were examined in chapter four and their different 
objectives analysed. For France-Plus the political mobilisation of Maghrebians 
has been the primary aim. While its campaigns to increase electoral enrolment 
have met with some success, its claims to have sponsored candidates for 
municipal office have been exaggerated. SOS-Racisme has sought to combat 
racism, but has alienated itself from Maghrebian youths by viture of its links 
with Jewish organisations. Both organisations are inextricably linked to the PS 
despite their claims to be independent of particular parties. 
In chapter five we highlighted the councillors' period in office. The 
responsibilities that they have been entrusted with fall primarily in the urban and 
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social fields. Differences exist between men and women councillors concerning 
objectives, with the latter favouring more tangible aims. Most councillors have 
been hindered in their duties by a lack of political experience and/or 
administrative obstacles. In a minority of cases councillors have experienced 
discrimination within their own party. In Seine-Saint-Denis opposition from 
PC-controlled municipalities has presented a formidable obstacle to councillors 
elected on PS lists. Councillors claim to represent all citizens in their 
municipality but contact with them is limited. Nevertheless councillors act as 
intermediaries in relaying demands from the grass-roots level to the decision- 
makers. 
Maghrebian pressure groups operating within the PS were studied in chapter 
six. Their existence reflects the overwhelming concentration of Maghrebians 
within this party. Both the CSCM and the CNESOM claim to provide a forum 
in which the Maghrebian voice can be heard on the national political stage. 
Despite claims to be above internal party divisions, both organisations are 
closely linked to particular tendencies within the PS. 
Chapter seven considered two testing points of the ways in which Maghrebians 
are perceived in French society. Maghrebians councillors agreed that both the 
Gulf War and the'headscarf affair indicated they were generally perceived in a 
negative light. The two events served to question the place of Maghrebians in 
France. In the case of the Gulf War the concept of the French nation-state was 
questioned. For the 'headscarf affair, the legitimacy of Islam in a secular state 
was being raised. 
8.2 Main Findings 
The main points which emerge from my study are: 
i) At a local level municipal councillors of whatever origin have extremely limited 
powers at their disposal. The decision-making process at municipal level is such 
that only mayors and their adjoints have been able to exert any degree of 
influence over the local political agenda. None of the Maghrebian councillors in 
my sample, or indeed in France as a whole has yet risen to the position of mayor 
and only a minority presently occupy the post of adjoint. In the case of 
councillors in my sample, their relative lack of experience and years has 
compounded matters. Councillors have felt frustrated at the limits of their 
powers and the slowness of the administrative machinery. 
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ii) The PS has played a major role in the development of Maghrebian political 
activism at municipal level in at least two ways. Firstly, the party has facilitated 
the political and associational experience of French youths of Maghrebian origin 
via the 1981 law on foreign associational activity. Secondly, by means of a 
directive from the PS leadership, it has enabled over eighty French nationals of 
Maghrebian origin to become elected on muncipal lists. The party has therefore 
significantly influenced the mode and level of Maghrebian political participation 
in France and this is reflected in my own sample, where the majority of 
councillors were elected on PS or joint PC-PS lists. The election of Maghrebian 
councillors on non-PS lists may, in fact, have been largely a reaction to PS 
efforts. 
iii) The interest that the PS has taken in promoting Maghrebian political 
participation raised expectations among those elected to municipal office. 
However, these hopes have remained largely unfulfilled. Councillors of 
Maghrebian origin have had the illusion of entering into positions of 
responsibility, whereas these positions in fact have extremely limited powers. 
The PS leadership did not sufficiently think through the implications of 
promoting Maghrebian political activism and a major consequence of this has 
been the disappointment and frustration of Maghrebian elected officials. The PS 
has not officially promoted any French national of Maghrebian origin to a 
position of national prominence within its party structure as an elected 
representative. At best it has provided semi-official posts internal to the party 
structure. However, these have been created without any of. the powers of formal 
authority. Furthermore the party has failed to honour its pledge to grant the right 
to vote to immigrants resident in France. 
iv) At a national level, Maghrebian political mobilisation is restricted to pressure 
group activity since there are as yet no nationally elected representatives of 
Maghrebian origin, although two Maghrebians have been elected as Euro MPs. 
Maghrebian pressure groups, which operate inside and outside national political 
parties, have failed to produce a national political agenda for Maghrebians. This 
is attributable to the following factors, some of which are interrelated: 
a) The fragmentation of pressure group activity among a number of 
organisations has prevented a common approach from being adopted. 
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b) The close identification of pressure groups with certain political parties 
(notably CSCM and the CNESOM within the PS) has alienated some 
Maghrebian activists. Party divisions have been reproduced within pressure 
groups operating inside and, in the case of France-Plus and SOS-Racisme, 
outside political parties. In the case of the CNESOM, as a result of its links 
with party leaders, pressure group activity has been perceived to follow PS 
leadership policy rather than to set out its own agenda. In the case of the 
CSCM it has been identified with tendencies in the PS that are marginalised 
from the party leadership and many Maghrebian councillors have felt 
alienated from this pressure group. 
c) Personality and ideological differences between Maghrebian pressure 
group leaders have prevailed and this has meant there has been little attempt 
to seek common ground. 
d) There is little contact between pressure groups and Maghrebians at grass- 
roots level. In the case of France-Plus and SOS-Racisme there has been no 
popular mandate for the election of leaders. The former has been seen as 
removed from the realities of life for the majority of Maghrebians in France, 
while the latter's links with Jewish organisations have discouraged many 
youths of Maghrebian origin from becoming members. 
e) There is at present no charismatic leadership figure of Maghrehian origin 
capable of bringing together the diverse and often opposing groups that 
operate in the political arena. 
v) As a result of the above factors, Maghrehian political activism has been 
seriously weakened since there is no one voice able to claim that it is putting 
forward the views of Maghrebians as a whole. Rather a number of voices, 
claiming to act as the legitimate spokespersons for Maghrebian interests but 
without any popular base, have been allowed to express their opinions. No 
national political agenda for Maghrebians exists at present with respect to their 
advancement in the political arena, the economic betterment of Maghrebians, the 
economic development of Maghrebian enterprise, educational equity, social 
service and welfare provision. Debate has centred instead around the promotion 
of cultural pluralism in France. 
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8.3 Limitations of the Study 
The study of Maghrebian political participation is a relatively recent area of 
research within the social sciences in France and, in comparison with other 
countries such as Great Britain and the United States, is still very much in its 
infancy. Consequently any researcher new to the field is faced with the problem 
of having to select from a diverse number of categories, which inevitably results 
in certain areas being chosen at the expense of others. My own study was no 
exception. In selecting certain options, I was aware that this meant excluding 
others which might also merit examination. While a comprehensive coverage of 
councillors within given departements was sought, the relatively small number 
of candidates studied means that it cannot be considered as wholly representative 
of councillors throughout France. Previous studies have encountered similar 
difficulties and a national study, which would necessarily involve the work of 
several researchers, is urgently required. Analysis of attempts at political 
mobilisation at different levels to include regional and European dimensions 
should also be an integral part of any comprehensive national study. Equally, 
research on Maghrebian councillors nationally could examine in greater depth 
variables such as gender and socio-professional status. One area which my 
study touched upon, but was not able to examine in sufficient depth was that of 
differences between councillors according to their national origins. The 
treatment of Maghrebian elected officials in parties other than the PS is a 
neglected area which could also be profitably investigated. 
My decision to analyse both the period in office of councillors and Maghrebian 
national pressure group activity meant that other areas of political mobilisation 
were correspondingly examined in less detail than I would have hoped. One 
example of this is the shaping of the local political agenda. By this I refer to the 
range of questions which are defined as problems requiring attention in the 
municipality. A crucial factor here is the relationship between the Municipal 
Council and economic forces which may influence the agenda. The extent to 
which economic elites exert influence over the local political agenda has been a 
neglected area of research. This aspect has yet to he examined with respect to 
municipalities on which Maghrebian councillors sit and is an avenue which 
requires further exploration. The extent to which national and even international 
factors impinge upon the local dimension is also worthy of analysis. 
My study sought to examine the relationship between councillors and a variety 
of bodies. However, a more in-depth coverage of the councillors' dealings with 
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local associations and their constituents is needed. In particular the extent to 
which associations make demands upon councillors and the frequency and 
degree to which councillors mix with associations should be looked at. This is 
important in that by becoming involved in the social life of the locality, 
councillors will be better able to articulate the demands that the local population 
may have. A related area is the extent to which councillors' previous 
associational experience affects their relationship with associations. 
8.4 Future prospects for Maghrebian political participation 
If the enhancement of Maghrebian political representation is the primary aim, 
then coalitional politics is the most likely means of achieving this goal. There 
may, perhaps, be the need for a national caucus similar to that created by 
Hispanics and African-Americans in the United States and which cuts across 
party lines. There are already signs that this may be beginning to take shape in 
France with the attempt by France-Plus to set up what it terms the Mouvement 
National des Elus Locaux (MNEL). However, first indications suggest that its 
close identification with the RPR may severely hinder its chances, given that the 
majority of Maghrebian elected officials are in the PS and that France-Plus's 
exaggerated electoral claims may have discredited this association in the eyes of 
councillors. Nevertheless it is one small step in the direction of promoting a 
national political agenda. 
The future direction that Maghrebian political participation may take will depend 
also on the reconsideration of current political alliegances. It remains to he seen 
how Maghrebians will react to the new government of the Right. Will this act as 
an incentive, perhaps, to further mobilisation? Will the party alliegances of 
potential Maghrebian candidates shift? While the PS may have a more 
sympathetic rhetoric, has it in practical terms been as responsive as it could have 
been? Do other parties offer a more viable alternative? Is the overwhelming 
concentration of Maghrebian elected officials in one party detrimental to the 
overall prospects of the ethnic group? All these questions remain to be 
answered. 
Finally, it needs to be recognised that any efforts to attain political office will not 
by themselves address the multitudinous problems that currently face the 
Maghrebian population in France. Even if there was the possibility of creating a 
Maghrebian national political leadership, this would still have its limitations. In 
the long-term struggle for the advancement of Maghrebians in French society, 
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alongside political factors, the socio-economic dimension cannot be ignored and 
should be an integral feature of a multi-dimensional strategy. 
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APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
ENQUETE SUR LES ELUS MUNICIPAUX D'ORIGINE MAGHREBINE 
Merci de bien vouloir prendre le temps de remplir ce questionnaire. 
Ma recherche concerne la participation des Francais d'origine maghrebine au 
niveau municipal et j'aimerais recueillir votre opinion sur un certain nombre 
de points. 
SECTION A L'accession au pouvoir politique 
1) Vous avez rte dlu(e) conseiller(ere) municipal(e) en mars 1989 sur une liste 
de quelle(s) formation(s) politique(s)? 
PS+ PC PS PC RPR UDF CDS RPR+UDF LISTE AUTONOME 
AUTRE 
2) Comment en etes-vous venu(e) a figurer sur cette liste? 
a) Je me suis proposd(e) aux responsables de la liste. 
b) J'ai ete invit6(e) ä le faire par les responsables de la liste. 
c) Un interm6diaire a propose ma candidature. Lequel/laquelle? 
3) Aviez-vous envisage la responsabilitd de vous placer sur une autre liste aux 
elections de mars 1989? 
Oui 
Non 
Si oui, laquelle? 
4) Etes-vous membre d'un parti politique? 
Oui 
Non 
Si oui, lequel'? 
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5) Quand avez-vous adhere ä ce parti? 
a) Avant de poser ma candidature. 
b) Au moment de poser ma candidature. 
c) Apres avoir posd ma candidature. 
6) Comment vous situeriez-vous par rapport ä un parti islamique? 
a) J'y adhererais certainement. 
b) Je n'y adhererais certainement pas. 
c) J'y adhererais peut-titre. 
7) Adh6rez-vous ä 1'une ou 1'autre des organisations suivantes: 
FRANCE PLUS 
SOS RACISME 
REPERES 
8) Eprouvez-vous un prejugd favorable/ ddfavorable/ plutöt ddfavorable ou 
etes-vous indifferent(e) ä 1'egard des organisations susmentionnnes? (Utilise- 
1'echelle 1-4,1 = tres defavorable, 4= tres favorable) 
FRANCE PLUS 
SOS RACISME 
REPERES 
9) Les organisations suivantes ont-elles soutenu votre candidature? Oui Non 
FRANCE PLUS 
SOS RACISME 
REPERES 
10) Avez-vous &6 soutenu(e) par d'autres organisations? 
Si oui, laquelle/ lesquelles? 
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SECTION B Le bilan au pouvoir 
1) Au moment d'etre blu(e) conseiller(ere) municipal(e) en mars 1989 quelle 
importance attachiez-vous aux objectifs suivants: (Re pondez ä l'aide de 
Mchelle 1-4,1= aucune impotance, 4= extremement important) 
a) Obtenir des avantages tangibles pour les franco-maghrdbins au 
niveau municipal (ex: faire construire un local communautaire). 
b) Promouvoir 1'egalite des chances pour la communaut6 franco- 
maghrdbine au niveau local. 
c) Changer 1'attitude des Francais dits "de souche" dans leur perception 
des Francais d'origine maghrdbine. 
d) Servir les int&rets de la communaut6 quelle que soit la race, la 
religion ou la nationality de ses habitants. 
2) Une fois dlu(e) quelles täches vous ont et6 confides? 
a) Maire-adjoint 
b) President de commission 
c) Membre de commission 
d) Autre (ä preciser) 
3) Dans quelle mesure vos responsabilites concernent-elles principalement la 
communaute maghrebine/ immigrde? (1= pas du tout, 4= essentiellement) 
4) Dans quelle mesure vos responsabilites concernent-elles la population 
locale dans son ensemble? (1= pas du tout, 4= essentiellement) 
5) Dans quelle mesure estimez-vous avoir reussi ä realiser les objectifs 
suivants? (echelle 1-4 comme prdc6demment): 
a) Procurer des avantages tangibles ä la communaute franco- 
maghrebine au niveau local. 
b) Promouvoir 1'egalite des chances pour la communautd franco- 
maghrebine au niveau local. 
c)Faire dvoluer la mentalitc des Francais "de souche" dans leur 
perception des Francais d'origine maghrdbine. 
d)Servir les interets de la communaute locale dans son ensemble quelle 
que soil la race, la religion ou la nationalite. 
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6) Quels obstacles majeurs vous ont empechee de realiser ces objectifs? 
(echelle 1-4 comme precedemment): 
a) Vous avez fait 1'objet de discriminations au sein de votre parti. 
b) Manque d'expdrience politique antdrieure. 
c) Contraintes administratives. 
d) Financement insuffisant. 
e) Opposition de la part de la communaute franco-maghrdbine. 
f) Opposition de la part de la communaute non franco-maghrebine. 
7) Commentaire libre sur les principaux obstacles auxquels vous vous etes 
heurte(e). 
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RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS 
(FACULTATIF) 
Je vous saurais gre de preciser quelques details ä votre sujet qui me 
permettront d'avoir une documentation plus approfondie. Je Liens ä prCciser 
que ces details resteront strictement confidentiels. 
Nom 
Pr6'nom 
Sexe 
Date de Naissance 
Lieu de Naissance 
Ville oü vous rdsidez 
Profession 
Baccalaureat OUI NON 
Diplomes d'enseignement superieur 
Nationalitel 
Date d'obtention de la nationalitt francaise 
1 Je presume que vous etes de nationalite francaise, mail pour les besoins de ma recherche il 
serait interessant de savoir ä quelle date vous avez opte pour la nationalitt francaise. Ces 
renseignements, je le rappelle, sont strictement confidentiels. 
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